Where every figure came from
European Stability Mechanism, Safeguarding the euro in times of crisis: the inside story of the ESM (2019) (Spain's slump, its 2012 budget and its economy minister's view): https://www.esm.europa.eu/system/files/document/safeguarding-euro-times-crisis-inside-story-esm.pdf. Reproduction authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 2), each found by searching the PDF page text. Chapter 25, 'Spain's banks: the ESM's first programme'. p.214 (timeline): in 2008 the economy entered recession as a property and credit bubble that had lasted a decade burst, and unemployment and the budget deficit rose sharply; in April-May 2010 the government announced consolidation measures; on 30 March 2012 the government proposed a cut in budget spending of 16.9 per cent, or EUR 27 billion. p.215: Spain fell back into recession at the start of 2012. p.216: Luis de Guindos, economy minister from December 2011, quoted: 'Europe did not trust Spain after the deficit mushroomed, and wanted to tighten the screws on us to ensure that we reduced it at a faster pace than we could manage.' p.217: the budget law passed in March 2012 made cuts of EUR 27 billion. The page gives the 27 billion in the ESM's terms, as savings in the budget the ESM's history describes; no second source in the set splits it between spending and taxes. The book's own unemployment figures for Spain and Greece come from an earlier Eurostat vintage and are not used on this page. Retrieved 2 October 2026 (series cache dl/esm2019.pdf).
European Commission, The Financial Sector Adjustment Programme for Spain, Occasional Papers 118, October 2012 (Spain's deficit deadline and the measures of July 2012): https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp118_en.pdf. © European Union, 2012. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 2), found by searching the PDF page text. p.47: the further budget measures adopted in July 2012 include a rise in the standard rate of VAT and in one of the reduced rates. p.48 (section 7.4.9): the revised recommendation under the excessive deficit procedure, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 9 July 2012, gives Spain until 2014 to bring its deficit below the reference value of 3 per cent of GDP. Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m8/ocp118.pdf).
US Congressional Research Service, The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress, R42377 (update of 25 March 2013) (Programme conditions, the critics and the German view): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42377.html. Public domain (US government work), so quoted directly. 'Major Crisis Policy Responses': assistance from the European rescue facilities and the IMF is paid out in phases, 'only after the country reaches benchmarks on fiscal austerity and structural reforms'; the IMF with the European Commission and the ECB, 'the so-called "troika"', helps design and monitor the programmes; critics 'argue that the focus of the crisis response on austerity measures has come at the expense of growth'. 'Political Dynamics': the leaders of Spain and Italy, both of which 'have both enacted considerable austerity measures', have been joined by French President Hollande in calling for more concerted European action to spur growth; 'In the German view, economic growth and economic convergence will not come without significant fiscal consolidation and economic reform.' Retrieved 1 October 2026 (series cache dl/crs42377.html).
Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers, IMF Working Paper 13/1, January 2013 (What two IMF economists found about budget cuts and forecasts, and their caveats): https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1301.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased, no quotation. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 1). Abstract page: the paper gives the authors' views, not necessarily the IMF's. p.3: their box in the October 2012 World Economic Outlook found that growth disappointments were larger where bigger budget cuts had been planned. p.3: with interest rates at their lower bound, central banks could not cut rates to offset the cuts. p.4: with lower incomes and a poorly working financial system, spending may have depended more on current income; using forecasts made in 2010 for European economies, each percentage point of GDP of planned cuts for 2010-11 went with output about 1 per cent lower than forecast. p.5: forecasters also underestimated the rise in unemployment that went with the cuts. p.3: the October 2012 World Economic Outlook box was the authors' own work; p.4: it drew many comments and criticisms, which this paper answers. p.4 also: the forecasts' implied multipliers were too low by roughly 1 on average. p.19: in the authors' judgement, forecasters at the start of the crisis had assumed multipliers of roughly 0.5 on average; actual multipliers were well above 1 early in the crisis; the smaller later coefficients may reflect smaller multipliers or forecasters learning. p.20: there is no single multiplier for all times and countries; in some cases confidence effects may partly offset the direct effects; the results argue for no particular policy in any country and do not imply that cutting deficits is undesirable, since almost all advanced economies must reduce debt. imf.org refuses our machines: read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20131102101143/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1301.pdf (captured 2 November 2013, 10:11:43 UTC). Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m8/wp1301.pdf).
IMF Independent Evaluation Office, The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal (2016) (What the IMF's evaluators concluded about the programmes' forecasts and cuts): https://ieo.imf.org/en/-/media/ieo/files/evaluations/completed/07-28-2016-the-imf-and-the-crises-in-greece-ireland-and-portugal/eac-full-report.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased except one short quotation. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 10), found by searching the PDF page text. Chapter 4. p.13 (chapter 2, para 27): Spain steadied its position through its own action and European financial help; the IMF gave Spain technical assistance. p.24, para 64: in Portugal as in Greece, when GDP shrank more than expected, the deficit ceiling was routinely tightened to meet the original targets. p.24, footnote 50: in the evaluators' view this tightening in effect stopped the automatic stabilisers from operating, made fiscal policy more pro-cyclical and deepened the contraction, while Ireland's programme built in flexibility from the start and let the stabilisers work. p.25, para 65: growth forecasts proved too optimistic in Greece and Portugal, though not in Ireland. p.25, para 66: the 0.5 multiplier IMF staff used proved too small in Greece and Portugal and was unsuited to euro area programmes, since those countries could not ease monetary policy, let alone devalue; IMF staff, in the October 2012 World Economic Outlook, concluded that "actual fiscal multipliers were larger than forecasters assumed". ieo.imf.org refuses our machines: read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20251206050247/https://ieo.imf.org/en/-/media/ieo/files/evaluations/completed/07-28-2016-the-imf-and-the-crises-in-greece-ireland-and-portugal/eac-full-report.pdf (captured 6 December 2025, 05:02:47 UTC). Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m8/ieo.pdf).
European Central Bank, Introductory statement with Q&A, Jean-Claude Trichet, Lisbon, 6 May 2010 (The ECB's case for quick budget cuts): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2010/html/is100506.en.html. Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. Introductory statement (the Governing Council's view): the longer the correction of budgets is put off, the greater the adjustment needed and the higher the risk of losses of reputation and confidence; quick, frontloaded consolidation plans focused on spending and combined with structural reforms will strengthen confidence in governments' ability to make public finances sustainable, reduce risk premia in interest rates and so support sustainable growth over the medium term. Q&A, Trichet: households' confidence for spending and investment, and firms' confidence in a stable budget outlook, are essential for recovery and growth. Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m8/ecb_is100506.html).
US Congressional Research Service, Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications, R41167 (Why Greece's government had to cut, and the conditions on its loans): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R41167.html. Public domain (US government work). All passages used concern Greece. 'The Triggers: Global Financial Crisis and Revelations of Mis-Reported Data': if investors lost confidence in the government's ability or willingness to repay, 'they would stop lending to the government or charge interest rates that were higher than what the Greek government could afford'; without new funds to roll over its debt, 'the government would have to implement austerity measures quickly or risk defaulting on its debt.' 'Financial Assistance from Eurozone and IMF': 'Disbursement of funds was made conditional on implementation of economic reforms'; 'Fiscal Consolidation and Economic Reforms in Greece' and note 15: the May 2010 plan agreed by the Greek government and the EU and IMF set annual deficit-reduction targets for 2010 to 2013, to bring the deficit below 3 per cent of GDP by 2014. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (series cache dl/crs41167.txt).
US Congressional Research Service, The Greek Debt Crisis: Overview and Implications for the United States, R44155 (updated 24 April 2017) (The Greek election of January 2015): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44155.html. Public domain (US government work), so quoted directly. 'Buildup and Outbreak of the Crisis': 'Elections in January 2015 of a new, far-left, anti-austerity Greek government heightened tensions considerably.' Retrieved 2 October 2026 (series copy in m6/r44155.html).
Eurostat, unemployment rates by sex, age and citizenship, annual (lfsa_urgan), Spain (The chart): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsa_urgan/default/table. Eurostat, CC BY 4.0, credit Eurostat. Unemployment rate, per cent of the labour force, ages 15 to 74, all citizenships, Spain, 2007 to 2016. Dataset updated 10 September 2026; retrieved 3 October 2026 through the Eurostat API. 2007 8.2, 2008 11.3, 2009 17.9, 2010 19.9, 2011 21.4, 2012 24.8, 2013 26.1, 2014 24.5, 2015 22.1, 2016 19.6. For 2009 to 2016 these equal une_rt_a for Spain in the same vintage (une_rt_a starts in 2009).
Eurostat: unemployment rate (une_rt_a), GDP in chain-linked volumes (nama_10_gdp), government deficit (gov_10dd_edpt1) (Unemployment, output and the deficit): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/une_rt_a/default/table. Eurostat, CC BY 4.0, credit Eurostat. Retrieved 3 October 2026 through the Eurostat API. une_rt_a (updated 10 September 2026), per cent of the labour force: ages 15 to 74, 2013: Spain 26.1, Greece 27.8, Germany 4.9; Spain 2011 21.4 ('more than one in five'); ages 15 to 24, Spain 2013: 55.5. nama_10_gdp (updated 2 October 2026), chain-linked volumes, 2010 euros, million: Spain 1,118,270.0 (2008) and 1,024,749.9 (2013), about 8 per cent lower (this build's arithmetic, 8.4%); Greece 247,275.7 (2008) and 180,522.1 (2013), more than a quarter lower (this build's arithmetic, 27.0%). gov_10dd_edpt1 (updated 22 April 2026), general government balance, Spain 2009: -11.2 per cent of GDP. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nama_10_gdp/default/table; https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/gov_10dd_edpt1/default/table.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.