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The 2008 Financial Crisis
How the crisis reached Britain
Six steps, about nine minutes, a question at most of them. You need no economics and no preparation, only a willingness to guess before you are told.
Step 1 of 6
Pools of American mortgages had been turned into bonds, most of each pool counted as safe, and the firms holding them paid with borrowing they renewed every morning. When the lenders stopped, that borrowing was what broke.
The question
Britain's biggest banks had bought some of the American mortgage bonds. They had also lent far more than their savers had paid in, and they borrowed the difference from other banks and large investors a few months at a time. In August 2007 that lending stopped.
Northern Rock ran out of lenders first, and savers queued outside its branches for the first time in more than a century. Five months passed before anyone decided what to do with the bank. Responsibility had been divided between three bodies: the Treasury, which controls government money, the Bank of England, which sets interest rates, and the Financial Services Authority, which checked banks one by one. No rule said which of the three decided.
Six steps take it in order: who was watching, how far British lending had run ahead of British saving, the bank that ran out of lenders, what the American bonds actually cost, the dollars European banks could not find, and the five months it took to decide what to do with the bank.
What this module covers
Written for every level. Tap any underlined word for what it means, and open the boxes below for the economics behind each decision. If you already know the theory, skip both and the history reads straight through.
By 2007 responsibility for watching the banks was split between separate agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, and none of them had power over the whole system.
Each agency was given one class of firm to look after, so a firm that fitted no class had no agency of its own.
The Congressional Research Service prepares briefings for members of the United States Congress. It wrote afterwards that American financial regulation was spread across many agencies, each given one kind of firm to look after. No , it said, covered every firm big enough to bring the others down.
Supervisors could tell whether one bank was sound. None of them could tell what would happen when every bank had done the same thing at once.
By the first half of 2008 the major British banks had lent out far more money than their customers had paid into them. They borrowed the difference from other banks and large investors, a few months at a time.
A bank that has lent more than its savers have paid in has to borrow the difference from somebody else. Those loans run for months, while the mortgages the money paid for run for decades, so the borrowing falls due long before the mortgage is paid off. Replacing that borrowing depends on other banks and investors being willing to lend that morning. While they are, the arrangement works and costs very little. When they are not, the bank still owes the money, still holds the mortgages, and cannot turn a mortgage into cash quickly enough to pay.
Put it another way. Think of it like paying for a long mortgage with a series of one-month loans: each one is cheap, and the trouble is not the cost but the morning the next loan is not offered.
The mortgages that money pays for run for decades, so the borrowing falls due long before the mortgage is paid off. Each time it falls due the bank has to find the money again, which was easy until August 2007.
HBOS was then one of Britain's largest banks. By 2008 it was borrowing more from other banks and investors, £248 billion, than it held for savers, £243 billion. The Commons Treasury Committee, the MPs who question the Treasury and the banks, published both figures.
The Bank of England watches that gap because the lenders, not the bank, decide when that money has to be paid back and whether to lend it again.
In the first half of 2008, how much more had the major British banks lent than their customers had paid in?
For scaleIn 2001 the same measure was close to nothing: what those banks had lent was comparable to what their customers had deposited with them.
Northern Rock, a mortgage lender based in Newcastle, took only a small part of its money from savers. On 9 August 2007 the firms it borrowed the rest from stopped lending to it.
It paid for new mortgages in three ways: money savers put in, bundles of mortgages it had already made and sold on as bonds, and borrowing from other financial firms.
On 9 August 2007 its own traders recorded that the market it borrowed in had stopped working, and after that neither of the two borrowed ways was open.
Money a bank holds for a saver is money it owes them. In 1997 savers' money was 62.7 per cent of everything Northern Rock owed, and over the ten years that followed the bank grew on borrowed money instead.
Savers queued outside its branches from Friday 14 September 2007 until the Monday. The Treasury Committee said it was the first time savers had queued at a British bank since Victorian times.
By the end of 2006, what share of everything Northern Rock owed was money it held for savers?
For scaleHalf of what Northern Rock owed came from mortgages it had bundled up and sold on as bonds. Those arrangements ran three and a half years on average, against mortgages that ran for decades.
Module 3 of 7 in The 2008 Financial Crisis
[1] The gap between what British banks had lent and what their savers had paid in: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 24, October 2008.
[2] What British banks lost on the American bonds they owned: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 23, April 2008.
[3] Northern Rock: where its money came from, and the run: House of Commons Treasury Committee, The run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, HC 56-I, 26 January 2008.
[4] HBOS: borrowed money against savers' money: House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: dealing with the failure of the UK banks, HC 416, 1 May 2009.
[5] European banks' dollar assets, and the gap under them: Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, June 2009.
[6] How much of it had to be borrowed again quickly: Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy and Jason Miu, Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, May 2011.
[7] How the work was divided, and what nobody had: HM Treasury, Review of HM Treasury's management response to the financial crisis, March 2012.
[8] The same division, written for MPs at the time: House of Commons Library, Northern Rock and financial supervision, SN04478, 1 February 2008.
[9] The same hole on the American side: Congressional Research Service, Causes of the Financial Crisis, R40173.
Country data from the World Bank (CC BY 4.0) and the UNDP Human Development Report (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
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