Where every figure came from
European Stability Mechanism, Safeguarding the euro in times of crisis: the inside story of the ESM (2019) (The new government, the talks, the deposit flight, the summit of 12 July and the third programme): https://www.esm.europa.eu/system/files/document/safeguarding-euro-times-crisis-inside-story-esm.pdf. © European Stability Mechanism, 2019. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 2), read from each page's folio; pp.311 and 321 open chapters and carry no folio, so are numbered from their neighbours. Chapter 36, 'Moving towards Grexit: at the cliff's edge': p.311: Greek voters, angry at the wage and pension cuts the troika required, turned to Syriza, led by Alexis Tsipras, who became prime minister on 26 January 2015 with one month left in the second programme; Syriza's campaign rested on expelling the troika. p.312 (timeline): 4 February, the ECB suspends the rating waiver for Greek bonds used as collateral; 20 February, the Eurogroup agrees to extend the second programme; 27 June, the Eurogroup refuses to extend it; 29 June, bank holidays and capital controls; 30 June, the programme expires and Greece misses an IMF repayment; 5 July, voters reject the creditors' conditions; 6 July, Varoufakis resigns; 8 July, Greece applies to the ESM. p.313: Tsakalotos, one of Tsipras's negotiators and later finance minister, said the government believed it could not ignore a popular vote for a change of direction; Dijsselbloem, the Eurogroup president, said the Greek authorities decided to stop complying with their agreement with the institutions after the election; from 11 February Greek bonds could not be used as collateral for ECB loans, so banks without eligible collateral had to ask the Bank of Greece for emergency liquidity assistance. p.314: the book describes the bank-sovereign circle tightening around Greece again; at his first Eurogroup Varoufakis spoke against budget cuts, backed a higher minimum wage and was wary of privatisation; the Eurogroup granted a four-month extension. p.316: Fitch, then Standard & Poor's and Moody's cut Greece's rating from the end of March. p.317: in May Greece tapped its IMF holding account to make a EUR 750 million repayment to the IMF; on 4 June it told the IMF it would delay a EUR 300 million repayment. p.318: the second programme was to run out on 30 June; late on Friday 26 June the Greek negotiators walked out; early on 27 June Tsipras announced a referendum on the creditors' latest conditions; the finance ministers met that day, with four days left in the programme. p.319: on Sunday 28 June Greece announced capital controls and a bank holiday from Monday; chart note (ESM calculations from Bank of Greece data): talk that Greece would abandon the euro led investors and depositors to move money elsewhere. p.320: voters rejected the creditors by 61% to 39% on 5 July; Stournaras, governor of the Bank of Greece: about EUR 45 billion of deposits left during Varoufakis's six months; 8 July request for an ESM programme. Chapter 37, 'Turning the corner: Greece's third programme': p.321: on 10 July a proposal from Germany was circulating that Greece should leave the euro if it would not agree to tougher reforms. p.323: leaving the euro, at least temporarily, was on the table; leaders agreed after overnight talks to move towards a third programme on tough conditions (dated 12 July in the p.322 timeline). p.324: a bridge loan from the EFSM, the Commission's fund, run by the whole EU. p.326: the EU approved the EUR 7 billion bridge loan on 17 July, and Greece used it to pay the ECB on time and clear its arrears with the IMF. p.327: banks reopened on 20 July after a three-week shutdown, with capital controls kept; the programme was approved on 14 August 2015, up to EUR 86 billion including up to EUR 25 billion for the banks; the IMF declined to contribute, citing concerns about Greece's long-term debt (pp.327-328). p.331: the government loosened the capital controls gradually. p.332: Greece borrowed EUR 61.9 billion from the ESM, below the authorised EUR 86 billion; the programme ended on 20 August 2018. Retrieved 2 October 2026 (series cache dl/esm2019.pdf).
US Congressional Research Service, The Greek Debt Crisis: Overview and Implications for the United States, R44155 (updated 24 April 2017) (The election, the disagreements, the bank run, the referendum, the deal and the IMF): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44155.html. Public domain (US government work), so quoted directly. 'Buildup and Outbreak of the Crisis': the IMF and European creditors lent in 2010 and 2012, and European creditors again in 2015; the ECB cut interest rates to record lows and in March 2015 began a new round of quantitative easing. 'Key Developments in 2015: The Third Package': key disagreements included reforms 'particularly relating to taxes, pensions, and fiscal targets, and potential debt relief'. 'Elections in January 2015 of a new, far-left, anti-austerity Greek government heightened tensions considerably.' 'Concerns that Greece could leave the Eurozone accelerated a run on Greek banks, and on June 28, the government imposed capital controls, closed Greek banks, and limited ATM withdrawals.' On 30 June Greece did not make a EUR 1.5 billion payment to the IMF. 'On July 5, 2015, voters in the referendum rejected the creditors' proposal, with more than 60% of voters voting "no."' The options discussed in July included keeping Greece in the euro with a third package, or Greece exiting the euro; on 12 July euro area heads of government agreed to keep Greece in, with a third financial assistance package (up to EUR 86 billion), wide-ranging reforms and 'no concrete debt relief'. The July agreement paved the way for a EUR 7 billion bridge loan used to clear arrears with the IMF and pay the ECB. 'Recent Developments': the IMF declined to take part in the third package 'due to concerns about Greece's debt sustainability and reform commitments'. 'Political Dynamics': public opposition to spending cuts and reforms drove the January 2015 election of Tsipras and Syriza; Tsipras pledged to reverse austerity and seek debt relief while keeping Greece in the euro; he portrayed agreeing to the creditors' terms as choosing 'the lesser of two evils', the less desirable option being an exit from the euro; he won a snap election in September 2015. Footnote 30: a temporary 'Grexit' was publicly proposed by the German finance minister. Retrieved 2 October 2026 (copy in m6/r44155.txt).
European Central Bank, press release, 4 February 2015: Eligibility of Greek bonds used as collateral in Eurosystem monetary policy operations (The ECB's collateral decision): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150204.en.html. Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. The Governing Council lifted the waiver that had let Greek government bonds be used in its operations despite not meeting minimum credit rating requirements, because it was 'currently not possible to assume a successful conclusion of the programme review'; banks without enough other collateral could get emergency liquidity assistance from their national central bank; the bonds ceased to be eligible from 11 February 2015. Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m9/pr150204.txt).
European Central Bank, press release, 28 June 2015: ELA to Greek banks maintained at its current level (The cap on emergency loans): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150628.en.html. Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. Following the decision to hold a referendum and the non-prolongation of the programme, the Governing Council decided to keep the ceiling on emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks at the level decided on Friday 26 June 2015, and said it would work closely with the Bank of Greece to maintain financial stability. Retrieved 3 October 2026 (copy in m9/pr150628.txt).
Euro Summit statement, Brussels, 12 July 2015 (SN 4070/15) (The terms set on 12 July): https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20353/20150712-eurosummit-statement-greece.pdf. © European Union. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged (Council of the EU copyright notice, https://web.archive.org/web/20161216185724/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/about-site/copyright/, captured 16 December 2016). The consilium.europa.eu site refuses our machines, so read from the Internet Archive capture of the original PDF, https://web.archive.org/web/20171215134547/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20353/20150712-eurosummit-statement-greece.pdf, captured 15 December 2017, retrieved 3 October 2026 (m9/es150712.pdf); PDF page = printed page. p.1: leaders stress the need to rebuild trust as a prerequisite for a new ESM programme. p.2: laws by 15 July on VAT and a broader tax base, pensions and the legal independence of ELSTAT, the statistics office. p.4: a fund of valuable Greek assets with a targeted total of EUR 50bn. p.5: these are minimum requirements to start negotiations; possible financing needs of between EUR 82 and 86bn. p.6: a rapid decision on a new programme is a condition for the banks to reopen; nominal haircuts on the debt cannot be undertaken.
Eurogroup statement on the ESM programme for Greece, 14 August 2015 (The programme agreed on 14 August): https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/08/14/eurogroup-statement/. © European Union. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged (Council of the EU copyright notice, https://web.archive.org/web/20161216185724/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/about-site/copyright/, captured 16 December 2016). Read from the Internet Archive capture of the page at its 2015 address, https://web.archive.org/web/20150814230811/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/08/14-eurogroup-statement/, captured 14 August 2015, retrieved 3 October 2026 (m9/eg150814.txt). The ESM loan agreement covers up to EUR 86 billion, including a buffer of up to EUR 25 billion for the banking sector; Greece targets a primary surplus (the budget balance before interest payments) of 3.5% of GDP by 2018, reforms its pension system and strengthens tax collection; a privatisation fund; nominal haircuts on official debt cannot be undertaken.
Eurostat, EMU convergence criterion bond yields, Greece, monthly (irt_lt_mcby_m) (The chart): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/irt_lt_mcby_m/default/table. Eurostat, CC BY 4.0, credit Eurostat. Ten-year government bond yields, monthly averages, Greece, January 2014 to June 2015 (the series has no value for July 2015). Dataset updated 11 September 2026; retrieved 3 October 2026 through the Eurostat API. September 2014 5.89%, October 2014 7.26%, January 2015 9.48%, April 2015 12.00%, June 2015 11.43%.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.