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The 2008 Financial Crisis
How a bad loan became a safe bond
Eight steps, about twelve minutes, a question at each. You need no economics and no preparation, only a willingness to guess before you are told.
Step 1 of 8
American house prices had never fallen across the whole country at once. Then they did. By 2006, banks were lending a lot of new money to people who would have been refused a few years earlier.
The question
American home loans were gathered into pools, and each pool was sold to investors as a bond. Each pool was cut into slices, and the top slices were graded triple-A, the highest grade there is. Moody's, one of the firms paid to give these grades, gave triple-A to 30 mortgage-related securities every working day in 2006.
What you'll be able to answer
The 2008 Financial Crisis Β· this module is lit
The losses that followed came to trillions of dollars. They were measured in four different ways, at four different dates. The firms holding these securities had borrowed money to buy them. Two American official bodies measured how much those firms had borrowed, and their figures do not agree.
The eight steps take the story in order: how a pool became a bond, how slicing it made safe-looking securities, who graded it, what the losses came to, how the firms borrowed, the two leverage figures, how lenders demanded more collateral, and how ordinary people's cash was caught up in it.
Take a guess
The pool has been turned into a bond and sold. Who now loses money if the mortgages in it stop being paid?
A bank that lends someone the money for a house waits years to get it back. Selling the loan on meant it did not have to wait.
The bank sold its loans on. Many loans were gathered into one pool, and each pool was turned into a bond and sold to investors.
A bond is a promise to pay whoever holds it. Bonds built out of pools of mortgages are called mortgage securities, and whoever buys one is owed the payments the American households in that pool make.
The bank had its money back straight away once the loan was sold, and an American bank could lend it to somebody else.
Moody's is a . Between 2000 and 2007 it gave the top grade, triple-A, to nearly 45,000 of these mortgage securities.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States (BOGZ1FL673065105Q), via FRED
For scaleMoody's gave triple-A to nearly 45,000 mortgage securities. In early 2010, only six private-sector companies in the United States had a triple-A grade of their own.
A pile of loans that people might never pay back is a hard thing to sell. Cutting the pile into ranked slices is how it was sold.
Each pool of mortgages was cut into ranked slices. Most of what came out of a pool of risky American mortgages was sold as low-risk securities.
Every payment the pool collects goes to the top slice first, and only what is left goes down the ranking. Losses run the other way, from the bottom upwards: the lowest slice is wiped out before the next one loses anything. An investor buys one slice. A lower slice earns more, but it takes the first losses. A higher slice earns less, but it is paid first. The top slice gets its money as long as most households in the pool keep paying. Investors thought a pool of many loans made this safe, because few households would stop paying at the same time.
Put it another way. Think of it like a queue at a payout window: the people at the front are paid out of whatever comes in, and only the people at the back go home with nothing when the money runs short.
The slices are s, ranked against each other. The top slice is paid first out of whatever the pool collects, and the bottom slice takes the first losses.
The top slice of a pool of risky mortgages was routinely given triple-A, the highest grade a bond can be given.
What made the top slice of a pool of risky mortgages count as low risk?
For scaleThe bottom slice of a pool had to be wiped out completely before the slice above it lost anything.
Moody's put its triple-A grade on mortgage securities every working day through 2006.
Whoever was selling a security paid Moody's for its grade. Investors then used that grade to decide what to buy.
In 2006 Moody's gave that grade to 30 mortgage-related securities on an average working day.
No buyer could check thousands of separate American mortgages alone, so buyers relied on the grade. The firm that wanted the grade chose who would give it and paid for it.
Of the mortgage securities Moody's rated triple-A in 2006, how many out of every hundred later had that grade taken away?
For scaleTriple-A is the highest grade there is, and it is the grade Moody's was giving here.
The bonds had been graded safe. Then many of the households behind them stopped paying, and someone had to take the loss.
By October 2008 the fall in value of mortgage securities was being counted in trillions of dollars.
Each figure answers a different question. A mark-to-market loss is how much less a security would sell for today than before. A credit loss is what the loans behind it are expected to fail to pay in the end. A write-down is a loss a firm has already recorded in its accounts. When buyers cannot value something or sell it quickly, they want a large reward for holding it, so prices fall further than the expected credit loss. The same crisis therefore has several totals. Mark-to-market losses across three areas came to around US$2.8 trillion in October 2008. A separate April 2009 estimate put write-downs at nearly US$4.1 trillion, on some US$58 trillion of assets, with banks bearing about two-thirds.
A loss at market prices is how much less an American mortgage security would sell for that day. The amount the loans behind it will fail to pay in the end is a different figure.
American sub-prime mortgage securities are built out of loans to people the banks rated high risk. They lost around US$310 billion of market value. The loans behind them were expected to fail to pay around US$195 billion.
The October 2008 total uses the prices of that month. It adds together the United Kingdom, the United States and the euro area, which is the group of countries that use the euro.
Across the United Kingdom, the United States and the euro area, how much value had these securities lost by October 2008?
For scaleAbout US$500 billion of write-downs, which are losses a firm has already recorded, had accumulated around the world by the end of August 2008.
The American firms that held these mortgage securities had borrowed to buy them. Their loans had to be paid back the next morning.
They borrowed in the market, giving securities to the lender as . The five largest American investment banks borrowed this way. They took no deposits from the public, so their lenders had no , the government promise that pays back people who keep money in a bank.
At the end of 2007 Bear Stearns, one of those five, was renewing as much as $70 billion of borrowing every night.
Congress set up the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to examine the crisis. The commission describes the repo market as worth many trillions of dollars, but gives no exact size for it.
A firm that must borrow again every morning can stay open only while somebody is willing to lend to it. However much the firm owns, it closes the day the lenders stop.
The lenders had no government guarantee behind them. What made them willing to lend to these firms again every morning?
For scaleThe inquiry commission says lending outside the banks was as big as the ordinary banking system. It publishes no figure for it.
Every firm doing this was doing it with borrowed money, and very little of their own. The question in the room was whether that mattered.
In 2007 the five largest American investment banks were carrying as much as $40 of assets for every $1 of their owners' money.
A firm's was everything it held divided by its owners' money, the . At 40 to 1, the owners had put in only $1 for every $40 of assets. So a drop of less than 3% in what the assets were worth could wipe out a firm.
Goldman Sachs was one of those five. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission puts its leverage at 17 to 1 in 2000 and 32 to 1 by 2007.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission puts Goldman Sachs at 32 to 1 for 2007. It took the figure from a market database and public filings, and does not say how it was worked out. The Government Accountability Office puts Goldman at 26.2 to 1 at the end of its 2007 financial year. The office divides total assets by equity, using the firm's own annual report. That measure counts only the assets the firm reports, and treats them all as equally risky. Several investment banks sold assets just before their financial year ended and bought them back afterwards. That made leverage look lower on the reporting date. Neither body says whether this explains the gap between its figure and the other's.
Put it another way. Think of it like two people measuring the same room, one including the alcove and one not: both tapes are honest and the answers differ.
Three of the other firms were in a similar position. The Government Accountability Office audits federal spending for Congress. It puts Morgan Stanley at 33.4 to 1, Merrill Lynch at 31.9 and Lehman Brothers at 30.7 at the end of their 2007 financial years.
It is 2007 and you sit on the board of one of these five firms. For every $1 of your owners' money you are carrying as much as $40 of assets, a great deal of it bonds built out of American mortgages. What do you do?
They carried on. On the inquiry commission's figures, Goldman Sachs went from 17 to 1 in 2000 to 32 to 1 by 2007. At the end of their 2007 financial years, the accountability office puts Morgan Stanley at 33.4 to 1, Merrill Lynch at 31.9 to 1 and Lehman Brothers at 30.7 to 1.
What followedAt the highest ratio, 40 to 1, a fall of less than 3% in the value of what a firm held would take all of its owners' money. These firms held bonds built out of American mortgages, graded by an agency the seller paid.
The figures behind these ratios came from the firms' annual reports, public filings and a market database. Every firm carried on.
Take a guess
Between April 2007 and August 2008, what happened to the collateral lenders asked for against bonds built out of ordinary American mortgages?
In 2008 these firms faced a run, which is when lenders all try to get their money back at once. Their lenders demanded far more collateral for the same loan.
A is the gap between what the collateral is worth and what the lender will lend against it. A bigger haircut means the borrower has to find more of its own money to hold the same securities.
Prime brokers are the banks that lend to investment funds against the securities they hold. In April 2007 their haircut on bonds built out of ordinary, lower-risk American mortgages was 2% to 4%. By August 2008 it was 10% to 20%.
For scaleAfter the crisis began, haircuts charged by prime brokers at least doubled for every kind of bond. For bonds built out of loans, they rose at least five times over.
Ordinary people's cash was caught up in the run through American s. These funds lend companies' and households' money on for very short periods.
People use such a fund as a place to keep cash. They do not think of it as an investment. The fund lends that cash on, and a great deal of it went to banks outside the United States.
American money market funds had an estimated US$1 trillion placed with banks outside the United States by the middle of 2008.
Records for the fifteen largest of these funds show what portion of their money sat with banks outside the United States?
For scaleAbout 85% of the money these funds placed outside the United States went to European banks.
The 2008 Financial Crisis
Can you answer each one now? Tap to check.
How was a pool of risky mortgages turned into bonds counted as safe?
Who paid for the grades, and did the grades prove right?
Why did lenders' demands for more collateral become a run on the firms that held the bonds?
Can you remember each figure? Tap to check.
The pool, turned into a bond
The slicing
Moody's triple-A grades, 2006
Losses marked to market prices, October 2008
How the firms holding it were funded
Goldman Sachs , 2007
The , April 2007 to August 2008
American money market funds, mid-2008
You met nine terms in this module
, , , , , , , ,
Moody's was paid by the seller for each grade. The firms had to borrow again every morning, with the securities as collateral.
[1] The grades, and how little equity there was: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Official Government Edition, January 2011. The figures below were read off rendered images of the printed pages, because a text extraction of this file returns the prose with every numeral silently deleted. Page xxv: "In 2006 alone, Moody's put its triple-A stamp of approval on 30 mortgage-related securities every working day", and "83% of the mortgage securities rated triple-A that year ultimately were downgraded", and "From 2000 to 2007, Moody's rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities as triple-A. This compares with six private-sector companies in the United States that carried this coveted rating in early 2010." Page 211 states the daily figure a second time as "an average of more than 30 mortgage securities each and every working day". Page xix: as of 2007 the five major investment banks were operating with extraordinarily thin capital, "By one measure, their leverage ratios were as high as 40 to 1, meaning for every $40 in assets, there was only $1 in capital to cover losses. Less than a 3% drop in asset values could wipe out a firm." Pages xix to xx: "at the end of 2007, Bear Stearns had $11.8 billion in equity and $383.6 billion in liabilities and was borrowing as much as $70 billion in the overnight market." Page xx: the panel "permitted the growth of a shadow banking system-opaque and laden with short-term debt-that rivaled the size of the traditional banking system", including "the multitrillion-dollar repo lending market", and gives that market no size. Page 65: "At Goldman Sachs, leverage increased from 17:1 in 2000 to 32:1 in 2007. Morgan Stanley and Lehman increased about 67% and 22%, respectively, and both reached 40:1 by the end of 2007. Several investment banks artificially lowered leverage ratios by selling assets right before the reporting period and subsequently buying them back", and "From 2000 to 2007, large banks and thrifts generally had $16 to $22 in assets for each dollar of capital, for leverage ratios between 16:1 and 22:1." The notes to chapter 5 source the leverage figures to "SNL Financial Database and SEC public filings" and print no formula beside them.
[2] The same firms, measured a second way: United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-739, Financial Markets Regulation, 22 July 2009. The figures below were read at the office's own accessible full text, over four agreeing passes. Figure 6, "Ratio of Total Assets to Equity for Four Broker-Dealer Holding Companies, 1998 to 2007", from "GAO analysis of the firms' annual report data", gives for 2007: Goldman Sachs 26.2, Morgan Stanley 33.4, Lehman Brothers 30.7, Merrill Lynch 31.9. Bear Stearns is not in that table and the office publishes no assets-to-equity ratio for it at any date. Figure 4 is a separate exhibit and is the five firms IN AGGREGATE, including Bear Stearns: 22.5 in 2002 and 30.5 in 2007, which the text rounds to "from an average ratio of around 22 to 1 in 2002 to around 30 to 1 in 2007". The measure is "the ratio of total assets to equity on the balance sheet", and the office prints its own limitation: "Although commonly used as a leverage measure, the ratio of assets to equity captures only on-balance sheet assets and treats all assets as equally risky." The phrase "at fiscal year-end" is the office's own and attaches to the per-firm table.
[3] What the losses came to, and what lenders demanded: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 24, October 2008. The Bank puts these mark-to-market losses at around US$2.8 trillion across the euro area, the United States and the United Kingdom, and expects the final loss of economic value on the assets to be smaller. And: mark-to-market losses in the three currency areas have climbed to around US$2.8 trillion in total, roughly 85% of the US$3.4 trillion of Tier 1 capital that banks held worldwide before the crisis, although banks bear directly only part of these losses in market value. Box 1: credit losses projected for US sub-prime RMBS have grown to around US$195 billion, but they are still well below the estimated fall of around US$310 billion in market value, which fits with investors still requiring large premia for uncertainty and illiquidity. Table 5.B, "Typical haircuts applied by prime brokers", was read off a rendered image of the printed page. It sets April 2007 against August 2008: prime mortgage-backed securities 2-4 to 10-20, consumer asset-backed securities 3-5 to 50-60, and every ABS collateralised debt obligation row blank for August 2008. The text beside it: haircuts on every type of fixed-income security are at least twice what they were when the financial crisis began, and at least five times higher for asset-backed securities, while prime brokers typically do not lend against ABS CDOs at all.
[4] The write-downs still expected: International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey, Further Action Needed to Reinforce Signs of Market Recovery, 21 April 2009. Potential writedowns could approach $4.1 trillion on about $58 trillion of assets, of which about $1 trillion had already been taken, and "Banks will likely bear about two-thirds of the $4.1 trillion in writedowns". The same sentence goes on to give that two-thirds a dollar value, and that figure is a different quantity from the Bank of England's total above β a projection of write-downs at April 2009 rather than losses marked to market prices at October 2008 β so it is not printed anywhere in the steps above, and neither figure is used to support the other.
[5] Where ordinary cash met it: Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, chapter II, The global financial crisis, June 2009. Records for mid-2008 show that the 15 largest prime funds, which together held over 40% of all prime fund assets, had lent half of what they held to non-US banks, with European banks taking roughly 85% of that share. On that basis, US money market funds had an estimated $1 trillion placed with non-US banks in mid-2008, when their total assets exceeded $2 trillion; this was more than 15% of the estimated total US dollar liabilities of European banks to non-banks. The word estimated is the report's own: the figure is extrapolated from the fifteen largest funds and is not a census. The report also records that further losses were expected beyond the roughly $500 billion of global writedowns built up by end-August 2008, and its timeline entry for 19 September 2008 records the American guarantee of money market funds with no amount attached.
[6] What euro area banks absorbed: European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, June 2009. By end-May 2009, euro area LCBGs had absorbed portfolio losses of just over EUR100 billion in total since the turmoil began, and about EUR65 billion of that was reported in 2008. LCBGs are large and complex banking groups, not all euro area banks, and the preceding sentence defines the quantity as write-downs of the values of portfolios containing complex credit products as their market or economic values sank.
[7] Haircuts, surveyed independently: Committee on the Global Financial System, The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality, CGFS Papers No 36, Bank for International Settlements, March 2010. Table 1, "Typical haircut on term securities financing transactions", sits on printed page 2 and was read off a rendered image. Its source line is the study group's own survey rather than a dealer. Prime mortgage-backed securities rated AA- and A go from 8, 12 and 25 per cent in June 2007 to a full hundred per cent in June 2009, and triple-A structured products from 10, 15 and 20 per cent to the same full hundred, the three columns being prime, non-prime and unrated borrowers. The paper defines the term: when a repo lends less cash than the collateral is worth at market prices, market participants call that discount a haircut.
[8] The part of the market that held: Adrian, Begalle, Copeland and Martin, Repo and Securities Lending, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 529, December 2011, revised February 2013. In the bilateral market, stress showed up as a large and fast rise in haircuts, which amounted to a general run on the market. Haircuts in the tri-party repo market hardly changed, but some firms saw the financing they got there fall sharply. And: The evidence indicates that the tri-party repo market as a whole saw no general run, but Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers do appear to have faced runs, and the funding they lost in that market added to their difficulties. Tri-party repo is settled through a clearing bank and is not the same arrangement as a trade cleared through a central counterparty.
[9] Government bonds, and what did not change: Financial Stability Board, Securities Lending and Repos, Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues, 27 April 2012. In bilateral inter-dealer repo against G7 government bond collateral, haircuts are often not required by market practice, and CCPs there have also held haircuts steady. Haircuts on lower quality assets such as ABS, however, rose sharply in inter-dealer repo and in the financing of leveraged investment funds. The G7 qualification is carried here in full because the same paragraph records central counterparties raising haircuts significantly on repo of bonds issued by peripheral euro area governments, so the unqualified claim would be wrong.
[10] The episode chart: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Issuers of asset-backed securities; home mortgages; asset, level (BOGZ1FL673065105Q), retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Public domain, citation requested (FRED's marking for this Board of Governors series). Retrieved 30 September 2026. Quarterly, 1998 to 2013, converted from millions to billions of dollars. Private issuers only: pools run by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not in it.
Country data from the World Bank (CC BY 4.0) and the UNDP Human Development Report (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
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