Where every figure came from
Office for National Statistics, Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures, seasonally adjusted (series ABMI, dataset QNA) (UK output, 2007 to 2013, and the episode chart): https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/abmi/qna. Open Government Licence v3.0. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (release of 30 September 2026). Quarterly, GBP millions at chained volume. Highest before the fall: 2008 Q1, 603,488. Lowest: 2009 Q2, 565,527, which is 6.3 per cent below it (derived: 1 - 565,527/603,488; about 6 per cent). First quarter above 603,488: 2013 Q2, 605,505. Chart: 2007 Q1 to 2013 Q4, in GBP billions (divided by 1,000 and rounded to one decimal place by this module).
Michael Joyce, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods (Bank of England), The United Kingdom's quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2011 Q3 (The Bank economists' estimate of the first round's effect on output and inflation, and the equivalent cut in Bank Rate): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/2011/the-uks-quantitative-easing-policy-design-operation-and-impact.pdf. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026; read off the rendered pages 200, 210 and 211 (introduction, Summary of the macro effects and Table C, conclusion). The authors work in the Bank's Macro Financial Analysis Division. Across several methods, the purchases may have raised the level of real GDP by 1½ to 2 per cent and inflation by ¾ to 1½ percentage points; applying the Bank's rule of thumb for a cut in Bank Rate, that is equivalent to a cut of 150 to 300 basis points, with large uncertainty. The transmission chart runs from asset prices and the cost of borrowing to spending and income, then to inflation. Page 200: from March 2009 to January 2010 the Bank bought GBP200 billion of assets; in early March 2009 Bank Rate was reduced to ½ per cent, effectively its lower bound, and the Committee judged that without additional measures spending would be too weak to meet the target, so it announced large-scale asset purchases. Page 210: the 150 to 300 basis point equivalent is the cut that would produce a similar rise in CPI inflation. Derived: 150 basis points = 1.5 percentage points = 3 x 0.5. The same figures were read in the authors' VoxEU column of 1 November 2011 and in the two Bank documents below.
Bank of England Independent Evaluation Office, IEO evaluation of the Bank of England's approach to quantitative easing, 13 January 2021 (The first £200 billion, 2009 to 2010; less evidence on output and inflation than on bond yields): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/independent-evaluation-office/ieo-report-january-2021/ieo-evaluation-of-the-bank-of-englands-approach-to-quantitative-easing. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026. Commissioned by the Bank's Court of Directors (its board); the team reported directly to the Chair of Court. Box B cites the Bank economists' 2011 estimate (Joyce and others) for the first GBP200 billion, bought in 2009 and 2010: output up 1.5 to 2 per cent and inflation up 0.75 to 1.5 points. It finds fewer studies of the effect on GDP and inflation than of the effect on bond yields, and says the long delays before those effects appear make cause and effect hard to pin down.
Brian Fabo, Martina Jančoková, Elisabeth Kempf and Ľuboš Pástor, Fifty Shades of QE: Comparing Findings of Central Bankers and Academics, NBER Working Paper 27849, September 2020 (revised April 2021) (Central bank studies report larger effects than academic ones): https://www.nber.org/papers/w27849. Paraphrased from the abstract page. Retrieved 1 October 2026. The paper previously circulated under the title Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research (quoted as a title). Compares the findings of central bank researchers and academic economists on the macroeconomic effects of QE: central bank papers report larger effects on output and inflation; central bank researchers who report larger effects on output have more favourable career outcomes.
Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, The benefits and costs of asset purchases, speech, Tokyo, 28 May 2024 (Effect on long-term yields up to 40 per cent smaller outside a crisis): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2024/html/ecb.sp240528~a4f151497d.en.html. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026. The speech says the market response to purchase announcements is much weaker in normal times, when investors are less held back by their balance sheets and freer to trade against price moves. Citing euro-area announcements (the PEPP and APP programmes), it puts the shortfall in the effect on long-term yields at up to 40 per cent outside a crisis. It adds that the effect on growth and prices varies with conditions.
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Quantitative easing: a dangerous addiction?, HL Paper 42, 16 July 2021 (summary, and chapters 2 and 3) (The Lords committee's conclusions, July 2021): https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5802/ldselect/ldeconaf/42/4205.htm. Open Parliament Licence v3.0; quoted briefly. Retrieved 1 October 2026. Para 33: the counterfactual, what would have happened without QE, is difficult to establish. Para 35: the Bank has said QE may be particularly effective when deployed at a time of market dysfunction. Para 49: strong evidence that it is an effective tool at times of crisis, when markets are dysfunctional or in distress. Para 50: central bank research tends to show QE in a more positive light than the academic literature; on balance, QE has had a limited impact on growth and aggregate demand over the last decade; limited evidence that it increased bank lending or investment or boosted spending by wealthy asset holders. Summary (4203): QE in 2009, with expansionary fiscal policy, prevented a recurrence of the Great Depression. Para 90 (4206): the detail the Bank publishes on how QE affects the economy is not sufficient for Parliament and the public to hold it to account. The committee took evidence from economists in Britain and abroad (chapter 2 witnesses). Chapter 1 (4204), para 1: the Bank was granted operational independence in 1997; para 2: the power to set Bank Rate passed from the Chancellor to the Monetary Policy Committee, under the Bank of England Act 1998.
Bank of England response to the Lords Economic Affairs Committee's report on Quantitative Easing, 16 September 2021 (The Bank's reply to the Lords committee, September 2021): https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7359/documents/76988/default/. Paraphrased; read off the rendered page 11, paras 3.7 to 3.9. The macroeconomic effects cannot be measured with great precision; what literature there is does not support the committee's conclusion of a limited impact over the decade; if the impact had been limited, QE could not have prevented a recurrence of the Great Depression as the committee separately concluded. Para 3.8 cites the Bank economists' estimate for the initial GBP200 billion. Para 3.9: QE may be particularly effective at a time of market dysfunction. Date and reply also recorded by the House of Lords Library, Quantitative easing (publication page).
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Making an independent Bank of England work better, HL Paper 10, 27 November 2023 (summary) (The committee's 2023 report: a democratic deficit, and a five-yearly review): https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldeconaf/10/1003.htm. Open Parliament Licence v3.0; quoted briefly. Retrieved 1 October 2026. Because the Government cannot challenge the Bank's decisions without compromising its independence, the Bank must be scrutinised by, and its officials held accountable to, Parliament; the committee is concerned that a democratic deficit has emerged; it recommends that Parliament conduct an overarching review of the Bank's remit, performance and operations every five years; more scrutiny and accountability should strengthen confidence in operational independence. Date from the House of Lords Library briefing of 15 April 2024.
Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, letter to Lord Bridges of Headley, Chair of the Economic Affairs Committee, 26 January 2024 (The Governor's reply, January 2024): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2024/andrew-bailey-letter-to-economic-affairs-committee-january-2024.pdf. Paraphrased; read off the rendered page 1. In performing its duties the Bank answers to Parliament; many of the recommendations are directed to the Government or to Parliament itself; the letter addresses those within the Bank's responsibilities. Date from the House of Lords Library briefing of 15 April 2024, which records the committee publishing the letter on 7 February 2024.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.