Before you start
What you'll be able to answer
- How did lenders' doubts spread to Portugal, Italy and Spain?
- How did banks and governments pull each other down, and what did euro area leaders do about it?
Where this sits
The Eurozone Crisis — 2009 to 2015 · this module is lit
- 21 Oct 2009Greece revises its 2009 deficit figure sharply upward
- May 2010Euro area governments and the IMF agree Greece's first rescue loan, EU governments agree to create rescue funds, and the ECB starts buying government bonds
- 28 Nov 2010Ireland agrees a rescue programme
- May 2011Portugal agrees a rescue programme
- Dec 2011 and Feb 2012The ECB makes two rounds of three-year loans to banks
- Mar to Apr 2012Private holders of Greek bonds take a cut of more than half in face value
- 20 Jul 2012Euro area ministers approve a loan to rebuild the capital of Spain's banks
- 26 Jul and 6 Sep 2012The ECB's president promises "whatever it takes"; the ECB announces a plan to buy struggling governments' bonds
- Mar to Apr 2013Cyprus takes rescue loans, while uninsured depositors, shareholders and bondholders meet the capital needs of Cyprus Popular Bank and the Bank of Cyprus
- Jun to Jul 2015Greece shuts its banks as savers rush to withdraw money, voters reject the lenders' terms, and euro area leaders agree to move towards a third programme
Lisbon, spring 2011
On 23 March 2011 Portugal's parliament voted down the government's plan to cut its deficit, the gap between spending and revenue, and the next day the prime minister, José Sócrates, and his government resigned. Governments borrow by selling bonds, promises to repay with interest, and on 6 April the rate on Portugal's two-year bonds passed 10 per cent. The next day Portugal, one of the euro area countries that share the euro, asked the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which lends to countries in trouble, for help.
Ireland's trouble came from its banks. What was the main cause of Portugal's trouble?
Years of slow growth and steady deficits. Portugal had no property boom and bust. Its banks did not hold the risky investments that had hurt banks in other countries.
Portugal's economy and its rescue programme
Portugal's economy had grown slowly for more than a decade before the crisis. GDP is the value of everything a country produces in a year. Since joining the euro, Portugal's government had almost always run a deficit above 3 per cent of GDP, the ceiling in EU rules. Portugal's banks depended on borrowing from abroad. Before the rescue request they were increasingly cut off from that money, so they borrowed from the euro area's central banks instead.
Portugal agreed a rescue programme in May 2011 for up to 78 billion euros. Three lenders each provided a third: the EU's rescue fund, the euro area's rescue fund and the IMF. The two funds had been set up in 2010 to lend to members that could not borrow. In return Portugal cut its deficit, helped its banks and made reforms to its economy.
From Portugal to Italy and Spain
Lenders did not stop at Portugal. They looked for the same weak points in other euro area governments: slow growth, high debt and weak banks. Italy's economy had hardly grown for most of the 2000s. Its banks were struggling, and its government debt had been larger than a year's output for years. Spain's banks had lent heavily during a housing boom, and the boom had turned to bust. So in August 2011 lenders lost trust in both governments. In October rating agencies, firms that grade how likely a borrower is to repay, downgraded both.
Italy and Spain, 2011
Italy and Spain were the third- and fourth-largest economies in the euro area. The chart shows Italy's ten-year borrowing cost: the yearly interest on its ten-year bonds. The rate stayed under 5 per cent through 2009 and 2010 and reached 7.06 per cent as a monthly average in November 2011, when Germany paid 1.87 per cent.
Doubtful lenders pay less for a government's bonds. The repayment stays the same. The gap between price and repayment is the lender's interest. So a lower price means a higher interest rate. A government repays old bonds by selling new ones. A higher rate makes each new bond cost more. Higher costs widen the deficit, which deepens lenders' doubts. By early 2013 Italy's debt was larger than the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain combined. Italy never took a rescue programme, but some feared the rescue funds were too small to rescue it.
Source: Eurostat, ten-year government bond yields (EMU convergence criterion series, irt_lt_mcby_m), Italy. CC BY 4.0.
Check yourself
Work from Portugal's programme above. Up to how many billion euros could the IMF lend?
26 billion euros
About 26 billion euros. The IMF lent a third of up to 78 billion euros, and 78 divided by 3 is 26.
Banks and governments in the crisis
In the euro area, banks and governments could pull each other down. Many banks held bonds of the governments under pressure. When lenders doubted a government, its bonds lost value, and the banks holding them lost money. If a government rescues its banks, it takes on their losses, so its debt rises. Higher debt deepens lenders' doubts, so the bonds lose more value and the banks lose money again.
The European Stability Mechanism, the euro area's permanent rescue fund, later called this the doom loop: "the cross-contamination between bank balance sheets and government finances". In other words, trouble in banks and governments spread to each other. In April 2012 the IMF's head, Christine Lagarde, warned of this vicious cycle. If a government could not fully repay its bonds, the banks holding them would lose money. Many analysts worried that banks lacked enough capital, the owners' money that absorbs such losses.
Check yourself
Italy's yearly deficit was relatively small before the crisis. Why could higher borrowing costs still strain its public finances?
Spain's government debt was 35.7 per cent of GDP in 2007. What was it by 2013?
About 100 per cent. The burst housing bubble, rising unemployment and the cost of the banks all added to the debt in those six years.
Spain before and after 2008
Spain's crisis grew out of a boom. In the 2000s its economy grew faster than its neighbours', and its government ran a budget surplus in many years. Banks lent easily, and house prices nearly tripled between 1997 and 2008. Prices that rise far above what homes are worth are called a bubble. In 2008 came the global credit crunch, when banks around the world suddenly cut their lending. Spanish house prices collapsed. Builders and property firms struggled to repay their loans, so the banks had huge losses. Bankia was formed in 2010 from seven struggling savings banks. Bankia became Spain's biggest property lender. In May 2012 it was partly nationalised, which means the state took part ownership of it.
The burst bubble and rising unemployment deepened the government's deficit. Spanish government debt rose from 35.7 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 100 per cent in 2013.
Check yourself
Spain's government ran a budget surplus in many years before 2008. Why did lenders doubt it anyway by 2012?
Spain's loan for its banks
By the spring of 2012 Spain was finding it hard to borrow. In July its ten-year borrowing cost reached 6.79 per cent as a monthly average, when Germany paid 1.24 per cent. On 25 June Spain asked for a loan for its banks only. On 20 July euro area finance ministers approved up to 100 billion euros. The money was lent to the government to recapitalise its banks, which means to give them fresh capital. The loan came from the euro area alone; the IMF advised but lent nothing. In return the weak banks were restructured, which means reorganised to make them sound. Their problem assets, such as loans unlikely to be repaid, were moved to a separate company. Spain used 41.3 billion euros of the loan and left the programme in December 2013.
When the euro was launched, who supervised the banks in the countries that used it?
Each country's own supervisor. A bank was watched at home, and a failing bank was usually left to its own government to rescue, even though the currency was shared.
Banking union, 2012
On 29 June 2012 euro area leaders agreed to build a banking union, a shared system for overseeing the euro area's banks. It was meant to break the loop between banks and governments. Its first part was common supervision. A single supervisor, housed at the European Central Bank (ECB), the central bank for the euro area, would watch the biggest banks instead of each country's own supervisor. Leaders also agreed that the euro area's permanent rescue fund should be able to put money into banks itself, instead of lending to their government.
The supervisor began work in November 2014. By 2019 it directly oversaw about 120 banks: the three largest in every member country, plus others that were very large or worked across borders.
Check yourself
Spain's banks needed fresh capital, and the euro area lent it to the government. What did that do to the government's debt?
Check yourself
The key questions
How did lenders' doubts spread to Portugal, Italy and Spain?
Lenders looked for the same weak points in each government: slow growth, high debt and weak banks. Portugal had a decade of slow growth and deficits. It could no longer borrow affordably, so it agreed a rescue programme in 2011. From August 2011 lenders lost trust in Italy, with its high debt, and Spain, with its banks' property losses. These were the third- and fourth-largest economies in the euro area.
How did banks and governments pull each other down, and what did euro area leaders do about it?
Banks held government bonds, and these lost value when lenders doubted the government. A government that rescued its banks took on their losses. In Spain a property bust left the banks with heavy losses. In 2012 the government borrowed from the euro area to repair them. Euro area leaders answered in 2012 by agreeing to build a banking union.
The numbers
Check yourself
From August 2011 lenders lost trust in Italy and Spain as well as Portugal. Why those two?
Check yourself
What did euro area leaders agree in June 2012 to stop banks and governments pulling each other down?