Explain what the 1998 recession cost Japan in output and jobs, and how the state supported the banks in 1998 and 1999 with public funds, new laws and new capital.
12 min
7 questions
Before you start
What you'll be able to answer
What did the 1998 recession cost Japan in output and jobs?
How did the state use new laws and public funds to deal with failing banks in 1998?
What did the public capital the state put into the major banks in 1998 and 1999 achieve?
Where this sits
Japan's Lost Decade — 1989 to 2006 · this module is lit
Dec 1989Share prices in Japan peak
Aug 1990The Bank of Japan's last rise in its discount rate, the interest rate at which it lent to banks
Aug 1992The government announces the first of six spending packages up to 1995
1995-96The first direct use of taxpayers' money against financial instability covers losses at failed housing-loan companies, the jusen
1 Apr 1997The consumption tax rate, a tax on what people buy, is raised
Nov 1997Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities fail
Oct-Dec 1998Japan's parliament, the Diet, makes more public money available to deal with banks' bad loans, and the state takes over the Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank
Feb 1999The Bank of Japan begins its zero interest rate policy, pushing its overnight rate as low as possible
Mar 1999Public capital, new capital paid for by the state, is put into the major banks
Mar 2001The Bank of Japan begins quantitative easing, a target for the money banks keep in their accounts with it
Oct 2002The Financial Services Agency, the banking regulator, launches its programme to cut bad loans
Mar 2006The Bank of Japan ends quantitative easing
Japan in the summer of 1998
In June 1998 a new regulator, the Financial Supervisory Agency, took over bank supervision from the Ministry of Finance. In the same month the problems at the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) became public. Seven months earlier Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities had failed. Yamaichi was a large firm trading shares and bonds for clients. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that output, the value of everything the economy produced, had fallen in late 1997 and early 1998. Business investment, firms' spending on equipment and buildings, was weakening.
Take a guess
Output fell through 1998. What do you expect happened to unemployment over the four years that followed?
It kept rising until 2002, even though output had grown again in 2000.
Japan's economy shrank in 1998
In 1998 Japan's output shrank by 1.8 per cent, on World Bank figures published in 2026.
The fall reached most of the economy. Household spending, house-building and business investment all fell further and for longer than in earlier recessions, the IMF said in 1999. Falling incomes held back household spending. Bank lending was limited, and the IMF said this seems to have held back business investment. Firms were also cutting debts they had taken on in the bubble years, the earlier boom in share and land prices.
The falls in spending and investment fed on each other. When households spend less, firms sell less. Firms that sell less invest less and hire fewer people, and people out of work spend less again.
Unemployment hit what the IMF called a post-war record, and kept rising until 2002
In June 1998 unemployment, the share of people who want work but have none, reached 4.3 per cent, a post-war record, the IMF reported.
The chart shows the World Bank's figures for each whole year. For 1998 as a whole the rate was 4.1 per cent, a little below the June figure. Output grew again in 2000, yet unemployment did not fall back. The yearly rate went on rising and reached 5.4 per cent in 2002. Large firms planned further cuts: in 1999 several announced plans to reduce their workforce, the IMF noted.
Unemployment in Japan, 1991 to 2006Per cent of people who want work but have none, yearly average
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS), data last updated 13 July 2026. CC BY 4.0.
Check yourself
Look at the chart. How had unemployment moved in the years from 1991 to 1997, before the recession?
Check yourself
A worker in Japan in 1998 still has a job but fears losing it. What does that worry do to the economy?
The government announced two spending packages in 1998
The government responded to the recession with two packages to support the economy. In April 1998 it announced one worth more than ¥16 trillion. In November it announced an emergency package of ¥27 trillion. More than ¥9 trillion of the November package was tax cuts. It also aimed to pay for building projects, help with rising unemployment and support for small and mid-sized firms.
The package totals are the government's own figures. Public investment rose sharply from late 1998, the IMF said. The government also took steps to ease the pressure on banks and other lenders. In the IMF's view, the extra public investment and the help for lenders steadied spending by households and firms early in 1999. The state had also put money into the banks, starting in March 1998.
Take a guess
In March 1998 the state offered the banks public capital. A bank's capital is its cushion against losses, and public capital is capital that the state pays for. Every major bank applied at once. Why might they have done that?
No bank wanted to stand out as weak. If all of them applied together, none would stand out. A 2001 paper for the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the central banks' own bank, gives this as the reason. The banks applied by choice; nothing forced them.
A first, smaller injection of public capital in March 1998 brought only a short calm
A law passed in February 1998 had set aside public funds to cover losses at failed banks and to put capital into banks. In late March 1998 the major banks received public capital totalling ¥1.8 trillion.
Capital matters because a bank can use it to cover losses. The more capital a bank holds, the more bad loans it can absorb before its depositors are at risk. Other lenders can also lend to it more safely.
Investors judged the sum far too small, the BIS paper records. Most of it came as loans and bonds that the banks would have to repay, though only after their other debts. Investors thought this kind of capital gave too little protection as well. The injection calmed markets, but only until about May.
In mid-1998 the government had to settle the future of the LTCB
The LTCB was a large bank. It held assets, such as loans, worth ¥26 trillion, and it offered many services to the firms that borrowed from it. It also had many derivatives, contracts whose value depends on something else, such as an interest rate. Many were swaps, in which two sides agree to exchange interest or currency payments. The other sides were large firms in Japan and abroad. Another bank, Sumitomo Trust, had been in talks to merge with it. From June 1998 the LTCB found it hard to raise the money it needed, the BIS paper records.
Your decision
You are advising Japan's government in the summer of 1998. What do you do about the LTCB?
About your choiceThe theory
On this view, a bank that cannot survive should close, and its owners bear the cost.
Where it was tried
From November 1997 Yamaichi Securities was closed down in an orderly way, the BIS paper records. Bank of Japan loans paid for returning customers' assets and completing its contracts.
What it costs
The LTCB's borrowers and other clients would lose its services. The LTCB might also fail to make the payments its contracts required. If so, the firms on the other side of its derivatives might all cancel those contracts at the same time. Markets in Japan and abroad could be unsettled as a result.
About your choiceThe theory
On this view, the bank keeps working while the state takes charge and looks for new owners.
Where it was tried
No law yet allowed it, the BIS paper records. In mid-1998 Japan had no way to put a bank of that size under temporary state control and then sell it to new owners.
What it costs
The Diet would first have to pass a new law. Meanwhile the bank would find it ever harder to raise money. Public money would cover the losses its shareholders could not.
About your choiceThe theory
On this view, a healthy bank takes over the business and its services carry on.
Where it was tried
A rescue merger had been tried before. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank had planned to merge with Hokkaido Bank in 1997, but the plan was dropped that September, the BIS paper records.
What it costs
A partner would take on bad loans of unknown size. Sumitomo Trust doubted how many of the LTCB's loans were bad, the BIS paper records. Rating agencies and the share market had also signalled they would punish Sumitomo Trust for such a merger.
What actually happenedThe policy
The Diet passed the Financial Reconstruction Law. It let the state nationalise a failing bank, which means taking it into state ownership for a time. On 23 October 1998 the LTCB was nationalised under this law. Its managers were replaced and its bad loans were moved out of the bank. The bank's owners, its shareholders, took the losses first. The Deposit Insurance Corporation covered the rest. It runs the scheme that repays depositors when a bank fails. Public money restored the bank's capital. The BIS paper gives two reasons for this choice: the bank's many services to its clients, and the risk its derivatives posed to markets. The talks to merge the LTCB with Sumitomo Trust had already failed. If the bank had collapsed in a disorderly way, the other sides of its derivatives might have cancelled their contracts all at once.
What followed
The LTCB kept doing business under state ownership, using cash from the Deposit Insurance Corporation. The BIS paper records no major direct effects on other financial markets. In February 2000 the bank was sold to New LTCB Partners, formed by the US investment fund Ripplewood and other overseas investors.
In October 1998 the Diet doubled the public funds available for banks
Two laws passed in October by the Diet, Japan's parliament, did two things. First, they made ¥60 trillion of public money available until March 2001 to deal with banks' bad loans, double the ¥30 trillion of public funds set aside in February. The size of the sum was meant to show that the government was committed to fixing the banks, the BIS paper says.
Second, they gave the state new powers. The Financial Reconstruction Law let it take over a failing bank, keep it running and honour all its debts and contracts. The LTCB was taken over under it that month. The other law set new rules for putting public capital into banks that could survive.
On 13 December the state nationalised Nippon Credit Bank. An inspection by the new regulator, under tougher standards, found it would be insolvent, owing more than it owned, once its losses were fully counted.
In March 1999 the state put new capital into 15 major banks
In March 1999 the state put ¥7.5 trillion of public capital into 15 major banks. Most of it bought preferred shares, a special class of shares. The banks also raised capital from private investors.
The amount was set to cover two kinds of loss. One was the fall in value of the shares and bonds the banks held. The other was losses on bad loans, under stricter new rules for marking down their value. Each bank had to publish a plan to raise its profits, so that the state could get its money back. The main aim, the BIS paper says, was to restore confidence in Japan's banks.
After the injection, the extra interest Japanese banks paid to borrow abroad began to fall. This extra was called the Japan premium. Lenders wary of risk charge more to banks they see as troubled, the BIS paper records.
Check yourself
Work from two figures in this module: public capital of ¥1.8 trillion went into the major banks in March 1998, and ¥7.5 trillion into 15 major banks in March 1999. How many times as large in money terms was the second? Give one decimal place.
times
4.2 times
About 4.2 times: 7.5 divided by 1.8. The BIS paper calls it more than four times as large.
Check yourself
A Japanese bank pays more than other banks for the same loan abroad, and the gap then shrinks. What does the shrinking gap tell you?
The banks were steadier by 1999, but their bad loans remained
By mid-1999 the immediate danger to the banking system had eased, the IMF judged. Yet the banks' balance sheets, their records of what they own and owe, were still weak, and so were their profits. The Bank of Japan wanted more than new capital, the BIS paper records. Banks still had to get rid of their bad loans.
Unemployment, as the chart shows, kept rising until 2002. Prices were edging down, the IMF noted in 1999. Why did prices across Japan's economy keep falling, and why did that matter for firms with debts? The next module takes up that question.
Check yourself
The key questions
What did the 1998 recession cost Japan in output and jobs?
Output shrank in 1998 as spending and investment fell. Unemployment reached what the IMF called a post-war record in June 1998, and the yearly rate kept rising until 2002, after output had begun to grow again.
How did the state use new laws and public funds to deal with failing banks in 1998?
In October 1998 the Diet doubled the public funds available for the banks. It also passed a law that let the state nationalise a failing bank and keep it running. The Long-Term Credit Bank was nationalised that month and Nippon Credit Bank in December.
What did the public capital the state put into the major banks in 1998 and 1999 achieve?
A small injection of public capital in March 1998 calmed markets only until about May. In March 1999 the state put far more into the major banks, mainly to restore confidence, the BIS paper says. After it the Japan premium, the extra interest Japanese banks paid to borrow abroad, began to fall.
The numbers
Output in 1998 (World Bank data, 2026)Shrank by 1.8 per cent
Unemployment, June 1998 (IMF), and yearly in 1998 and 2002 (World Bank)4.3 per cent, a post-war record; 4.1 and 5.4 per cent
Spending packages of April and November 1998, headline totalsMore than ¥16 trillion and ¥27 trillion
Public funds made available for banks, October 1998Doubled from ¥30 trillion to ¥60 trillion
Public capital put into the major banks, March 1998 and March 1999¥1.8 trillion, then ¥7.5 trillion into 15 banks
Check yourself
Japan's output grew again in 2000, yet the yearly unemployment rate was higher in 2002 than in 1998. Which explanation does the evidence in this module support?
Check yourself
A firm has a swap, a contract to exchange interest payments, with the LTCB. The bank is nationalised in October 1998. What happens to the swap?
Check yourself
What is public capital, of the kind the state put into Japan's banks in 1998 and 1999?