Where every figure came from
Bank of England, The Distributional Effects of Asset Purchases, 12 July 2012 (reprinted in the Quarterly Bulletin 2012 Q3, pages 254 to 266) (Who gained and who lost from the purchases, 2012): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/2012/the-distributional-effects-of-asset-purchases.pdf. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026; figures read off the rendered Bulletin pages 257 to 259. Median: the household in the middle of the distribution. Introduction: changes in monetary policy unavoidably have distributional effects whatever the instrument; Bank Rate has been at 0.5 per cent since March 2009. Section 1: investors who sold gilts bought other assets, raising a wide range of asset prices. Page 258: the analysis of the Bank economists Joyce, Tong and Woods suggests the first round raised UK households' net financial wealth, including partial estimates of pension wealth, by about 16 per cent. Page 259: in a 2011 survey for the Bank (NMG), the median household held only around GBP1,500 of gross financial assets (excluding pensions, including deposits), while the top 5 per cent of households held an average of GBP175,000, around 40 per cent (written here as about two-fifths) of the financial assets of the household sector. Page 257 and Table A: households' interest receipts on deposits, compared with September 2008 levels, were around GBP70 billion lower in total by April 2012, deposits mostly pay rates linked to short-term rates. Summary and page 259: changes in Bank Rate, not asset purchases, were the dominant influence on deposit rates. Also published by the Bank as a paper dated 12 July 2012.
Resolution Foundation (Jack Leslie, Fahmida Rahman, James Smith and Joe Gagnon), Quantitative (displ)easing? Does QE work and how should it be used next time?, 7 September 2019 (How the gains in wealth and income were shared): https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/quantitative-displeasing/. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (publication page; report PDF: the 40 and 12 per cent figures read off the rendered pages 8 and 9, the 4.3 and 3.2 per cent figures off page 3). Great Britain, 2006-08 to 2012-14, using a method like a Bank of England staff working paper and the Bank's estimates of the effects. Net wealth covers net property wealth, net financial wealth and private pension wealth (Figure 3 notes). Around 40 per cent of the aggregate gain in wealth from higher financial asset prices, property prices and inflation went to the wealthiest tenth of families, and only 12 per cent to the bottom half. Through employment and wages, a 4.3 per cent income boost for the bottom half of the income distribution against 3.2 per cent across the top half, because QE is estimated to have raised employment more at the bottom; the effect through the economy reduces income inequality. The asset price effect appears to widen absolute wealth gaps and to be broadly neutral for relative wealth inequality. Looking only at asset prices gives a partial view of the impact of QE.
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Quantitative easing: a dangerous addiction?, HL Paper 42, 16 July 2021 (chapter 3) (The Lords committee on inequality, July 2021): https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5802/ldselect/ldeconaf/42/4205.htm. Open Parliament Licence v3.0; quoted briefly. Retrieved 1 October 2026. Para 58: Dr Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy, told the committee that by supporting the economy QE reduced income inequality "at the margin", by mitigating the loss of employment in less well paid groups. Para 68: the mechanisms "have benefited wealthy asset holders disproportionately by artificially inflating asset prices. On balance, we conclude that the evidence shows that quantitative easing has exacerbated wealth inequalities."
Bank of England response to the Lords Economic Affairs Committee's report on Quantitative Easing, 16 September 2021 (The Bank's reply on inequality, September 2021): https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7359/documents/76988/default/. Paraphrased; read off the rendered page 12, paras 3.12 to 3.16. Asset price effects should be weighed against the effects on jobs and wages. Earlier Bank staff analysis found similar percentage effects across the distributions of income and wealth. The absolute, cash effect varied more: if asset prices rose uniformly by 10 per cent, a holder of GBP100 would gain GBP10 and a holder of GBP1,000 would gain GBP100. So QE did not benefit asset holders disproportionately, as the committee concluded, but in proportion to their holdings, reflecting existing differences in wealth.
Bank of England Database, monthly average of UK resident monetary financial institutions' sterling weighted average interest rate, interest-bearing sight deposits from households (series CFMHSCV) (Interest paid on households' instant-access accounts, and the episode chart): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/. Open Government Licence v3.0 (not a spot exchange-rate series). Retrieved 1 October 2026. Monthly, per cent, not seasonally adjusted, January 2007 to December 2016. September 2008: 3.08. July 2009: 0.74. 2010 and 2011: between 0.74 and 0.99. 2012: slightly above 1.
Paul Tucker, Quantitative easing, monetary policy implementation and the public finances, Institute for Fiscal Studies Green Budget 2022, chapter 7, October 2022 (Reserves pay Bank Rate; the saving from paying no interest on a large part of them): https://ifs.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-10/Quantitative-easing-monetary-policy-implementation-and-the-public-finances-Green-Budget-2022.pdf. Paraphrased; key findings read off the rendered pages 1 and 2. The author is a former central banker. QE creates reserves that are paid Bank Rate, which shifted a large part of government debt from fixed-rate to floating-rate borrowing, so rises in Bank Rate raise the government's debt-servicing costs immediately. A tiered system paying no or low interest on a large part of reserves would, on market expectations of 6 October 2022 and the Bank's plans for unwinding QE, save between around GBP30 billion and GBP45 billion in each of the next two financial years. Page 9 (pdf page 10, read off the rendered page): if Bank Rate averages more than the yield on the gilts it bought, the Bank makes a loss, which it passes on to the Treasury; Key findings, point 4: the Bank need pay Bank Rate only on the amount of reserves necessary to establish its policy rate.
Office for Budget Responsibility, Debt maturity, quantitative easing and interest rate sensitivity, Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2021, Box 4.1 (How much a rise in interest rates adds to the government's interest bill): https://obr.uk/box/debt-maturity-quantitative-easing-and-interest-rate-sensitivity/. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026. The gilt purchases are financed by reserves that pay Bank Rate, and the interest on the whole stock of reserves responds immediately to Bank Rate, whereas changes in long-term rates reach the interest on gilts slowly, around a third of the effect within five years. If short- and long-term interest rates were both one percentage point higher than in the forecast, debt interest spending in 2025-26 would be GBP20.8 billion higher, 0.8 per cent of GDP.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.