Where every figure came from
European Commission, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, Occasional Papers 149, May 2013 (The banks, the deal of 25 March, the bail-in and the programme's terms): https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp149_en.pdf. © European Union, 2013. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 2). p.7 (executive summary): Cyprus asked for help on 25 June 2012; the package is worth up to EUR 10 billion, EUR 1 billion of it from the IMF; the euro area member states agreed the programme on 24 April 2013; the banking sector was increasingly cut off from international market funding; a bank holiday of 10 days was imposed; the contribution of uninsured depositors to recapitalising the two largest banks was an important part of the March agreement. p.12 para 7: at the end of 2012 deposits from non-residents, in particular from outside the euro area, were about 30 per cent of all deposits. p.31 para 43: loan quality in Cyprus was deteriorating, and Cyprus Popular Bank needed large amounts of emergency liquidity assistance from the Central Bank of Cyprus. p.35 para 52: Cyprus has in effect been shut out of markets for long-term borrowing since mid-2011. p.39 (Box 5, timeline): 16 March 2013 political agreement including a one-off levy on resident and non-resident depositors, insured and uninsured, higher taxes on capital income and company profits, and a privatisation plan; the bank holiday followed the House of Representatives' decision not to adopt the levy; 25 March agreement on the key elements of a programme. p.40 para 59: the Commission expects uninsured depositors' losses in the bail-in to leave them poorer and so to cut spending and investment, and the restructuring of the banks to weigh on credit. p.42 para 63: about EUR 1.4 billion of subordinated debt was bailed in; Cyprus Popular Bank's insured deposits went to Bank of Cyprus and its uninsured deposits stayed in the legacy bank, to be wound up over time; 37.5 per cent of uninsured deposits at Bank of Cyprus were converted into shares and a further 22.5 per cent frozen; the capital needs of the two banks, together about EUR 10 billion (over 50% of Cypriot GDP), were covered "exclusively through the contributions of uninsured depositors", shareholders and bondholders also contributing in full. pp.43-44 paras 64-65: the banks reopened on Thursday 28 March under capital controls; cash withdrawals were limited to EUR 300 a day per account, and payments abroad were restricted. p.51 para 87 and p.80 (MoU 2.3): a privatisation plan, and a higher corporate income tax rate. p.80 (MoU 2.11): a sliding-scale cut in the pay of employees and pensioners of the public and wider public sector, from 0.8 per cent up to 2.0 per cent by income band. p.99 (Annex I.1): a further scaled reduction rising by income band, with a top rate well below half (rate not printed here). p.55 para 103: the ESM loan covers EUR 2.5 billion of financial sector needs (provided cash-less) and EUR 6.5 billion for the budget and for repaying maturing debt; the IMF provides its share as a loan under the Extended Fund Facility. p.55 para 103: the ESM provides EUR 9 billion and the IMF about EUR 1 billion. p.67 and p.119: parliament adopted a law on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions on 22 March 2013, with powers that include transferring a bank's business and bail-in. p.74 (MoU 1.23, 1.26-1.27): the valuation found the two largest banks insolvent; Bank of Cyprus took over Cyprus Popular Bank's Cypriot assets, insured deposits and emergency liquidity assistance; part of the remaining uninsured deposits at Bank of Cyprus stayed frozen until an independent valuation, after which more could be converted into shares if needed. Programme conditions (section 4 and MoU): downsize the banking sector, correct the excessive deficit, raise taxes, and privatise state assets. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (series cache dl/ocp149.pdf).
European Stability Mechanism, Safeguarding the euro in times of crisis: the inside story of the ESM (2019) (The road to the deal, the levy and the vote, and what the rescue changed): https://www.esm.europa.eu/system/files/document/safeguarding-euro-times-crisis-inside-story-esm.pdf. Reproduction authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 2), each found by searching the PDF page text. pp.19-20: in every case the euro area's assistance came as loans, not grants, with conditions. Chapter 31, 'Crisis in Cyprus': p.261: the 2012 writedown of privately held Greek debt cost Cypriot banks more than EUR 4 billion, over 22% of GDP; the banking sector was then roughly six and a half times as large as the economy. p.262 (timeline): Cyprus adopted the euro on 1 January 2008; on 30 June 2012 the government bought EUR 1.8 billion of Laiki Bank shares, for an 84% holding, after private investors did not. pp.263-264 (timeline): bank holiday from 18 March 2013; parliament rejects the agreement on 19 March; on 25 March the burden is shifted to deposits over EUR 100,000; capital controls from 28 March, lifted two years later; Cyprus exits on 31 March 2016. p.267: the institutions judged that about EUR 10 billion was needed for the banks and roughly EUR 7 billion for the government, together about the size of Cypriot GDP. p.268: the IMF warned that lending on that scale would make the debt unsustainable, and the Eurogroup settled on up to EUR 10 billion; the ECB was poised to cut off emergency liquidity assistance; Michael Sarris, the finance minister: 'We really had no negotiating power and no credibility'; the banks relied on deposits and sold relatively few bonds; deposits were insured up to EUR 100,000, under EU deposit insurance rules dating from 1994 and updated in 2009 and 2010 to prevent bank runs. p.269: agreement in the early hours of 16 March; European bank shares fell on the Monday on fears for savers elsewhere and that the tax would make deposit insurance promises moot; Cyprus was under 0.2% of euro area GDP; parliament voted the plan down with no member in favour; Sarris returned from Russia empty-handed; Russia had paid out EUR 2.5 billion to Cyprus in three instalments in 2011 and 2012. p.270: Russia later restructured its loans to Cyprus, with longer repayment and lower interest, once a euro area package was agreed; on 25 March euro area finance ministers endorsed the revised package, up to EUR 10 billion; the European share would be EUR 9 billion and the IMF's EUR 1 billion. pp.271-272: the book's view is that the Cyprus programme set a new precedent by relying less on rescues paid for by taxpayers; previously only junior creditors had been made to take losses in the EU; in Spain junior bondholders took losses but senior creditors were spared, while in Cyprus the banks had little junior debt, so senior creditors had to contribute; the EU's bank recovery and resolution rules were agreed in December 2013. Retrieved 2 October 2026 (series cache dl/esm2019.pdf).
US Congressional Research Service, The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress, R42377 (update of 25 March 2013) (The levy, its rejection and the deal of 25 March): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42377.html. Public domain (US government work), so quoted directly. 'A tentative assistance package that included taxing depositors was rejected by the Cypriot parliament.' Other euro area states insisted that Cyprus raise 'approximately €5.8 billion' on its own; some Europeans, especially in Germany, saw the assistance as benefitting wealthy Russians with deposits in Cypriot banks. 'The Cypriot government had supported the tax on small depositors to lessen the burden on large depositors, in order to ensure Cyprus's future as an off-shore banking center.' Under the new agreement, deposits under EUR 100,000 'will be fully protected'. Russia had lent Cyprus EUR 2.5 billion. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (series cache dl/crs42377.html).
European Central Bank, press release, 21 March 2013: Governing Council decision on Emergency Liquidity Assistance requested by the Central Bank of Cyprus (The ECB's deadline): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130321.en.html. Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. The Governing Council decided to keep emergency liquidity assistance at its current level until Monday 25 March 2013; after that it could be considered only with an EU/IMF programme in place that would ensure the solvency of the banks concerned. Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m7/pr130321.txt).
Eurostat, unemployment rate by sex and age, annual (une_rt_a), Cyprus (The chart): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/une_rt_a/default/table. Eurostat, CC BY 4.0, credit Eurostat. Unemployment rate, per cent of the labour force, ages 15 to 74, Cyprus, 2009 to 2018 (the series for Cyprus starts in 2009). Dataset updated 10 September 2026; retrieved 3 October 2026 through the Eurostat API. 2009 5.4, 2010 6.3, 2011 7.9, 2012 11.9, 2013 15.9, 2014 16.1, 2015 15.0, 2016 13.0, 2017 11.1, 2018 8.4.
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