- Market-oriented environmental policy
- A market-oriented environmental policy is one that gives firms an incentive to cut pollution while leaving them some flexibility in how they do it.
- Command-and-control regulation
- Command-and-control regulation is a law that sets how much pollution a firm may emit and may also say which pollution-control technology it must use.
Tools a government uses on an externality
Can you name five tools, other than regulation, that a government uses to correct a market failure?
Each tool changes either the price people face, the amount supplied, or what buyers know.
A pollution tax is a charge on each unit of pollution a firm emits, so the firm cuts emissions wherever cutting costs less than the tax.
Can you think of an example?
Landfill Tax adds a charge to every tonne of waste sent to landfill, so recycling pays wherever it costs less than the tax.
A subsidy is a payment from the government, to a firm or to a buyer, for each unit of a good whose use benefits third parties.
Can you think of an example?
A voucher worth the benefit each flu jab gives other people lowers the price the person vaccinated pays, so more people get jabbed.
State provision is the government supplying a good itself, paid for from taxes, so that everyone contributes and nobody can free ride.
Can you think of an example?
The NHS gives flu jabs free to the people most at risk, paid for from taxes, so the price stops nobody who should be jabbed.
Information provision is the government publishing, or requiring sellers to publish, information buyers lack, so they judge a good's true benefit or harm.
Can you think of an example?
Health warnings printed on cigarette packets tell smokers about harm they may underrate, so some buy fewer or give up.
Tradable permits cap the total pollution allowed and let firms buy and sell the right to emit within that cap.
Can you think of an example?
Under the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, a firm that can cut emissions cheaply sells its spare allowances to one for which cutting costs more.
Check yourself
Many buyers underrate the tooth decay that sugary drinks cause. Which tool tackles that cause of over-consumption most directly?
Regulation cleans up, but gives firms no reason to beat the standard
Laws that set how much each firm may emit, and sometimes which equipment it must fit, have been largely responsible for cleaner air and water in the United States since the 1970s. Economists point to three weaknesses. Once firms meet the standard, they have no incentive to do better. The same rule usually applies to every firm, whether cutting is cheap or costly for it. And because the rules are written through politics, they fill up with loopholes and exceptions won by lobbying.
A tax or permits reach the same cut at a lower cost
A pollution tax or tradable permits leave each firm to choose how much to cut, so the firms that can cut cheaply cut most and the rest pay. Their advantage is not that they cut pollution by more or less than regulation. It is that, through incentives and flexibility, they reach any given cut at a lower cost to society. They work badly if the tax is set too low or the permits allow too much.
Check yourself
Why do economists often prefer a pollution tax to a rule that sets the same limit for every firm?
Subsidies, provision and information suit benefits and knowledge gaps
Where a good's benefits spill over to others, the fix runs the other way: a subsidy or voucher lowers the price, or the state supplies the good from taxes so nobody can free ride. Where buyers misjudge a good, the public sector may need to provide the information itself. Each has a cost. Government spending costs taxpayers money and can be directed more for political than for economic reasons, and a subsidy paid on every unit also pays people who would have bought anyway.
Which tool is best, and how far to go, depends on the case
Cutting pollution pays only while the benefit of the next cut exceeds its cost. The first cuts are cheap and do the most good; later ones cost more and do less. Overall benefits exceeding costs does not prove every regulation is sensible. The tool matters too: permits work best where a few dozen or a few hundred firms are keen to trade, as power stations are, while a charge suits millions of small emitters, such as car engines.
Match the tool to the failure first: a tax or permits for an external cost, a subsidy or provision for an external benefit, information for a knowledge gap. Then weigh it: cost to society, certainty of the result, what the government must know, and the risk of government failure. Judge by naming what your answer turns on, such as how many polluters there are.
Check yourself
The curves show the marginal benefit and marginal cost of cutting pollution. Which point shows the amount of protection a government should aim for?
At A the next cut is worth far more than it costs, so stopping here leaves pollution that would be cheap to remove.
Yes. At B the benefit of the last cut just equals its cost. Any more costs more than it is worth; any less gives up a net gain.
At C each extra cut costs more than the good it does, so society is giving up too many resources to reduce pollution.
Exam question
Assess whether a tax is a better way than regulation of reducing pollution from car engines. [8]
For a tax: each driver cuts where cutting is cheapest, by driving less or buying a cleaner car, so a given cut costs society less, and every unit still costs money, so the incentive to cut never stops. Against: the government must know the external cost to set the rate, and a tax set too low cuts little, while a limit on each car's emissions gives certainty about the maximum. But regulation gives no reason to beat the standard and is prone to loopholes. Judgement: with millions of small emitters a charge usually works best, perhaps with regulation as a floor.
Levels reward analysis of each tool taken through to its effect on pollution and cost, evaluation weighing flexibility and cost against certainty and information, and a judgement that names what it turns on: here, that there are millions of small emitters.
Regulation cuts pollution but gives no reason to beat the standard, treats every firm alike and collects loopholes. A pollution tax or tradable permits let the firms that cut cheaply cut most, so any given cut costs society less. Subsidies and state provision fix external benefits, and information fixes knowledge gaps, at a cost to taxpayers. The best tool, and how far to go, depends on the case.