Where every figure came from
IMF, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis: A Factsheet (17 January 1999), with its boxes (The growth record, the origins, the Thai deficit): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. 'Origins of the Crisis': the crisis came after several decades of strong growth in Asia; with exchange rates kept relatively fixed and weak supervision, banks and firms borrowed large sums abroad, much of it short-term, in foreign currency and unhedged; slow growth in Europe and Japan kept interest rates low there and added to the build-up. Box 2 (Thailand), table of selected economic indicators, sources given as the Thai authorities and IMF staff: current account balance -7.9 per cent of GDP in 1996. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000301113356id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (capture 2000-03-01). Box 2 read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000818041550id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf (capture 2000-08-18). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment, Occasional Paper 178 (1999) (Why the inflows looked safe; debts and reserves; the float): http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/OP178.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Chapter II, p. 10: the IMF and the authorities knew the inflows were large, but their concern was softened by the belief that the inflows reflected good investment prospects, a stable economy and high growth; with hindsight much of the money financed rising asset prices and poor loans. Note 8 (p. 10): by end-1997 property loans were of the order of 30-40 per cent of all loans in Thailand. Chapter II, p. 11: debt due within a year exceeded gross reserves in all three countries for over two years before the crisis; note 10: forward contracts outstanding were a key liability set against Thailand's reserves. Chapter II, p. 9: weak financial systems raised the cost of defending the currency with interest rates, which made markets doubt the authorities would do it. Chapter II, p. 16: depositors ran on the Bangkok Bank of Commerce in May 1997. Chapter II, p. 10: Thailand was forced to float the baht on 2 July 1997 as it struggled to roll over short-term debt and its net reserves ran down. Chapter I, Box 1.1 (p. 2): the float followed mounting speculative attacks and worry about reserves; the policy package that came with it was, in the paper's view, inadequate and did not restore confidence; the baht fell by 20 per cent against the dollar in July, and short-term interest rates were allowed to fall sharply after a brief rise. Chapter VI, Box 6.4 (p. 47): in May 1997 the Czech Republic raised overnight rates briefly during an attack on its currency, then left its exchange-rate band for a managed float; the Slovak Republic raised one-month interbank rates steeply the same month after an attack on the koruna. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000819020651id_/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/OP178.pdf (capture 2000-08-19). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Bank for International Settlements, 68th Annual Report (8 June 1998), chapter VII, Financial intermediation and the Asian crisis (The credit boom, the short-term borrowing, the forward book, the chronology): http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. Chapter highlights: defending "a dollar peg" grew harder as capital markets opened. "Domestic credit explosion": bank credit grew by more than 10% a year in real terms in most of the Asian countries in the 1990s, much of it into property. "Easy global liquidity": of international bank lending to the five countries in 1995-96, two-thirds was due within a year, and banks in Asia lent these funds on to borrowers at home; the Bangkok International Banking Facilities, set up in early 1993 to promote Bangkok as an international financial centre, let local banks borrow in dollars. "External portfolio management": residents hedged spot and forward against the central bank's reserves (see below). "Domestic credit explosion": banks limited their own risk by lending at floating rates to long-term borrowers, and short-term deposits made long-term lending hard to hedge. "External portfolio management" (p. 128): residents with uncovered short-term foreign debts sought cover once the peg was doubted, and because neither interest rates nor the exchange rate moved enough, they often got it at the cost of the central bank's reserves; the Bank of Thailand's short forward position reached an estimated 24 billion dollars by mid-1997, about four-fifths of its reserves. Derived here: 24 x 5/4 = 30 billion dollars of reserves. Table VII.6, Chronology of the crisis (p. 131): early 1997, heavy intervention in spot and forward markets; 15 May, controls to separate the onshore and offshore markets, with strong pressure continuing; 2 July, the baht floats. Pages 131-132: such controls were far from successful and further eroded investor confidence. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20030814095807id_/http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf (capture 2003-08-14). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Royal Thai Government and Bank of Thailand, Letter of Intent to the IMF, 14 August 1997 (Thailand before the float): http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/081497.htm. Published by the IMF with the authorities' permission; paraphrased. Section I, Background: a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account and high domestic interest rates drew in short-term capital; a sudden drop in exports kept the current account deficit high; slowing activity and too much property building left many firms struggling to pay their debts and weakened the banks and finance companies that had passed the short-term inflows on; the baht was closely tied to the US dollar; attacks on the baht grew after May 1997 and ran down the Bank of Thailand's reserves. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000819092215id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/081497.htm (capture 2000-08-19). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, testimony on the Asian crisis before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 30 January 1998 (Why borrowers took dollar loans): https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980130.htm. Public domain. Greenspan told the committee that, with pegged exchange rates presumed to last at least beyond the term of a loan, banks and other firms were willing to borrow dollars unhedged to get dollar interest rates that were invariably lower than rates in their own currencies. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
US Congressional Research Service, Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Options, 98-74 (updated 23 April 1998) (The float): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-74.html. Public domain (US government work). Section "Background to the Crisis" (p. CRS-1): after using up its reserves against speculative attacks on the baht, which had been pegged to the US dollar, the Thai government "had little choice but to let the currency find its own level." Read from EveryCRSReport.com; no Internet Archive capture of the official crsreports.congress.gov copy exists (checked 2 Oct 2026). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
World Bank, East Asia: The Road to Recovery (1998) (The growth record): http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/364021468770639382/pdf/multi-page.pdf. World Bank copyright; paraphrased. Chapter 1, section "Was the miracle real?" (p. 2): the gains in living standards from the region's growth were real, and the number of people in poverty in East Asia halved in twenty years. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, Thailand (Thailand's growth before 1997): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=TH. CC BY 4.0, credit World Bank. Data last updated 13 July 2026; Thailand 1980-1997 retrieved 2 October 2026 on the device from the World Bank API. Growth 1987-1996: 9.5, 13.3, 12.2, 11.2, 8.6, 8.1, 8.3, 8.0, 8.1, 5.7 per cent. Derived here: the average of those ten years is 9.3 per cent, so "about 9 per cent a year".
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.10 foreign exchange rates: Thai baht to one US dollar, monthly (FRED series EXTHUS) (The chart): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EXTHUS. Public domain, citation requested (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED). The currency of Thailand against the US dollar, monthly averages of noon buying rates in New York. January 1995 to December 1996: between 24.57 and 25.60 baht per dollar. June 1997 24.53; July 1997 30.27; September 1997 35.26; October 1997 37.54; December 1997 44.31; January 1998 52.98; December 1998 36.28. Derived here: the largest monthly rise in baht per dollar is December 1997 to January 1998, 52.98 - 44.31 = 8.7 baht, against 30.27 - 24.53 = 5.7 in July 1997 and 37.54 - 35.26 = 2.3 in October 1997. Derived here: from June 1997 to January 1998 the baht lost 1 - 24.53/52.98 = 54% of its dollar value. Retrieved 1 October 2026 on the device and read twice.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.