Where every figure came from
Alan Greenspan, Economic volatility, remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 30 August 2002 (Greenspan's 1999 warning and his 2002 argument): https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20020830/default.htm. Federal Reserve Board speech, public domain; quoted briefly. It quotes his testimony to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services of 22 July 1999: productivity acceleration does not ensure that equity prices are not overextended; "an unwarranted, perhaps euphoric, extension of recent developments can drive equity prices to levels that are unsupportable even if risks in the future become relatively small". The speech defines asset bubbles as surges in prices of assets to unsustainable levels; says it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact; notes that from mid-1999 through May 2000 the federal funds rate was raised and equity price increases were largely undeterred; judges that nothing short of a sharp increase in short-term rates that engenders a significant economic retrenchment is sufficient to check a nascent bubble; bubbles are often precipitated by perceptions of real improvements in productivity and profitability, emerge when investors overestimate the sustainable rise in profits or unrealistically lower the discount rate they apply, and "Human psychology being what it is, bubbles tend to feed on themselves". It also quotes the July 1999 testimony on the need for policies "to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion". Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-2012 (January 2002) (Productivity, over-investment and the rate cuts): http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/32xx/doc3277/EntireReport.pdf. US government work, public domain. Chapter 2 opening: labour productivity growth sped up from an annual average of 1.6 percent between 1991 and 1995 to 2.6 percent between 1995 and 2000, mostly because of a historically high level of business investment, spurred by advances in information technology (computers, peripherals, software and communications equipment) and a surge in stock prices, which reduced the cost of capital; before most of the nine post-war recessions the imbalance had been demand exceeding supply, with monetary tightening in response, but at the end of the 1990s the primary imbalance seems to have come from overly optimistic expectations of the future profitability of new investment; investment plunged beginning late in 2000; during 2001 the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate 11 times, from 6.5 to 1.75 percent, which probably kept the stock market from sinking further and bolstered housing and auto sales; the tax cuts enacted in June 2001 prevented consumption from slowing more than it might have otherwise. Chapter 1 (Figure 1-3 text): the recession seems to have been precipitated mostly by a period of unsustainable investment in the late 1990s. Chapter 2, "Business Fixed Investment and Inventories": overly optimistic expectations of future demand, reflected in inflated stock prices, led businesses to invest in new plant and equipment at levels that appear excessive in hindsight; many IT firms invested ahead of demand to be first in new Internet and other IT markets; investment first fell to a sustainable rate, then below it while firms worked off the excess capacity built up while overinvesting. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20041229094227id_/http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/32xx/doc3277/EntireReport.pdf (capture 2004-12-29). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bank for International Settlements, 71st Annual Report (June 2001), chapter VI, Financial markets (Technology share prices against earnings): https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2001e.htm. BIS copyright; paraphrased. Chapter VI, "Asset price bubbles versus fundamentals" and Table VI.1: during the run-up, analysts justified high valuations of technology stocks by predicting that earnings growth would accelerate; earnings growth never caught up with prices; in the US technology sector, the BIS puts the rise in stock prices over five years at almost five times the growth of earnings (Table VI.1); for broad share markets generally, it says the price rises appeared driven largely by mutually reinforcing investor optimism and herding. Highlights: telecommunications firms had borrowed heavily. The report refers to the BIS's member and shareholding central banks. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20050306122453id_/http://www.bis.org:80/publ/ar2001e.pdf (capture 2005-03-06). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, private fixed investment in information processing equipment and software (FRED series A679RC1Q027SBEA) (The episode chart): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A679RC1Q027SBEA. Public domain, citation requested (FRED). Quarterly, billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate: Q1 1995 243.954; Q4 2000 465.497 (the highest value from 1995 to 2003); Q4 2002 378.860 (the lowest after 2000 in the window); Q4 2003 415.664. Charted to one decimal place. Derived here: 465.5 / 244.0 = 1.91; 378.9 / 465.5 = 0.814, a fall of about 19 per cent. Current vintage, retrieved 3 October 2026 (FRED CSV, fetched in the cloud container and copied to the lane data folder) and read twice.
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (February 2002), chapter 1 (Other causes of the slowdown): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2002/pdf/ERP-2002.pdf. US government work, public domain. Chapter 1 (contents pp. 36-39) lists factors behind the 2000-01 slowdown under the headings "Decline in Equity Values", "Surge in Energy Prices" (energy prices surged in 1999 and 2000; oil rose from $12.00 a barrel to a peak of $34.40 a barrel for West Texas Intermediate in November 2000), "Higher Interest Rates", "Collapse of the High-Technology Sector" (investors ratcheted down the earnings prospects of these firms and perceived a greater risk of investing in them, and the capital investment boom reversed) and "Lingering Effects of Y2K" (the run-up in capital spending ahead of the Y2K event made swings in high-technology capital spending worse, with a bulge in investment around January 2000). The same chapter says the September 11 attacks and the fall in confidence late in 2001 were sufficient to tip the nation into its seventh recession since 1960; the module follows the NBER dating (peak March 2001) and prints no September 11 line (research knownDisagreements). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (February 2003) (The causes are argued over): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2003/pdf/ERP-2003.pdf. US government work, public domain. Chapter 1 (pp. 27-28): the precise reasons for the bear market of 2000-02 are subject to debate; it was probably influenced by two general factors, a decline in expected profit growth and an increase in the premium investors required to hold risky assets; some observers attributed most of the decline to the corporate scandals, but equity prices fell around the world, even in countries with different accounting systems and governance institutions. Chapter 2, "Financial Analysts' Reports": concerns that some analysts may face conflicts of interest. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Federal Open Market Committee, statement, 3 January 2001 (The first rate cut): https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2001/20010103/default.htm. Federal Reserve Board press release, public domain. The FOMC lowered its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 6 percent, in light of further weakening of sales and production, lower consumer confidence, tight conditions in some financial markets and high energy prices. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, federal funds target rate, daily (FRED series DFEDTAR) (The eleven cuts and the 1 per cent rate): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTAR. Public domain, citation requested (FRED). Target changes in 2001, per cent: 6.00 (3 Jan), 5.50 (31 Jan), 5.00 (20 Mar), 4.50 (18 Apr), 4.00 (15 May), 3.75 (27 Jun), 3.50 (21 Aug), 3.00 (17 Sep), 2.50 (2 Oct), 2.00 (6 Nov), 1.75 (11 Dec): eleven cuts. Then 1.25 (6 Nov 2002) and 1.00 (25 Jun 2003). Retrieved 3 October 2026 and read twice.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, civilian unemployment rate, monthly, seasonally adjusted (FRED series UNRATE) (Unemployment): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE. Public domain, citation requested (FRED). April 2000 3.8 (the lowest from 1995 to 2004); November 2001 5.5; June 2003 6.3 (the highest monthly value from 1995 until October 2008, checked on the full series); December 2004 5.4. Current vintage, retrieved 3 October 2026 and read twice.
National Bureau of Economic Research, Business Cycle Dating Committee announcement, 17 July 2003 (What the end of the recession did and did not mean): https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-17-2003. NBER copyright; paraphrased. The trough was in November 2001; the recession that began in March 2001 lasted 8 months, which the committee calls slightly less than average for recessions since World War II; in dating the trough it did not conclude that conditions since then had been favourable or that the economy was back to normal capacity. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
US Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release 2003-54, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (28 April 2003) (The 2003 settlement): https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. US government work, public domain. The SEC, the New York Attorney General, state regulators, NASD and the New York Stock Exchange completed enforcement actions against ten of the nation's top investment firms; the actions allege that from approximately mid-1999 through mid-2001 or later the firms let investment banking exert inappropriate influence over research analysts; the firms neither admitted nor denied the allegations; the ten firms pay $875 million in penalties and disgorgement ($487.5 million penalties, $387.5 million disgorgement), $432.5 million to fund independent research and $80 million for investor education; the total of all payments is roughly $1.4 billion; the firms must separate research from investment banking, and analysts' pay may not be based on investment banking revenues. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20030501051615id_/http://www.sec.gov:80/news/press/2003-54.htm (capture 2003-05-01). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.