Where every figure came from
IMF press releases 97/37 (20 August 1997), 97/50 (5 November 1997) and 97/55 (4 December 1997) (The three loans, how they were paid, and the conditions): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. PR 97/37 (Thailand): a stand-by credit of up to SDR 2.9 billion (about US$3.9 billion) over 34 months; about US$1.6 billion available at once; about US$810 million after 30 November 1997 if the end-September performance targets were met and the first review was complete; later drawings quarterly, each subject to targets and reviews; equal to 505 per cent of a quota of about US$780 million; approved under the emergency financing mechanism adopted in September 1995 for members facing an external financial crisis; IMF and bilateral money to go only to the balance of payments gap and to rebuilding the central bank's reserves; a public sector surplus kept partly as a margin for the costs of financial restructuring; value added tax raised from 7 to 10 per cent with spending cuts, health and education protected; an end to open-ended support for insolvent institutions; remaining institutions to strengthen their capital; at the 11 August Tokyo meeting Japan pledged US$4 billion. PR 97/50 (Indonesia): up to SDR 7.338 billion (about US$10.14 billion) over three years, SDR 2.2 billion (about US$3.04 billion) at once, the next part after 15 March 1998 subject to end-December targets and a review; tight fiscal and monetary policy, a budget surplus, closing unviable banks, lower tariffs, phasing out import and marketing monopolies over three years, more privatisation; World Bank US$4.5 billion and Asian Development Bank US$3.5 billion (derived here: 8 billion between them). PR 97/55 (Korea): SDR 15.5 billion (about US$21 billion) over three years, 1,939 per cent of quota; about US$5.56 billion at once, about US$3.58 billion on 18 December after the first review and about US$2 billion on 8 January 1998 after the second; money market rates raised sharply, to be kept high as needed to calm markets; a tight budget; a clear and firm exit policy for troubled financial institutions and recapitalisation of weak banks; legislation for an independent central bank; foreigners allowed to set up bank subsidiaries and brokerages and to own more of listed Korean firms; a number of countries, among them the United Kingdom and the United States, ready to consider a second line of money expected to exceed US$20 billion. Thailand read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/19990209113658id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm (capture 1999-02-09). Indonesia read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000229043419id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9750.HTM (capture 2000-02-29). Korea read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/19990117023902id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9755.htm (capture 1999-01-17). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis: A Factsheet (17 January 1999), with its boxes (Commitments and disbursements, the first programme, why money was tightened): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Main text, 'The IMF's Immediate Response': the IMF's first steps included tightening monetary policy for a time to stop the currencies falling, closing unviable financial institutions, structural reforms and a sound budget. Box 1 (p. 2, as of 17 January 1999, US$ billion): commitments Thailand 17.2 (IMF 4.0), Indonesia 42.3 including additions since July 1998 (IMF 11.2), Korea 58.4 (IMF 21.1), total 117.9 (IMF 36.3); IMF disbursements 30.9 in all (Thailand 3.1, Indonesia 8.8, Korea 19.0); the Korea disbursement figure does not net off its December 1998 repayments. Box 2 (pp. 3-5), Thailand: the initial programme included closing unviable financial institutions, 56 finance companies among them, and moving the public sector from deficit to a small surplus; chronology: 11 August 1997, IMF-convened meeting in Tokyo, total pledged eventually about US$17 billion; 8 December 1997, first review completed and US$810 million disbursed. Box 4 (p. 13), Korea: approval of about US$21 billion on 4 December 1997, 1,939 per cent of quota. Boxes read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000818041550id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf (capture 2000-08-18). Main text read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000301113356id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (capture 2000-03-01). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Royal Thai Government and Bank of Thailand, Letter of Intent to the IMF, 14 August 1997 (The government's own statement of its programme): http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/081497.htm. Published by the IMF with the authorities' permission; paraphrased. The letter sets out the policies the government undertook to follow under the programme: restructuring the financial sector beginning with unviable finance companies, a move from a public sector deficit to a surplus, and the rise in value added tax from 7 to 10 per cent, in effect from 16 August 1997. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000819092215id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/081497.htm (capture 2000-08-19). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Bank for International Settlements, 68th Annual Report (8 June 1998), chapter VII, Financial intermediation and the Asian crisis (The record loan, the usual limit, the size of the packages): http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. Table VII.6, Chronology of the crisis (p. 131): 20 August 1997, IMF standby credit for Thailand of $3.9 billion approved; 5 November, Indonesia's IMF standby credit of $10.1 billion approved, with $3 billion at once; 4 December, Korea's standby credit, "a record $21 billion" over three years, approved, with $5.6 billion paid at once. Page 134, "Official liquidity assistance": IMF loans normally stay within three times a member's quota, and the Asian credits were very large against quotas (Table VII.9); in the BIS's view one aim of the size of each package was its effect on market psychology, to stop confidence draining away, though the size needed is hard to judge; the support offered did not cover all of the countries' short-term foreign obligations; exchange rates of all three tended to weaken further, sometimes sharply, in the weeks after the packages were announced. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20030814095807id_/http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf (capture 2003-08-14). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
US Treasury, Statement of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, RR-2091, 3 December 1997 (The US offer to Korea): http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/pr2091.htm. Public domain (US government work). "The United States is prepared to provide up to $5 billion in assistance from the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund toward this effort." The support would be contingent and temporary, if needed, and "conditioned on the implementation of the appropriate set of macroeconomic and structural policies supported by the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB." Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/19991111203706id_/http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/pr2091.htm (capture 1999-11-11). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Hansard: HC Deb 3 December 1997 vol 302 c245W (written answer, International Monetary Fund (Korea)); HC Deb 12 February 1998 vol 306 cc533-4 (oral answers, Asian Economies (IMF Rescue Plans)) (Britain's offer to Korea): https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1997/dec/03/international-monetary-fund-korea. Open Parliament Licence. 3 December 1997, the Chancellor, Gordon Brown: "The UK would consider an amount up to the equivalent of $1.25 billion. Any loan would depend on a financing need and would only be made with agreement by the IMF." 12 February 1998 (https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1998/feb/12/asian-economies-imf-rescue-plans): Britain is one of the bilateral contributors to Korea, with a potential contribution of $1.25 billion, and "no contribution has yet been disbursed." Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, Fund Accounts (FA) dataset: Use of IMF Credit and Loans, US dollars, monthly, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea (The chart): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/2.1/data/IMF.STA,FA/THA+IDN+KOR.CLIMF_USD.M. IMF data, used with credit to the International Monetary Fund (dataset IMF.STA:FA 8.0.0, indicator CLIMF_USD, "Use of IMF Credit and Loans, US dollar"; access level PUBLIC_OPEN). Derived here: each month is the sum of the three countries, in billions of dollars, rounded to 0.1. None of the three owed the IMF anything from January to July 1997; the jump in December 1997 is Korea's first drawings. July 1997 0.0; August 1997 1.6 (all Thailand); November 1997 4.6; December 1997 16.5; January 1998 18.4; November 1998 29.4, the highest month on the chart. The chart stops in November 1998, before Korea began repaying in December 1998. The loans are in SDRs, so small month-to-month moves in the dollar series reflect the SDR's dollar value (Korea's SDR balance was unchanged from September to November 1998). Retrieved 3 October 2026 on the device from the IMF SDMX API and read twice.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.