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The 2008 Financial Crisis
How the crisis reached Britain
Six steps, about nine minutes, a question at most of them. You need no economics and no preparation, only a willingness to guess before you are told.
Step 1 of 6
American banks had grouped home loans together and sold the groups as bonds, mostly rated safe. The firms holding the bonds had paid with very short loans, replaced each morning. When lenders stopped, that borrowing failed.
The question
Britain's biggest banks had bought some bonds made from American home loans. They had also lent out far more money than their savers had put in. They borrowed the missing amount from other banks and large investors, a few months at a time. In August 2007 that lending stopped.
What you'll be able to answer
The 2008 Financial Crisis · this module is lit
Northern Rock was the first bank to lose its lenders. Savers queued outside its branches to take their money out, the first queue like it at a British bank in more than a century. Five months passed before anyone decided what to do with the bank.
Three bodies shared responsibility for the banks. The Treasury controls government money. The Bank of England sets interest rates. The Financial Services Authority checked banks one at a time to see whether each was safe. No rule said which of the three should decide what to do with a bank in trouble.
The page has six steps. They cover who was watching the banks, how far British lending ran ahead of saving, Northern Rock, what the American bonds cost, the dollars European banks could not get, and the five months it took to decide.
By 2007 responsibility for watching the banks was split between separate agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, and none of them had power over the whole system.
Each agency looked after one type of firm. A firm that fitted none of the types had no agency of its own.
The Congressional Research Service prepares briefings for members of the United States Congress. After the crisis it wrote that American financial regulation was spread across many agencies, each given one kind of firm to look after. No , it said, covered every firm big enough to bring down other firms if it failed.
The people who checked banks could tell whether one bank was safe. No agency had the job of seeing what would happen if many banks got into trouble at the same time.
By the first half of 2008 the major British banks had lent out far more money than their customers had paid into them. They borrowed the difference from other banks and large investors, a few months at a time.
A bank that has lent more than its savers have paid in has to borrow the difference from somebody else. The bank's borrowing lasts a few months, while the mortgages it paid for last for decades. So the borrowing falls due long before the mortgage is paid off. Each time a loan falls due, the bank needs other banks and investors to agree to lend again that day. As long as they agree, the bank keeps going and pays little. When they refuse, the bank still owes the money. Its mortgages are repaid slowly over decades, so it cannot get that money back in time to pay.
Put it another way. Think of paying for a long mortgage with a series of one-month loans, each of them cheap. The danger comes on the day a lender refuses to give you the next one.
The banks used the borrowed money to pay for mortgages, which run for decades. So the borrowing falls due long before a mortgage is paid off. Each time it falls due, the bank has to find the money again. Until August 2007 that was easy.
HBOS was then one of Britain's largest banks. By 2008 it had borrowed £248 billion from other banks and investors. That was more than the £243 billion it held for savers. The Commons Treasury Committee, the MPs who question the Treasury and the banks, published both figures.
The Bank of England watches the gap between what banks lend and what savers pay in. It does so because the lenders decide when they want their money back, and whether to lend it again. The bank that borrowed has no say.
In the first half of 2008, how much more had the major British banks lent than their customers had paid in?
For scaleIn 2001 the gap was close to nothing: the banks had lent about as much as their customers had deposited with them.
Northern Rock, a mortgage lender based in Newcastle, took only a small part of its money from savers. On 9 August 2007 the firms it borrowed the rest from stopped lending to it.
Northern Rock had three ways to pay for new mortgages. Savers put money in. It sold groups of its existing mortgages to investors as bonds, for cash, and it borrowed from other financial firms.
On 9 August 2007 Northern Rock's traders noted that the market where it borrowed had stopped working. After that it could neither sell mortgage bonds nor borrow from other firms.
Money a bank holds for a saver is money it owes them. In 1997 savers' money was 62.7 per cent of everything Northern Rock owed. Over the next ten years the bank grew mostly by borrowing instead.
From Friday 14 September 2007 until the Monday, savers queued outside Northern Rock's branches to take their money out. The Treasury Committee said no British bank had seen savers queue like this since Victorian times.
By the end of 2006, what share of everything Northern Rock owed was money it held for savers?
For scaleHalf of what Northern Rock owed was money it had raised by selling groups of its mortgages as bonds. Those bonds lasted three and a half years on average. The mortgages behind them ran for decades.
Take a guess
Which did more harm to the British banks?
British banks had two troubles at once in 2007. They owned some of the American mortgage bonds, and they had borrowed heavily from other banks and investors who stopped lending in August.
If a bank owns a bond that falls in value, it loses the amount the bond fell by. If a bank cannot take out new loans, it must pay back each old loan in full on the day it is due. After August 2007 the British banks could not take out new loans.
A British bank could be hurt by the American bonds even if it owned none. No lender could tell which banks held the bonds or how much they had lost on them, so lenders stopped lending to every bank.
The Bank of England put the major British banks' s in the second half of 2007 at US$14 billion. Of that, US$11 billion was on sub-prime lending in America, meaning loans to people the lenders rated high risk.
Source: Bank of England Database, IUMAAMIJ less IUMABEDR, monthly averages
For scaleAt the end of 2007 the same banks still owned US$192 billion of the same kinds of American bonds. That was far more than the US$14 billion they had written down on them.
Take a guess
Why could the Bank of England not end a shortage of dollars in London?
European banks, British ones among them, had lent a great deal in dollars and bought American bonds priced in dollars. Their own customers paid them in euros and pounds.
A bank in Europe may lend money in dollars or buy an American bond. Either way it has to pay out dollars. Its own customers pay it in euros or pounds. To get dollars, the bank gives another bank euros or pounds and gets dollars for a set time. At the end, the two banks swap back, and the bank makes a new swap. Each swap lasts months, while the American bond or dollar loan lasts years. If the banks that hold dollars stop agreeing to swaps, the European bank must find dollars some other way. Its own cannot create dollars.
By 2007 these banks had lent more in dollars than they were receiving in dollars. They got the rest through a : they gave another bank pounds or euros for a few months and got dollars in return.
The Bank for International Settlements is owned by the world's central banks. It said European banks held more than $8 trillion in dollar loans, bonds and other holdings by the middle of 2007. Those holdings were more than $800 billion bigger than their dollar debts: dollars they had borrowed or held for customers.
European banks got the extra $800 billion by exchanging pounds and euros for dollars. When the banks holding dollars stopped making these swaps, a European bank had to find dollars some other way.
For scaleThe Federal Reserve Bank of New York, part of America's central bank, estimated that European and Swiss banks had paid for $1.1 trillion to $1.3 trillion of their dollar holdings with short-term borrowing.
In 1997 Britain divided responsibility for its banking system between three bodies. When Northern Rock could no longer borrow, nothing said which of the three would decide what to do.
The Treasury wrote the law, approved any rescue and reported to Parliament. The Bank of England set interest rates and kept watch over the banking system as a whole. It had handed the job of checking individual banks to the Financial Services Authority, or FSA. Together the three bodies were called the Tripartite.
Northern Rock's savers queued in September 2007. On 17 February 2008 the Treasury announced that the government would take over the bank and own it. Parliament passed a law on 21 February giving the government power to take over banks. The bank was the next day.
The Treasury Committee found a significant failure of the Tripartite arrangements in September 2007, meaning the way the three bodies shared the work. The Treasury's own review said nobody had ever settled which of the three would make the final decision, and this held up the answer.
Watching over the banks in 2007 meant four jobs. Three bodies shared the work, and each of three jobs belonged to one of them. Which job had no law written for it at all?
For scaleFive months separated the queues outside Northern Rock's branches from the decision about what to do with it.
The 2008 Financial Crisis
Can you answer each one now? Tap to check.
Why did an American mortgage problem become a British banking problem?
Why was Northern Rock the first British bank to run out of money?
Why could the Bank of England not end the shortage of dollars?
Why did it take months to decide what to do with Northern Rock?
Can you remember each figure? Tap to check.
Who was watching the whole banking system
What British banks had lent beyond their savers' money, first half of 2008
Northern Rock's savers' money, end of 2006
What British banks wrote down, second half of 2007
European banks' dollar holdings, mid-2007
Northern Rock, from the savers' queue to public ownership
You met four terms in this module
, , ,
The damage came from money British banks had to borrow again every few months. No rule said who acted when a bank could not borrow.
[1] The gap between what British banks had lent and what their savers had paid in: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 24, October 2008. Read twice, the second time for the words. In 2001, UK banks lent about as much to customers as they took from them in deposits. By 2008 H1, however, lending exceeded deposits by £700 billion, a surplus the report calls the customer funding gap (Chart 1.7). That chart is titled "Major UK banks' customer funding gap, household saving ratio and foreign interbank deposits", so the subject is the major UK banks as the Bank groups them rather than every bank in the country. On why the lending between banks stopped, the same report says that because it was unclear how exposures were spread across institutions, banks saw greater counterparty credit risk in lending to each other, and that valuation uncertainty "generated a system-wide rise in counterparty risk" whose consequence was "a breakdown in interbank funding markets".
[2] What British banks lost on the American bonds they owned: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, Issue No. 23, April 2008. Table A, "Major UK banks' and LCFIs' structured credit and monoline-related write-downs and exposures", read twice. Major UK banks, 2007 H2: total write-downs 14, of which US sub-prime 11; remaining exposures at end-2007, 192; all in US$ billions. The footnote says the totals cover write-downs on available-for-sale financial instruments and on trading book assets that were announced up to and including 24 April 2008, so the figure counts what had been announced by that date and the date travels with it.
[3] Northern Rock: where its money came from, and the run: House of Commons Treasury Committee, The run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, HC 56-I, 26 January 2008. Read twice. Paragraph 17: "retail deposits and funds had fallen from 62.7% at end-1997 to 22.4% at end-2006", and, from the evidence of the bank's chief executive in the same paragraph, "50% was securitisation, which had an average life of three and a half years; 10% was covered bonds, which had an average life of about seven years; and of our wholesale borrowings, which is 25%, half of that had a duration longer than one year and the other half was less than one year's duration." Paragraph 23: "on 9 August 2007, Northern Rock's traders noted a 'dislocation in the market' for its funding." The summary: "The period from Friday 14 September 2007 to Monday 17 September saw the first run on the retail deposits of a United Kingdom bank since Victorian times", and "There was a significant failure of the Tripartite arrangements in September 2007, and lessons must be learned from that failure." The report heads a box "1866 and all that" and nowhere dates the previous run to 1866.
[4] HBOS: borrowed money against savers' money: House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: dealing with the failure of the UK banks, HC 416, 1 May 2009. Read twice. Paragraph 43: "As HBOS entered 2008, it was drawing a greater proportion of its funding from the wholesale markets than from retail deposits with £248 billion of wholesale funding exceeding the £243 billion of retail deposits."
[5] European banks' dollar assets, and the gap under them: Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, June 2009. Chapter II, section "Money market funds amplify instability in the wake of the Lehman failure", read twice: European banks above all had grown their US dollar assets fast over the previous ten years, reaching over $8 trillion by mid-2007, and these were more than $800 billion larger than their estimated US dollar liabilities, which meant they funded across currencies and leaned heavily on tools such as foreign exchange swaps.
[6] How much of it had to be borrowed again quickly: Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy and Jason Miu, Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, May 2011. Read twice: Swiss, United Kingdom and euro area banks were estimated to have more than $8 trillion of dollar exposures on their balance sheets in 2008, and $1.1 trillion to $1.3 trillion of that was financed from short-term sources.
[7] How the work was divided, and what nobody had: HM Treasury, Review of HM Treasury's management response to the financial crisis, March 2012. Read twice. Paragraph 2.8 divides the work three ways. The Treasury was "responsible for the institutional structure of financial regulation and legislation and, in the event of a crisis, for authorising certain types of financial interventions and keeping Parliament informed". The Bank "gained powers to set interest rates, independent of Government, but relinquished responsibility for banking supervision to the FSA". The third body was "responsible for prudential and conduct of business regulation of all financial services including banks and building societies". Paragraph 2.11: "The war games revealed the lack of a statutory resolution framework to deal with a failing bank." Paragraph 4.36: "the unresolved question of who ultimately would decide, hindered resolving issues." Paragraph 3.8: "On 17 February 2008, the Treasury announced that Northern Rock would be taken into public ownership. The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was passed on 21 February, to provide the Government with temporary powers to nationalise banks. Northern Rock was nationalised the following day."
[8] The same division, written for MPs at the time: House of Commons Library, Northern Rock and financial supervision, SN04478, 1 February 2008. Read twice. The Bank of England's listed responsibilities include "maintaining a broad overview of the system as a whole" and "undertaking, in exceptional circumstances, official financial operations". The supervisor's include "the authorisation and prudential supervision of banks, building societies, investment firms". The Treasury's include "the overall institutional structure of financial regulation and the legislation which governs it". On the nationalisation: "22 February, NRB moved into a period of 'temporary public ownership'." The briefing calls the run "the first run on the retail deposits of a United Kingdom bank since Victorian times" and gives no earlier date.
[9] The same hole on the American side: Congressional Research Service, Causes of the Financial Crisis, R40173. Read twice. Under "Fragmented Regulation": "U.S. financial regulation is dispersed among many agencies, each with responsibility for a particular class of financial institution." Under "No Systemic Risk Regulator": "No regulator had comprehensive jurisdiction over all systemically important financial institutions." Four more bodies state the same finding and are recorded at link 15 of the research file: the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission chapter 4, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation chapter 4, the de Larosière report for the European Commission of 25 February 2009, and the Financial Stability Board section V.
[10] The episode chart: Bank of England Database, series IUMAAMIJ (monthly average of UK resident monetary financial institutions' sterling 3 month interbank lending rate) and IUMABEDR (monthly average of Bank Rate). Bank of England Database, Open Government Licence v3.0. Retrieved 30 September 2026. Monthly, January 2006 to December 2009. The line is the first series less the second, worked out for this chart.
Country data from the World Bank (CC BY 4.0) and the UNDP Human Development Report (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
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