Where every figure came from
Letter from Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 9 November 2012 (HM Treasury, Asset Purchase Facility: cash management operations) (The November 2012 agreement on the surplus): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a74ba5540f0b61df477800d/govletter121109.pdf. Published on GOV.UK under the Open Government Licence v3.0; paraphrased, quoted briefly. Retrieved 1 October 2026; read off the rendered pages 1 and 2. The Chancellor and the Governor agreed to transfer the gilt coupon payments received by the Asset Purchase Facility, net of interest costs and other expenses, to the Exchequer. Previously these cash flows accumulated on the APF's balance sheet. Because the APF is indemnified by the Government, its gains or losses are ultimately due to the Exchequer, so the coupons amount to "payments from one part of the public sector to another". The scale and likely duration of the APF had increased significantly since its start. Transfers would at first run from the APF to the Government but were likely to need reverse payments in the future as Bank Rate increases and the gilts are unwound; under reasonable assumptions the majority of any transfer would eventually need to be reversed; the Government would meet return payments on a timely basis. Page 2: the Chancellor intended to use the funds to reduce the stock of outstanding government debt, so the private sector would hold fewer gilts and more money than otherwise, a small loosening of monetary conditions compared with keeping the coupons on deposit in the APF; the Monetary Policy Committee viewed using the coupon income to reduce the stock of gilts as having an effect similar to the Committee buying gilts of the same value.
Bank of England, Asset Purchase Facility Quarterly Report, 2026 Q2 (The payments to and from the Treasury): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/asset-purchase-facility/2026/2026-q2. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026. The report says the APF made net cash payments to HM Treasury from 2009 to 2022, reaching a cumulative peak of GBP123.9 billion at the end of September 2022. Payments in the other direction began in October 2022 and have been made every quarter since. At the end of 2026 Q2 (June 2026) the net total transferred to HM Treasury stood at GBP16.2 billion, and the Bank expects HM Treasury to have to keep paying the APF until the unwind ends. On one plausible set of assumptions the Bank estimates that lower debt-servicing costs from QE cover much or all of the Treasury's net lifetime payments to the APF. Derived for the numeric check: 123.9 - 16.2 = 107.7, the net paid by the Treasury to the APF between end-September 2022 and end-June 2026.
Patrick Honohan, How Much Capital Do Central Banks Really Have?, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 25-15, July 2025 (The indemnity compared with other central banks, and its effect on spending plans): https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/2025-07/wp25-15.pdf. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026; read off the rendered pages 10 and 11. The paper says the programme's net interest fell as rates went up and became negative in 2022. Unlike the Fed and the ECB, the Bank of England is covered by a government indemnity for APF losses, so a loss does not merely reduce a dividend: the Treasury pays the Bank for it promptly. Elsewhere, the usual response to losses was to cut or suspend dividends to the government. Citing the Bank's own estimates, the author puts total Treasury payments to the Bank from 2022 onwards at up to GBP280 billion, about 12 per cent of GDP. Page 11, the author's view: the indemnity has collided with the government's rule of balancing current spending with taxes, which has limited its ability to carry out its spending plans.
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Making an independent Bank of England work better, HL Paper 10, 27 November 2023 (Summary) (The Lords committee on the deed and on the Bank and the Treasury): https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldeconaf/10/1003.htm. Open Parliament Licence v3.0; quoted briefly. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (Summary, 1003.htm). Publication date 27 November 2023 from the report contents page, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldeconaf/10/1002.htm. The committee again asks for the Deed of Indemnity, the contract between HM Treasury and the Bank, to be published, describing it as the document that "commits the taxpayer to paying any financial losses" the Bank might suffer from quantitative easing. It recommends clear lines of responsibility and communication between the Bank and HM Treasury where fiscal and monetary policy interact.
HM Treasury, Asset Purchase Facility deed of indemnity (FOI release), 19 November 2024 (When the deed was released): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asset-purchase-facility-deed-of-indemnity. Open Government Licence v3.0. Retrieved 1 October 2026. Following a ruling by the Information Commissioner's Office, HM Treasury released a redacted version of the deed of indemnity on 19 November 2024.
House of Commons Library, Central bank reserves and government's debt interest, CBP-10455, 9 January 2026, section 2.4 (Who would decide to change the interest on reserves): https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10455/CBP-10455.pdf. Open Parliament Licence v3.0; quoted briefly. Retrieved 1 October 2026; read off the rendered pages 6 and 25. Page 6: the reserves created to fund QE earn Bank Rate, a variable rate that changes with each Bank Rate decision, roughly every six weeks, while the Bank receives a fixed rate of interest on the gilts. Tiering means paying less interest, or none, on part of the reserves; to work, it would probably require banks to hold a set amount of reserves earning nothing or less than Bank Rate. Page 25: the briefing says it is not fully clear whether the power to change the interest on reserves sits with the Bank or the Chancellor, and that both say they want no change. Governor Bailey says a statutory level of reserves "would be fiscal policy, which is something that must be enacted by the Government and Parliament". The government says monetary policy, QE included, is for the Monetary Policy Committee, and that it has "no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England".
HM Treasury, Remit for the Monetary Policy Committee, letter from the Chancellor to the Governor, 26 November 2025 (Who sets the target and who sets the interest rate): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6925e17547904590c9da2d38/CX_Letter_-_Bank_of_England_-_Andrew_Bailey_-_26112025.pdf. Open Government Licence v3.0. Retrieved 7 September 2026 (cached). Under the Bank of England Act the remit, set by the government, specifies what price stability is taken to be and confirms the inflation target; the government fully supports the operational independence of the Monetary Policy Committee in setting policy.
Paul Tucker, Quantitative easing, monetary policy implementation and the public finances, Institute for Fiscal Studies Green Budget 2022, chapter 7, October 2022 (How the APF is set up, and the original plan for its profits and losses): https://ifs.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-10/Quantitative-easing-monetary-policy-implementation-and-the-public-finances-Green-Budget-2022.pdf. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026; read off the rendered pages 1 (key finding 2), 9 (Box 7.1) and 10. The author is a former central banker. Key finding 2: the reserves QE creates sit in banks' accounts at the Bank and earn Bank Rate, the Bank's policy rate, so much UK government debt has in effect moved from fixed-rate borrowing, with costs locked in, to floating-rate borrowing. Box 7.1: the Bank carries out QE through a wholly owned company (APFF Ltd), which pays for its gilts with a loan from the Bank charged at Bank Rate; the reserves created are owed by the Bank. The company has thus borrowed at a floating rate to hold fixed-rate gilts. The Treasury covers its losses and takes its running profits, which arise when Bank Rate is below the portfolio's average yield. The first plan was to settle profits or losses when the scheme ended; quarterly cash settlement came in late 2012 because QE was lasting far longer than expected.
Office for National Statistics, CPI annual rate 00: all items (series D7G7, dataset MM23) (The peak in inflation): https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/d7g7/mm23. Open Government Licence v3.0. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (release of 16 September 2026). October 2022: 11.1 per cent, the highest monthly figure from 2016 to August 2026; November 2022 10.7, December 2022 10.5; August 2026 3.1.
House of Commons Library, Economic update: The new Prime Minister, inflation and the cost of living, CBP-10975, 31 July 2026 (How far prices rose from January 2021): https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10975/. Open Parliament Licence v3.0. Retrieved 1 October 2026. UK consumer prices rose by 30.7 per cent from January 2021 to June 2026, on the ONS CPI level series D7BT (checked: 142.5 / 109.0 = 1.307); from August 2015 to January 2021 they rose by 8.7 per cent (checked: 109.0 / 100.3 = 1.087).
Office for National Statistics, CPI index 00: all items, 2015 = 100 (series D7BT, dataset MM23) (The episode chart): https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/d7bt/mm23. Open Government Licence v3.0. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (release of 16 September 2026). Monthly, January 2016 to August 2026. August 2015 100.3; January 2021 109.0; October 2022 126.2; June 2026 142.5; August 2026 143.6. The index has not returned to its January 2021 level at any point since. For the chart check (derived): January 2016 99.5 to January 2021 109.0 is a rise of 9.5 per cent (under a tenth); January 2021 to January 2026 139.5 is a rise of 28.0 per cent (more than a quarter); 28.0 / 9.5 = 2.9, about three times.
Tomasz Wieladek, Quantitative easing generates more inflation than conventional monetary policy, VoxEU column, 3 January 2024 (Newer work on quantitative easing and inflation): https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/quantitative-easing-generates-more-inflation-conventional-monetary-policy. Paraphrased; one economist's column, not a position of the publisher. Retrieved 1 October 2026. The author is Chief European Economist at T. Rowe Price. He fits models to QE data from before the pandemic for the euro area, the UK and the US, leaving out pandemic-era data. To compare like with like he sets QE against conventional policy moves of equal size, for example an equal fall in the shadow rate and in the policy rate, or an equal response of long-term interest rates. On that basis QE's effect on inflation is two to four times that of conventional policy in the UK and the US, though not in the euro area; for output and several other variables he finds no sign of a difference. He adds that a meta-analysis of 82 earlier studies points the same way, and notes that many commentators blame QE for part of the post-pandemic inflation.
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 15-7, May 2015 (The earlier verdict): https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb15-7.pdf. Paraphrased. Retrieved 1 October 2026. On the United States: up to then, the inflation that QE was feared to cause had not appeared, and inflation had if anything been too low. The brief expects prices to stay benign after QE.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.