Where every figure came from
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, The current Asian crisis and the dynamics of international finance, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate (12 February 1998) (The root of the problems in his view; the moral hazard objection and his answer; investors' losses): https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980212.htm. Public domain (US government work), so quoted directly. He backed the Administration's request to add to the IMF's resources. 'Opponents of IMF support also argue that the substantial financial backing, by cushioning the losses of imprudent investors, could exacerbate moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when someone can reap the rewards from their actions when events go well but do not suffer the full consequences when they go badly.' Some such risk-taking was doubtless due to expected IMF bailouts, 'though arguably it has been the expectation of governments' support of their financial systems that has been the more obvious culprit'; 'the expectation of broad bailouts, at least in the Asian case, has turned out to have been an illusion.' 'Asian equity losses, excluding Japanese companies, since June 1997, worldwide, are estimated to have exceeded $700 billion, at the end of January, of which more than $30 billion has been lost by U.S. investors.' 'There has doubtless been some of that type of inappropriate risk-taking attributable to expectations of IMF bailouts'. IMF conditionality 'helps to mitigate some of the moral hazard concerns.' 'at the root of the problems is poor public policy that has resulted in misguided investments and very weak financial sectors.' Retrieved 1 October 2026 (lane cache fedag980212).
IMF, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis: A Factsheet (17 January 1999), with its Box 5, 'Three Major Misunderstandings about the IMF-Supported Programs in Asia' (The IMF's account of the origins; the critics' case as the IMF stated it, and the IMF's answer): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Section 'Origins of the Crisis': in the IMF's view the countries' difficulties were not mainly the result of macroeconomic imbalances but came from weaknesses in financial systems and, less so, in governance; weak supervision of the financial sector, poor judging and handling of risk, and exchange rates held relatively fixed led banks and companies to borrow heavily abroad, much of it short-term, in foreign currency and unhedged; over time the money went increasingly into poorer investments; slow growth in Europe and Japan, which kept interest rates there low, also contributed. Box 5 (factsheet PDF, p. 18), item 2 states the criticism that the programmes are structured wrong: their austerity, including high interest rates, is unsuitable, and they overlook the private debt problems at the heart of the crisis. The IMF answers that each programme's centrepiece is far-reaching financial and structural reform, not austerity, and that countries under currency attack show a temporary rise in rates, which makes holding the currency more attractive and guards against a depreciation-inflation spiral, has worked. Item 3 states the charge that the IMF bails out reckless investors and so creates moral hazard; the IMF answers that most investors in Asia lost heavily, while granting that restoring stability may protect banks with short-term claims from the full consequences of their actions. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000301113356id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (captured 1 March 2000) and, for the boxes, https://web.archive.org/web/20000818041550id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.pdf (captured 18 August 2000). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Bank for International Settlements, 68th Annual Report (8 June 1998), chapter VII, Financial intermediation and the Asian crisis (The two weaknesses the BIS saw; the swing in capital flows): http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. Page numbers are printed page footers. Highlights (p. 117): two weaknesses were common to the crisis countries: an excessive growth of bank credit that financed overinvestment, unprofitable capacity and boom-and-bust cycles in asset prices, and reliance on volatile kinds of foreign finance, notably short-term bank loans, which left the economies exposed to swings of sentiment; expectations that governments would back major financial institutions probably also contributed. 'The policy response' (p. 133): capital flows to Asia went from inflows running at almost $100 billion a year in 1996 to outflows of a similar size in the second half of 1997 (Table VII.8). Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20030814095807id_/http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf (captured 14 August 2003). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, Occasional Paper 178: T. Lane and others, IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment (1999), chapter II by Javier Hamann (IMF staff's account of a self-fulfilling run, and its note on Radelet and Sachs): http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/OP178.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Chapter II, 'Background to the Crisis', p. 9 (printed folio): the crisis was rooted mainly in weak financial systems and other structural weaknesses, and budget imbalances were relatively small; short-term foreign-currency debt made the economies vulnerable because fears that set off a run on it can be self-fulfilling, like bank runs without deposit insurance: if other creditors are pulling out, each has an incentive to join the queue, and even a debtor solvent before the attack could be pushed into insolvency. Note 2: Radelet and Sachs (1998) focus on this kind of self-justifying behaviour in the Asian crisis; reference list: Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:1998. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000819020651id_/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/OP178.pdf (captured 19 August 2000). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF Independent Evaluation Office, The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (2003) (The named critics and the office's answers; its verdict on Korea; why the question stays open): http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased, no quotation. Page numbers are the printed page numbers (printed = PDF page - 12), read from each page's folio. Executive Summary, p. 1: findings benefit from hindsight, and any evaluation compares with what alternative policies might have done, which is very difficult to establish rigorously. P. 2: Korea's first programme was clearly underfinanced, mainly because major shareholder governments would neither take concerted action to involve private lenders nor provide enough financing upfront, for what was, of the three cases, most clearly a liquidity crisis. Pp. 3-4: the countries' experience gives no definitive answer to the continuing debate on whether high interest rates stabilise the exchange rate; in Indonesia the planned tight money was not carried out for most of the crisis, so critics' claim that it caused the output collapse is not warranted; Korea's rate rises were appropriate to defend the currency but not enough alone, because much of the outflow turned on credit rather than yield; rates may have been kept higher than necessary in early 1998 once the market had steadied, though caution was understandable; given bank restructuring's squeeze on credit, a few months of higher than necessary rates could not have been the dominant cause of the recession. Chapter 4, p. 33: the tight budgets in Indonesia and Korea were criticised as unnecessary and possibly partly responsible for the output collapse (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Sachs, 1998). P. 4: in Brazil high interest rates did not do major harm to the private sector, because its banks were sound and its companies carried little debt, compared with the situations in Asia. P. 4: the agreement by major international banks on 24 December 1997 to roll over interbank debt was a turning point. P. 37: in Korea outflows went on until a rollover agreement with the banks was reached, and only then was the financing problem effectively resolved; critics argued large front-loaded packages are subject to moral hazard; the office finds this possible in principle but the evidence mixed. P. 41: one view (Feldstein, 1998) held the structural measures unrelated to resolving the crisis, a distraction from the core issues and an encroachment on domestic decisions; Radelet and Sachs argued the reform agenda hurt confidence by signalling the situation was worse than markets had feared; an alternative view (Summers, 1999; Goldstein, 2002) held that restoring confidence required tackling the structural causes. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20050315024854id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf (captured 15 March 2005). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, Issues Brief 00/05 (June 2000) (The IMF's later view on tight money, on the first budgets and on moral hazard): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Lessons for crisis prevention: there is no evidence that the crisis originated in moral hazard. 'How are the policy responses to be judged?': tight monetary policies, when firmly applied, worked in reversing pressure on the currencies; Indonesia, by contrast, kept negative real interest rates through the middle of 1998, with rapid monetary expansion, and its currency's collapse was much more severe and drawn out. Same section: in hindsight, the programmes' initial fiscal objectives, based partly on the assumption of moderate slowdowns, were too tight, and they were adjusted. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20011216050339id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm (captured 16 December 2001). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics, Interest Rates dataset: money market rate, Korea, monthly (The chart): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/2.1/data/IMF.STA,MFS_IR/KOR.MMRT_RT_PT_A_PT.M. IMF data, used with credit to the IMF (dataset IMF.STA:MFS_IR 9.0.0, Korea, MMRT_RT_PT_A_PT, money market rate, per cent a year, monthly). The IMF describes the series as the rate in the market for short-term debt securities and instruments, typically under one year; monthly averages; m6's daily overnight figures (25 and 30 per cent, December 1997) are not shown here. June 1997 11.19; November 1997 14.09; December 1997 21.58; January 1998 25.63, the highest month on the chart; May 1998 18.45; August 1998 9.53; October 1998 7.27; December 1999 4.77. Retrieved 3 October 2026 on the device from the IMF data portal (m10/kor_mmr.json) and read twice.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.