The argument this series makes, in 14 steps. It is the same spine every module is built on, and no module states more of it than its own share.
In October 2009 Greece's newly elected government revised its planned 2009 deficit from 3.7 to 12.5 per cent of GDP; Greece's borrowing costs rose, and by early 2010 it risked defaulting on its debt.
In May 2010 euro area governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to lend Greece 110 billion euros over three years, paid out only as Greece cut its budget deficit and reformed its economy.
In the same month EU governments agreed to create two temporary rescue funds, the EFSM and the EFSF, announced as able to lend up to 500 billion euros, because the euro area had no fund to lend from.
Ireland had guaranteed its banks' debts in 2008; the state then injected about 46 billion euros into the banks in 2009 and 2010, and in November 2010 Ireland agreed an 85 billion euro rescue programme.
In May 2011 Portugal became the third euro area country to take a rescue programme, of up to 78 billion euros.
From 2011 the crisis spread to Italy and Spain: their ten-year bond yields, as monthly averages, peaked at 7.06 per cent in Italy in November 2011 and 6.79 per cent in Spain in July 2012.
The European Central Bank (ECB), which had bought government bonds since May 2010, lent banks 489.2 billion euros for three years in December 2011 and a further 529.5 billion euros in February 2012.
In March and April 2012 private holders of Greek government bonds took a 53.5 per cent cut in face value on about 197 billion euros of bonds, alongside a second Greek programme adding 130 billion euros.
In July 2012 euro area finance ministers approved up to 100 billion euros to recapitalise Spain's banks, while Spanish government debt rose from 35.7 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 100 per cent in 2013.
On 26 July 2012 the ECB's president said it would do "whatever it takes to preserve the euro", and on 6 September the ECB offered to buy, with no limit set in advance, short-term bonds of countries in a rescue programme.
In 2013 Cyprus took rescue loans of up to 10 billion euros, but the separate capital needs of Cyprus Popular Bank and the Bank of Cyprus, about 10 billion euros, were met by uninsured depositors, shareholders and bondholders.
By 2013 Greek output was more than a quarter below its 2008 level, and unemployment had reached 27.8 per cent in Greece and 26.1 per cent in Spain.
In 2015 a new Greek government and its lenders reached stalemate: after a bank run Greece shut its banks and imposed capital controls in late June, voters rejected the lenders' terms, and euro area leaders agreed a third programme of up to 86 billion euros.
Explanations of the crisis still differ: some stress government borrowing in Greece, Portugal and Italy, some private debt built on cheap credit in Ireland, Spain and Cyprus, some a currency union without a shared budget, and some how the crisis was handled.