Before you start
What you'll be able to answer
- Why did investors pull money out of Thailand's neighbours too?
- How did the selling reach Korea by the end of 1997?
- What happened to the money flowing into Asia, and why did the Philippines come through better?
Where this sits
The Asian Financial Crisis — 1997 to 2000 · this module is lit
- 2 Jul 1997Thailand stops holding the baht at a fixed rate to the dollar and lets it float
- 14 Aug 1997Indonesia lets the rupiah float
- 20 Aug 1997The IMF approves a loan of about $3.9 billion for Thailand
- Nov 1997The IMF approves a loan of about $10.1 billion for Indonesia
- Nov 1997Indonesia closes 16 banks
- 4 Dec 1997The IMF approves a loan of about $21 billion for Korea
- 24 Dec 1997Korea's programme is speeded up
- 21 May 1998President Suharto of Indonesia resigns
- Aug 1998A crisis in Russia spreads panic beyond Asia
- 1-2 Sep 1998Malaysia brings in rules on money leaving the country
- 1999Growth returns in most of the region
On 11 July 1997 the Philippines let the peso move more freely
On 2 July 1997 Thailand let its currency, the baht, float. From then on the market set its price, and the central bank stopped holding it. Traders began selling the Philippine peso at once. Nine days later the Philippine central bank widened the band, the range within which it kept the peso against the US dollar. It did not say how wide the new band was. Indonesia widened the band for its rupiah the same day. Contagion, trouble spreading from one country to others, had begun.
In June 1997 one US dollar bought about 26 Philippine pesos. By January 1998, how many pesos did a dollar buy?
About 43. The peso lost a large part of its value against the dollar. The peso lost less than the Thai baht, which lost more than half of its value.
Investors pulled money from the neighbours too
Investors who had lent to Thailand looked again at its neighbours. Some neighbours had weak banks and large debts in dollars that were due within months. Investors pulled money out of those countries. A short-term debt must be repaid or renewed within months, and lenders can refuse to renew it. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) lends to countries that cannot pay their foreign bills. Its account says the crisis spread to economies that investors believed had similar problems.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the central banks' own bank, adds one more point. In its view the first wave of selling came mainly because investors tended to treat Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines as one group with Thailand. Their economies were only partly alike. Even before the crisis, share prices in those three countries had tended to rise and fall with share prices in Bangkok from week to week.
Three currencies under pressure in July and August
Within weeks of the float the Philippine peso, the Malaysian ringgit and the Indonesian rupiah came under pressure. The three countries answered in different ways. The Philippines widened the peso's band. According to the BIS, it also kept its short-term interest rates high for longer than Malaysia or Thailand did. Malaysia let the ringgit drop rather than spend heavily to hold it, and by the end of July the ringgit had fallen by 4.8 per cent. On 14 August Indonesia let the rupiah float.
Malaysia and the Philippines had one strength that Thailand lacked. Their central banks held reserves, meaning dollars and other foreign money. Those reserves were larger than the foreign debt the two countries had to repay within a year. According to the BIS's figures, Malaysia's reserves were larger by a wide margin.
Check yourself
Suppose a country's reserves are larger than its foreign debt due within a year. Now suppose lenders take fright and refuse to renew their loans. Why do the reserves help?
The peso fell with the baht
The chart shows how many pesos one US dollar bought each month in 1997 and 1998. A rising line means a weaker peso. In June 1997 a dollar bought about 26 pesos. After the baht floated the peso fell month after month, and by January 1998 a dollar bought about 43. The peso fell less far than the baht, which lost more than half of its value against the dollar.
In the IMF's later account, Malaysia and the Philippines were at first hit in the same ways as Thailand, Indonesia and Korea. Investors lost confidence and money flowed out. Reserves fell and share prices collapsed. The currencies fell sharply.
Source: IMF, Exchange Rates dataset (pesos per US dollar, period average). Credit: International Monetary Fund.
Check yourself
Look at the chart. What happened to the peso after January 1998?
Check yourself
In June 1997 a dollar bought about 26 pesos. In January 1998 it bought about 43. Roughly what share of its value against the dollar, in per cent, had the peso lost?
40 %
About 40 per cent. In June one peso was worth 1/26 of a dollar. In January it was worth 1/43 of a dollar. 26 divided by 43 is about 0.6. So the peso kept about six-tenths of its value and lost about four-tenths. The rise from 26 to 43 pesos per dollar measures something else: how much dearer the dollar became. Using the exact monthly figures instead of the rounded ones, the peso's loss is 38 per cent. That is still less than the baht's loss of more than half.
Two more links carried the trouble further
A cheaper baht made Thai goods cheaper abroad. So countries that sold similar goods risked losing sales, a risk the IMF lists next to investors' doubts. In the BIS's view, this worry was probably a big part of the later rounds of selling. Once the peso, the ringgit, the rupiah and the baht had all fallen, the same worry spread to other Asian countries.
The BIS adds that lenders active across the region may have spread the trouble. In one case a Hong Kong securities firm, a dealer in shares and bonds, had lent dollars to an Indonesian company. The firm sold parts of that loan to Korean banks, and the firm later failed. In January 1998 Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, told Congress: "Vicious cycles of ever rising and reinforcing fears have become contagious."
In 1996 private investors and lenders put money into Asia at a rate of almost a hundred billion dollars a year. What happened in the second half of 1997?
Money flowed out at about the same rate. In about a year the flow turned right round, from coming in to going out.
Money left the whole region
Between 1996 and the second half of 1997, private money moving to Asia swung from inflows of almost a hundred billion dollars a year to outflows of about the same size, the BIS reports. Foreign banks cut their loans to Asian firms. In some countries firms struggled even to get the loans they needed to pay for imports and exports.
When money flows out, people sell the local currency for dollars. For a time a central bank can use its reserves to buy up that currency, which holds its price. If the selling goes on, the reserves run down. Then either the currency falls, or interest rates must rise to give people a reason to keep it.
Check yourself
Three of these are given in this module as ways the crisis spread across the region in 1997. Which one is not?
Hong Kong, then Korea
On 17 October Taiwan stopped spending reserves to hold up its currency. From 20 to 23 October share prices in Hong Kong fell by 23 per cent in three days. By late October the pressure had reached South Korea. The IMF's own watchdog, the Independent Evaluation Office, says that around the time of the Hong Kong fall many lenders, banks above all, began to judge Korea riskier.
In the BIS's account, Korea paid abroad only a little more than it earned (a modest current account deficit), and its inflation was low. But bank troubles in the countries already hit drew attention to Korea's weak banks. Much of what Korean banks owed abroad was short-term. From early 1997 they had some trouble renewing it. From August, as confidence was shaken more openly, some foreign banks chose not to renew loans to Korean institutions. In December Korea floated its currency, the won.
Check yourself
A foreign bank has lent to Korean banks for three months at a time and also for ten years. It wants to cut what it has lent to Korea within the year, without breaking any agreement. Which loans can it cut most easily?
The Philippines came through with a smaller fall
The Philippines came through better than most of its neighbours. In the IMF's account, after mid-1997 it let the peso float and strengthened its banks. Its central bank also made money dearer to borrow (tighter monetary policy). From mid-1998 it relaxed its budget, spending more or taxing less, and lowered interest rates again. In 1998 the Philippines' output, the value of everything it produced, fell by less than 1 per cent. That was far less than the falls in Indonesia, Thailand or Malaysia. In the IMF's view, reforms the Philippines made with IMF support in the late 1980s and early 1990s seem to have kept its losses of output and jobs smaller.
By December 1997 Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had all turned to the IMF for loans. What did the IMF's rescue loans of 1997 offer, and what did they ask in return? The next module follows the rescues.
Check yourself
The key questions
Why did investors pull money out of Thailand's neighbours too?
In the IMF's account, investors believed that Thailand's neighbours had problems like Thailand's. In the BIS's view, the first wave of selling came mainly because investors grouped Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines with Thailand. Their economies were only partly alike. A cheaper baht also threatened the sales of rival exporters, and the BIS ties that worry to the later waves. The BIS also suggests that lenders active across the region may have helped the trouble spread.
How did the selling reach Korea by the end of 1997?
In October Taiwan stopped supporting its currency, and share prices in Hong Kong fell sharply. According to the IMF's evaluation office, lenders came to judge Korea riskier at around the same time. In the BIS's account, bank troubles in the countries already hit drew attention to Korea's weak banks. Much of what Korean banks owed abroad was short-term. From early 1997 they had some trouble renewing it. From August confidence was shaken more openly, and some foreign banks chose not to renew loans to Korean institutions, the evaluation office records. In December Korea floated the won.
What happened to the money flowing into Asia, and why did the Philippines come through better?
Private money moving to Asia swung from inflows of almost a hundred billion dollars a year in 1996 to outflows of about the same size in the second half of 1997. The Philippines' output fell only slightly in 1998. In the IMF's account, the Philippines let the peso float, made money dearer to borrow and strengthened its banks. In the IMF's view, its reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s helped it through.
The numbers
Check yourself
In July 1997, in the first wave, investors sold Philippine shares and pesos as soon as the baht fell. In the BIS's view, what mainly drove that first wave of selling?
Check yourself
Which pair of things helped carry the crisis to Korea in late 1997?
Check yourself
In 1998 output in the Philippines fell by less than 1 per cent, far less than in Thailand. What reason does the IMF give?