Where every figure came from
Bank for International Settlements, 68th Annual Report (8 June 1998), chapter VII, Financial intermediation and the Asian crisis (The chronology, how the crisis spread, the reserves, the swing in capital flows): http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. Table VII.6, Chronology of the crisis (p. 131): 2 July 1997, the baht floats and pressure spreads to the Philippine, Malaysian and Indonesian currencies; 11 July, the band of the Philippine peso is widened to a range not stated; the band of the rupiah is widened the same day; the ringgit falls by 4.8% by the end of July; 14 August, the rupiah floats; 17 October, the authorities stop supporting the New Taiwan dollar, and pressure on the Hong Kong dollar and share markets grows; 20-23 October, turbulence in Hong Kong, the "Hang Seng index falls by 23% in three days" and pressure on the Korean won mounts; 16 December, the won floats. Page 132: the crisis came in three waves; the first spread to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, mainly, in the BIS's view, because investors tended to group those countries together, only partly because their economies were alike; even before the crisis their weekly share price moves had tended to follow those in Bangkok (Table VII.7), and the link grew closer after the float; Asian finance firms active across the region's markets may have added to the spread, for example a Hong Kong securities firm, which failed, that had lent dollars to an Indonesian company and sold parts of the loan to Korean banks; once all four currencies had fallen, worry about the competitiveness of other Asian countries was probably a significant part of the later waves; banking problems in the countries whose currencies fell drew attention to weak banks across Asia, particularly in Korea, which had only a modest current account deficit, low inflation and a won allowed to fall since 1995. Page 128: in the BIS's words Malaysia and the Philippines had kept reserves well above their short-term external debt (Table VII.4, mid-1997: short-term external debt was 62% of reserves in Malaysia, 88% in the Philippines and 153% in Thailand; derived here: reserves were larger than that debt in Malaysia and the Philippines, by a wide margin only in Malaysia); Malaysia, under pressure, preferred to let its currency drop and limited its intervention. Page 136: the Philippines kept overnight interest rates high after the outbreak for longer than Malaysia or Thailand. Page 133, "The policy response": capital movements to Asia went from inflows running at almost a hundred billion dollars a year in 1996 to outflows of about the same size in the second half of 1997 (Table VII.8); bank loans to Asian firms fell, and some countries had great difficulty even in getting trade finance. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20030814095807id_/http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf (capture 2003-08-14). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis: A Factsheet (17 January 1999) (Why the crisis spread, in the IMF's account): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. 'Origins of the Crisis': once speculative attacks on the baht had set off the crisis, contagion moved quickly to other economies in the region, both those that looked exposed to a loss of competitiveness after the baht's devaluation and those that investors believed had similar financial or economic problems. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000301113356id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (capture 2000-03-01). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF Independent Evaluation Office, The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (2003) (How the crisis reached Korea): http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Chapter 2, p. 17: a large part of Korean banks' foreign liabilities were short-term and in foreign currency; in early 1997 Korean banks began to have some difficulty rolling over short-term credit lines with international banks; the crisis in South-East Asia from mid-1997 did not at once spread visibly to Korea; confidence was shaken more openly from August 1997, as problems in the banks grew and regional contagion became clearer; some foreign banks decided not to renew Korean institutions' credit lines, partly because of earlier worries about their health and partly because this was the easiest way to cut their overall exposure to East Asia. Chapter 2, p. 18: the failed speculative attack on the Hong Kong dollar and the sharp fall in Hong Kong share prices at the end of October 1997 came with a rise in how risky many international investors, particularly bank lenders, judged Korea, and the won came under more pressure. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20050315024854id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf (capture 2005-03-15). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, Issues Brief 00/05 (June 2000) (The Philippines and Malaysia): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Box 4, 'Malaysia and Philippines': the contagion from mid-1997 hit both; at first both saw what Indonesia, Korea and Thailand saw, a loss of investor confidence with large capital outflows, falling reserves, share market collapses and large currency falls; in the IMF's view, a successful IMF-supported programme of adjustment and reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s seems to have let the Philippines come through at a relatively lower cost in output, jobs and social disruption; it floated the peso, tightened monetary policy and strengthened its banks, and relaxed fiscal and monetary policy as things steadied in mid-1998. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20011216050339id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm (capture 2001-12-16). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF press releases 97/37 (20 August 1997), 97/50 (5 November 1997) and 97/55 (4 December 1997) (When the three turned to the IMF): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. The IMF approved stand-by credits for Thailand on 20 August 1997, for Indonesia on 5 November 1997 and for Korea on 4 December 1997. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/19990209113658id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm (capture 1999-02-09). Indonesia read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000229043419id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9750.HTM (capture 2000-02-29). Korea read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/19990117023902id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9755.htm (capture 1999-01-17). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, testimony on the Asian crisis before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 30 January 1998 (How fear spread): https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980130.htm. Public domain. "Vicious cycles of ever rising and reinforcing fears have become contagious." Retrieved 1 October 2026.
World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (Output in 1998): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. CC BY 4.0, credit World Bank. Data last updated 13 July 2026; retrieved 1 October 2026 on the device from the World Bank API. 1998: Philippines -0.5, Indonesia -13.1, Thailand -7.6, Malaysia -7.4 per cent.
IMF, Exchange Rates (ER) dataset: Philippine pesos to one US dollar, period average, monthly (The chart): https://data.imf.org/. IMF data, used with credit to the IMF (dataset IMF.STA:ER 4.0.1, Philippines, XDC_USD, PA_RT). January to June 1997: between 26.32 and 26.38 pesos per dollar; June 1997 26.38; January 1998 42.66; April 1998 38.44; September 1998 43.78, the highest month on the chart; December 1998 39.07. Derived here: from June 1997 to January 1998 the peso lost 1 - 26.38/42.66 = 38% of its dollar value (from the rounded figures 26 and 43, about 40%). Retrieved 1 October 2026 on the device from the IMF data portal and read twice.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.