Learn › Economic history › The 2008 Financial Crisis
The 2008 Financial Crisis
How the 2008 crisis began
Six steps, about nine minutes, with a question in each. It is written for readers new to economics. Some questions ask you to guess before you see the answer.
Step 1 of 6
The question
The 2008 financial crisis began in the American housing market. Lenders had assumed house prices would keep rising. When prices fell, many borrowers stopped repaying at around the same time.
What you'll be able to answer
The 2008 Financial Crisis · this module is lit
Take a guess
A lender has lent most of a house's price, and the borrower stops paying. When is the lender most likely to lose money?
House prices in America had not fallen across the whole country since the 1930s.
Lenders expected prices to keep rising, so each house should stay worth more than the loan on it. They paid more attention to the value of the house than to how much the borrower earned. If a borrower stopped making payments, the lender could take the house and sell it to get its money back.
If prices fell, the house might sell for less than the borrower still owed. Then the lender would lose money.
So in 2005, a home loan was only safe for the lender if house prices kept rising.
Take a guess
By what percentage did the index fall from its July 2006 peak to its February 2012 low?
The Case-Shiller index tracks the prices of American houses that sold more than once. It starts at 100 index points in January 2000. A reading of 150 index points would mean prices were 50 per cent higher than in January 2000. In July 2006 the index reached 184.6 index points.
Only houses that are sold have a price. The Case-Shiller index looks at houses that sold more than once, and compares what each one sold for each time. This shows how much the price of the same house changed. The index is set at 100 in a starting month. A reading of 184.6 means house prices were 84.6 per cent higher than in that starting month.
So between January 2000 and July 2006, the price of a typical American house rose by about 85 per cent. Many loans in those years were based on these higher prices.
After July 2006, prices began to fall. The index reached its lowest point in February 2012, at 134.0 index points.
For scaleThe FDIC found that in some parts of the country, house prices fell by more than 50 per cent.
Take a guess
Where did borrowers fall behind on their mortgages most often?
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was set up by the US Congress to investigate the causes of the crisis. It found that borrowers fell seriously behind on their mortgage payments most often in the areas that had seen the biggest housing booms.
People who bought at the height of a local boom paid the highest prices. When prices fell, they were the first to owe more on their loan than their house was worth. Selling the house would no longer raise enough to pay off the loan.
California, Arizona, Nevada and Florida were among the states with the biggest booms. Borrowers there fell seriously behind at twice the rate of the rest of the country.
The losses were concentrated where prices had risen fastest. Many borrowers in those places stopped repaying at the same time.
Many of the home loans made in these years were . A subprime mortgage is a loan to a borrower with a weaker record of repaying debts. The lender sees that borrower as more likely to fall behind on payments.
Lenders charge subprime borrowers a higher rate of interest, because they are more likely to fall behind. If the borrower keeps paying, the lender earns more.
On the FDIC's count, subprime loans were 20 per cent of all new American mortgages in 2006.
Subprime loans were 20 per cent of new American mortgages in 2006. Was the share higher or lower in 2007?
A tie counts as correct either way.
For scaleIn 2006, lenders made $600 billion of subprime loans. They sold most of these loans on to other investors, who then received the borrowers' payments.
According to the Federal Reserve, the US , many subprime borrowers counted on rising house prices to help them repay.
When these borrowers could not keep up their payments, they had two options. The first was to sell the house for more than they had paid, and use the money to pay off the loan.
The second was to take out a new, larger loan based on the house's higher value, and use it to pay off the old one (). A lender would agree to this because the house was now worth more.
Both options only worked while house prices were rising. Once prices peaked, selling or refinancing became much harder, and many borrowers could not repay.
When a subprime borrower could not keep up the payments, what did they usually do?
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, All Commercial Banks (DRSFRMACBS), via FRED
Between the end of 2003 and the end of 2007, the amount of American and similar investments grew by about $10 trillion. Investors from other countries bought about $4.5 trillion of that $10 trillion.
When many investors want to buy bonds, the borrowers who issue them can pay a lower rate of interest. So foreign buying helped keep long-term interest rates in America low, including the rates on mortgages. Lower mortgage rates meant smaller monthly payments, which helped push house prices up.
China mostly bought very safe American government debt. European investors bought large amounts of bonds backed by bundles of American mortgages. The money from those sales went back to lenders, who used it to make new home loans.
Where did much of the money flowing into American investments in these years come from?
The 2008 Financial Crisis
Can you answer each one now? Tap to check.
What did American lenders assume about house prices in the 2000s?
Why did so many borrowers stop repaying at the same time?
Where did much of the money for the lending come from?
Can you remember each figure? Tap to check.
What lenders assumed
The Case-Shiller index
The FDIC's figure for the fall
Where borrowers fell behind most
share of new mortgages
Where the money came from
You met four terms in this module
, , ,
Home loans were safe only while house prices kept rising. Prices began to fall in July 2006.
[1] The assumption the lending rested on, how far prices fell, and how much of the lending was subprime: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008-2013, chapter 1. Read twice, identical both times. "After all, the United States had not experienced large nationwide declines in house prices since the Great Depression." "house prices at the national level declined more than 30 percent from their peak" and "in some areas of the country, they fell more than 50 percent". "As subprime loan originations plummeted from 20 percent of total mortgage production in 2006 to 8 percent in 2007". THE CHAPTER NAMES NO STATES: it says only "concentrated in certain states" and "some areas of the country", which is why the sand states are cited to the Inquiry Commission instead.
[2] What American house prices actually did, month by month: S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, S&P Dow Jones Indices, served by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Read twice off the series data, identical both times. The index is set at 100 for January 2000, not seasonally adjusted. JULY 2006 = 184.607, the highest value of 2006. FEBRUARY 2012 = 133.987, the lowest value anywhere between 2007 and 2013. 27.4 PER CENT IS DERIVED AND NOT QUOTED: 1 - 133.987/184.607 = 0.2742, and the division is the build's own. The two index values are what the source publishes and both print, so a reader can check the arithmetic. The FDIC puts the same fall at more than 30 per cent; see fdic1. Neither is corrected here.
[3] Where people fell behind first: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, chapter 11. Read twice, identical both times: "Serious delinquency was highest in areas of the country that had experienced the biggest housing booms", and in the "sand states" - California, Arizona, Nevada and Florida - serious delinquency ran at "double the rate in other areas". THE PERCENTAGES IN THIS CHAPTER DO NOT RENDER and came back as placeholders on both reads, which is the FCIC PDF glyph fault recorded earlier in the 2008 build. No figure from this chapter prints. HOLE 7: no institution publishes a measure of the concentration itself, and the step does not invent one.
[4] The other count of how much of the lending was subprime: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, chapter 5, Subprime Lending. Read twice, identical both times, and the numerals were checked explicitly on the second read because other FCIC PDFs return digits as unreadable glyphs. Both legible here: "In 2006, $600 billion of subprime loans were originated, most of which were securitized. That year, subprime lending accounted for 23.5% of all mortgage originations." The FDIC counts the same year at 20 per cent. Both draw on Inside Mortgage Finance and neither is corrected.
[5] What the loans were built to do: Federal Reserve History, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 22 November 2013. Read twice, identical both times. When high-risk borrowers could not keep up their repayments, they would either sell their homes for a profit and repay the mortgage, or take on more debt against the higher prices. And: Once house prices peaked, refinancing and home sales became less workable ways to settle mortgage debt, and loss rates on mortgages started to rise for lenders and investors.
[6] Where the money came from, and what it did to mortgage rates: Ben S. Bernanke, Carol Bertaut, Laurie Pounder DeMarco and Steven Kamin, International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007, International Finance Discussion Papers No. 1014, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 2011. Read twice, 4 October 2026, identical both times. "Between year-end 2003 and year-end 2007, the value of total U.S. securities outstanding rose about $10 trillion, of which roughly $4½ trillion was absorbed by foreign investors." "On net, China's current account surpluses were used almost wholly to acquire assets in the United States, more than 80 percent of which consisted of very safe Treasuries and Agencies." "The amount outstanding of AAA-rated asset-backed securities rose $1.7 trillion, of which U.S. residents took $1.1 trillion and Europeans $0.4 trillion." "Lower long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, in turn contributed to the extended rise in house prices." Europe's investors "engaged in a process of intermediation which augmented the supply of financing for MBS and related instruments." Replaces the Bank of England FSR, which supported only the intermediation half of spine link 6; the Bernanke, Bertaut, DeMarco and Kamin study supports both halves. Board of Governors staff paper; the prose is our own wording.
[7] The episode chart: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks (DRSFRMACBS), retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Public domain, citation requested (FRED's marking for this Board of Governors series). Retrieved 30 September 2026. Quarterly, 2003 to 2012. It covers loans held by commercial banks only, not every American mortgage.
Country data from the World Bank (CC BY 4.0) and the UNDP Human Development Report (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
Games · Learn · Atlas · Read · Feedback · Privacy · Contact