Where every figure came from
IMF, Public Information Notice 98/60, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Japan (August 1998) (The 1997 tightening, the fall in output, the causes the IMF named, the Japan premium, share prices): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1998/pn9860.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Background section: after strengthening in 1996 and early 1997 the economy fell into recession; real GDP fell sharply in the second quarter of 1997, mostly because an earlier rush of household spending ahead of the April consumption tax rise was reversed; output recovered a little in the third quarter and fell again in the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998. Strains in the financial sector were "an important factor behind the slowdown": fragile bank balance sheets and a stricter regulatory framework due in April 1998 tightened credit; the failure of several major financial institutions in late 1997 came with turmoil in short-term money markets and a sharp increase in the Japan premium; worry about the banks showed in a sharp fall in share prices from mid-1997. A shift toward fiscal consolidation and the Asia crisis held activity back further. The stance turned contractionary in 1997, the IMF says, to reach a sustainable fiscal position ahead of demographic pressures; the general government structural deficit fell by an estimated 1½ per cent of GDP through tax rises (a 2 percentage point rise in the consumption tax rate on 1 April 1997 and the withdrawal in June 1997 of earlier income tax relief) and sharp cuts in public investment, to which the IMF gives no month. The Asia crisis cut the support from demand abroad and hurt confidence; net exports fell in the first quarter of 1998, mainly on weaker exports to the rest of Asia; falling commodity prices improved Japan's terms of trade. The target for the overnight rate had not changed since September 1995. The gloss on demographic pressures (the costs that come with a population growing older) is the writer's, not the IMF's. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20001211160600id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1998/PN9860.HTM (capture 2000-12-11). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
IMF, Public Information Notice 99/75, IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Japan (August 1999) (What started the 1997 downturn; bank lending; exports in 1998): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/pn9975.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Background section: after a brief recovery in 1996 the economy went back into recession early in 1997; the downturn began with a fall in household spending after the April 1997 consumption tax rise that was larger than expected, and was made worse by a sharp cut in lending by Japanese banks, linked in part to the failure of three major financial institutions late in 1997, and by the Asia crisis. Export volumes fell through 1998 and into early 1999, which the IMF ties to a fading boost from the earlier fall of the yen, despite the downturn in Asian trade; the page does not join this fall to the Asian crisis. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20001216065100id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/PN9975.HTM (capture 2000-12-16). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Thomas A. Lubik and Karl Rhodes, A Closer Look at Japan's Rising Consumption Tax, Economic Brief 19-10 (October 2019) (The tax rise, the public debt it was meant to address, and the caution about blaming it): https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2019/eb_19-10. Reserve Bank publication; quoted briefly, otherwise paraphrased. The government raised the "consumption tax from 3 percent to 5 percent in 1997"; household consumption rose a little ahead of the rise, then fell and stayed flat for about two years. At the time Japan was seeking a way to bring its growing national debt under control. The brief reports research (Lubik and Lecznar) finding a break in household consumption in the second quarter of 1997, coinciding with the tax rise, which stops short of blaming the tax rise for the recession. Opening paragraph: some commentators and economists have blamed tax rises for the recessions of 1997 and 2014, but "little statistical analysis has been published to support or refute" that view. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Hiroshi Nakaso, Bank for International Settlements, BIS Papers No 6, The financial crisis in Japan during the 1990s: how the Bank of Japan responded and the lessons learnt (October 2001) (The failures of November 1997 and the Bank of Japan's lending): https://www.bis.org/publications/paper-6-financial-crisis-japan-during-1990s-how-bank-japan-responded-and-lessons-learnt.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. The cached text names its author as a member of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department. Section 1.3.2: Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Yamaichi Securities and Tokuyo City Bank failed one after another in November 1997. Section 1.3.2.1: Sanyo, a medium-sized securities house, applied to the Tokyo District Court on 3 November 1997 and its business was suspended; it defaulted on ¥8.3 billion of unsecured call money, a small sum beside the market's turnover; lenders then preferred to place money with the Bank of Japan rather than in the interbank market, foreign banks cut their credit limits to Japanese banks in general, the market contracted and interbank rates came under upward pressure; in late November the Bank of Japan supplied large amounts of funds to the market. Section 1.3.2.2: Hokkaido Takushoku gave up continuing on its own; Hokuyo Bank, a regional bank in Hokkaido, agreed to take over its business there; the failure was announced on 17 November and the Bank of Japan lent to it to meet large deposit withdrawals, its uncollateralised support peaking "at ¥2.6 trillion in early February 1998". Section 1.3.2.3: Yamaichi, a large securities house, collapsed after off-the-book liabilities came to light; on 24 November 1997 it was announced that it would stop taking new business and wind down; the Bank of Japan lent to it so customers' assets could be returned and contracts settled. Section 1.3.2.4: Tokuyo City Bank, a regional bank in Sendai, failed on 26 November 1997; the Asian crisis, which broke out in July in Thailand and its neighbours, reached Korea in the autumn. Section heading 1.3.2: "The financial crisis of autumn 1997". Figure 5 measures the Japan premium as the 3-month rate Japanese banks paid in the Japan offshore market less the 3-month LIBOR rate, the rate at which banks in London lent to each other; with the IMF's note of a sharp increase, this is the source for the page's gloss of the Japan premium as the extra interest Japanese banks paid to borrow abroad. Read from https://www.bis.org/publications/paper-6-financial-crisis-japan-during-1990s-how-bank-japan-responded-and-lessons-learnt.pdf. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bank of Japan, Statement by the Governor (tentative translation), 17 November 1997 (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/press/danwa/dan9711b.htm. Paraphrased. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank told the Bank of Japan that it had become difficult to continue its business on its own, after it lost market confidence, seen in a sharp fall in its share price and in its deposits; its sound business was to be transferred to another bank, and all deposits were protected. Same source and wording as the shipped module why-japans-asset-bubble-grew-and-what-followed. Cached in this lane at cache/615eeba30819e1f5; read 2 is an independent download, s3/read2/boj9711.html, byte-identical (4 October 2026). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Financial Crises and Bank Supervision: New Directions for Japan?, Economic Letter 97-37 (December 1997) (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank): https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/economic-letter/1997/12/financial-crises-and-bank-supervision-new-directions-for-japan/. Reserve Bank publication; quoted briefly. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank was "the first city bank" to close "its doors during the crisis"; the letter explains a city bank as a large commercial bank. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Statistics: Financial Market Prices, Japan, equities, period-average index, monthly (JPN.EQTS.PA_IX.M) (The chart; the fall in share prices in late 1997): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/3.0/data/dataflow/IMF.STA/MFS_FMP/+/JPN.EQTS.PA_IX.M. IMF data, used with credit ("IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics"). Monthly averages, 2010 = 100, January 1996 to December 1998 (36 values; s3/m4_eqts_rows.json). January 1996 180.6; April 1997 155.4; June 1997 172.6; July 1997 172.5; November 1997 139.6; December 1997 135.9; October 1998 115.6; December 1998 125.1. Derived here: from June 1997 to December 1997 the index fell 21.3 per cent (21.2 per cent from July), so "about a fifth"; from April to June 1997 it rose. Retrieved 3 October 2026 through the IMF SDMX API on the device; an independent second download was identical (re-compared 4 October 2026).
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.