Where every figure came from
World Bank, World Development Indicators: unemployment, total, per cent of total labour force, modelled ILO estimate (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS), and GDP growth (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG), Japan (Output in 1998; unemployment by year; the chart): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=JP. CC BY 4.0, credit World Bank. Data last updated 13 July 2026, retrieved 3 October 2026 through the World Bank API and downloaded again independently the same day; the two reads are identical (re-compared 4 October 2026). Unemployment, yearly, per cent: 1991 2.06, 1997 3.37, 1998 4.08, 2002 5.39, 2006 4.19; the chart plots every year from 1991 to 2006 as published. Real GDP growth: 1998 -1.77, 2000 2.98. Rounded on the page to 4.1, 5.4 and 1.8. GDP growth series page: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=JP. Derived here: unemployment rises in most years from 1991 to 1997 and is highest in 2002 within 1991 to 2006. The IMF estimate made in 1999 put the 1998 fall in output higher; the page uses the World Bank figure and names its year, and does not print the IMF estimate.
IMF, Public Information Notice 98/60, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Japan (August 1998) (Output falling in late 1997 and early 1998; the June 1998 unemployment record; flat earnings): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1998/pn9860.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Background: activity fell again in the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998; job growth slowed sharply after early 1997 and the unemployment rate rose to "a post-war record of 4.3 percent in June 1998"; monthly earnings were flat over the year; business investment faltered as credit tightened and growth and profit forecasts fell. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20001211160600id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1998/PN9860.HTM (capture 2000-12-11). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
IMF, Public Information Notice 99/75, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Japan (August 1999) (Why demand fell in 1998; the packages and public investment; the state of the banks in 1999): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/pn9975.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Background: in 1998 each main part of private demand fell further and for longer than in earlier recessions; household spending was held back by falling incomes and by worries over jobs, as unemployment rose and several large firms announced plans to cut staff; bank lending fell sharply, partly because of the failures of late 1997, and limits on bank credit also seem to have weighed on business investment, alongside firms' efforts to work off debt and over-investment from the bubble years. The IMF counted the November 1998 package at a smaller total than the government's headline figure, and said a surge of public investment from the last quarter of 1998, with steps to ease financial strains, helped steady private demand and lift output early in 1999. A framework for handling bank problems was now largely in place, easing immediate fears for the system, but banks' balance sheets and profits were not yet fully repaired. Core consumer prices had been falling slightly since the autumn of 1998. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20001216065100id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/PN9975.HTM (capture 2000-12-16). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comprehensive Economic Measures (24 April 1998) (The April 1998 package): http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/measure98/measures.html. Government of Japan terms; paraphrased. The April 1998 measures had a total amount of more than 16 trillion yen, with fiscal spending of about 12 trillion yen and temporary and policy tax cuts. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000302040042id_/http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/measure98/measures.html (capture 2000-03-02). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Measures Taken by the Obuchi Administration (June 1999) (The November 1998 package; the 15 major banks): http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/measure99/index.html. Government of Japan terms; paraphrased. The November 1998 emergency package totalled 27 trillion yen, with more than 9 trillion yen of tax cuts, aimed at infrastructure, tax cuts, rising unemployment and small and medium-sized firms. Under the heading on stabilising the financial system: public funds of 7.5 trillion yen were injected into 15 major banks, and failing institutions were placed under public management. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20001206005100id_/http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/measure99/index.html (capture 2000-12-06). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Hiroshi Nakaso, Bank for International Settlements, BIS Papers No 6, The financial crisis in Japan during the 1990s: how the Bank of Japan responded and the lessons learnt (October 2001) (The March 1998 injection, the LTCB, the October 1998 laws, Nippon Credit Bank, the March 1999 capital, the Japan premium): https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. The cached text names its author as a member of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department. Section 1.3.2.3: Yamaichi Securities, a securities house, suspended new business in November 1997 as a step towards closing and was wound down for liquidation in an orderly way (declared bankrupt in June 1999), with Bank of Japan loans used to return customers' assets and settle its contracts. Section 1.3.2.5: a February 1998 law made public funds available for the first capital injection; because banks did not want to be singled out as weak, all the major banks applied together, and applications were voluntary, and footnote 13 records that compulsory injection was discussed in the summer of 1998 and dropped; on 30 March 1998 they received a capital injection totalling ¥1.8 trillion; markets judged the sum far too small, and most of it was subordinated loans and bonds, also seen as inadequate. Section 1.4: markets stayed calm until about May. Section 1.4.1: the LTCB, one of three long-term credit banks, had assets of ¥26 trillion and a large derivatives book, substantial parts of it interest rate and currency swaps, with major firms at home and abroad; it offered many services to borrowers and other clients; in June 1998, as its problems surfaced, the new Financial Supervisory Agency took over supervision from the Ministry of Finance; a rescue merger with Sumitomo Trust Bank failed when Sumitomo Trust doubted the size of LTCB's bad loans and rating agencies and the share market signalled they would punish a merger; in 1997 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank's planned merger with Hokkaido Bank had been abandoned in September (section 1.3.2.2); no mechanism then existed to wind down so large a bank for sale to new investors; the Financial Reconstruction Law allowed temporary nationalisation; managers were replaced, bad loans removed, losses borne first by shareholders and then by the Deposit Insurance Corporation, and public money restored capital; the authorities briefed the derivatives trade body and the bankers' federation that all contracts would be honoured; the bank was nationalised on 23 October 1998, with no major direct spillover to other markets, kept trading on liquidity from the Deposit Insurance Corporation financed by the Bank of Japan, and was bought in February 2000 by New LTCB Partners, formed by the US fund Ripplewood and other overseas investors; the wind-down for sale was chosen because of the bank's services to clients and the systemic concern its derivatives posed; the new law took four months, during which the bank was under heavy funding pressure. Section 1.4.2: under the new law, business at nationalised banks was to continue without interruption and full performance of their liabilities was assured; the October laws doubled the public funds available from ¥30 trillion to ¥60 trillion, until March 2001, to show the government's commitment; a second law set rules for capital injections into viable banks. Section 1.5.1: after an inspection with tougher standards found it would be insolvent, Nippon Credit Bank was nationalised on 13 December 1998; it had received capital from the Bank of Japan and private institutions in July 1997. Section 1.5.2: the March 1999 injection into 15 major banks was ¥7.5 trillion of public capital, mostly preferred shares, sized to cover unrealised losses on securities and losses on bad loans under stricter write-down rules; the banks also raised capital privately; each bank published a plan to improve profits; the main aim was to restore confidence; the amount was more than four times the March 1998 injection; the Bank of Japan welcomed it but said banks still had to remove bad loans and consolidate further. Section 1.5.3: after that injection the Japan premium began to decline. Figure 5 measures the Japan premium as the gap between a dollar rate paid by Japanese banks in the Japan offshore market and three-month dollar LIBOR. Section 5: lenders sensitive to risk charged higher premiums to banks they saw as troubled. Read from https://www.bis.org/publications/paper-6-financial-crisis-japan-during-1990s-how-bank-japan-responded-and-lessons-learnt.pdf. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: operations involving banks under special public management (The dates of the two nationalisations and the buyer of the LTCB): https://www.dic.go.jp/english/e_katsudo/page_000268.html. DICJ copyright; paraphrased. Schedule table: special public management of the Long-Term Credit Bank began on 23 October 1998 and of Nippon Credit Bank on 13 December 1998; the Long-Term Credit Bank was taken over by New LTCB Partners. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.