Where every figure came from
World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (Growth in 1998 and 1999, and the chart): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. CC BY 4.0, credit World Bank. Data last updated 13 July 2026. Real GDP growth, per cent, South Korea: 1995 9.7, 1996 8.0, 1997 6.3, 1998 -4.9, 1999 11.6, 2000 9.2, 2001 4.7 (the chart rounds each year to a whole number). 1999: Malaysia 6.1, Thailand 4.6, Philippines 3.3, Indonesia a little under one per cent. Older figures differ: the IMF's June 2000 brief gave South Korea's 1998 fall as 6.7 per cent and its 1999 growth as 10.75 per cent, on the data of the time. The Congressional Research Service report of April 2000 gave 6.5 and 10.2 per cent. Retrieved 1 October 2026 on the device and read twice.
IMF, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, Issues Brief 00/05 (June 2000) (The IMF's account of the recovery, Korea's and Indonesia's paths, the unfinished reforms): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Section I: in the IMF's view the rebound was not spontaneous but the result of the countries carrying out their policies and of large financial support, above all under the IMF-supported programmes. Section IV: progress on restructuring company debt was slow in all three programme countries, which held back the recovery. Section V: financial markets steadied in South Korea and Thailand early in 1998 and much later in Indonesia; currencies began to recover and interest rates were below pre-crisis levels by mid-1998; activity turned up in mid-1998 in South Korea and later elsewhere; the recoveries, once begun, were unexpectedly strong, notably in South Korea; they reflected a revival of private spending at home, whose collapse had caused the recessions, which had come mainly through investment; during the recessions current accounts adjusted hugely, mostly through sharp falls in imports. Section VI, 'Signs and Substance of Recovery': recovery came faster than many observers expected; growth came from household spending, exports and some new private investment; South Korea's upturn began in the last quarter of 1998; Indonesia's recovery was held back by political turmoil and poor carrying-out of policy, and its economy began to grow again late in 1999; interest rates started falling in South Korea and Thailand early in 1998 and in Indonesia in mid-1999; credit to the private sector grew only modestly, partly because lenders had become more cautious; current accounts stayed in surplus, partly from gains in competitiveness and strong world demand for electronics; currencies were up from their lows but well below pre-crisis levels in real terms, which supported competitiveness; reserves were rebuilt, and South Korea was borrowing on international capital markets again; weak banks and other lenders had been closed, merged or recapitalised and supervision strengthened. Section VII: the unfinished agenda of structural reform remained large; bank recapitalisation was still to be completed, and company restructuring would be a long process. Box 2, Korea: a temporary rise in interest rates to steady the won restored financial stability by early 1998, after which policy was eased quickly to support the economy, and the budget was set to cushion the recession; reforms included closing nonviable institutions, dealing with bad loans and recapitalising banks; South Korea had stopped drawing on its IMF loan; table of selected indicators (sources: Korean authorities and IMF staff estimates): current account balance, per cent of GDP, 1997 -1.7, 1998 12.7. Derived here: the swing from 1997 to 1998 is 12.7 + 1.7 = 14.4 percentage points of GDP. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20011216050339id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm (capture 2001-12-16). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
IMF, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis: A Factsheet (17 January 1999) (Bank closures and recapitalisation, the turn in current accounts, Korea's repayment): http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. 'The IMF's Immediate Response to the Crisis': reform of the financial system was the centrepiece of the Asian programmes; in every case they arranged to close financial institutions that could not survive, writing down their shareholders' capital, to recapitalise those short of capital, and to supervise weak ones closely. 'Additional Measures Taken by the IMF in Response to the Crisis': the Supplemental Reserve Facility was created for members with a large short-term need for money caused by a sudden loss of market confidence. 'Early Results and the Outlook': the current accounts of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand had turned from deficit to surplus quickly and by large amounts; in December 1998 South Korea made repayments to the IMF under the Supplemental Reserve Facility of US$2.8 billion in total, which the IMF took as a sign of South Korea's progress out of the foreign exchange crisis of a year before. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000301113356id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (capture 2000-03-01). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
US Congressional Research Service, Asian Financial Crisis and Recovery: Status and Implications for U.S. Interests, RL30517 (6 April 2000) (How the recovery was seen in 2000; the unfinished bank and company reform): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30517.html. Public domain (US government work). Section "From Crisis to Incomplete Recovery" (pp. CRS-1 to CRS-2): apart from Indonesia, the hardest-hit East Asian economies had made "a remarkable, though still incomplete, recovery"; the speed of the turnaround surprised many analysts; a number of analysts and institutions warned that the recovery was uneven and incomplete, that structural weaknesses remained, and that incomes and living standards were still well short of pre-crisis levels in several countries. "Exchange Rates" (p. CRS-7): Indonesia's exchange rate was still affected by strife and political instability. "Marked Improvement in Macroeconomic Performance" (p. CRS-8): South Korea's output fell by 6.5 per cent in 1998 and grew by 10.2 per cent in 1999; at first most projections saw South Korea growing by one or two per cent in 1999. "Uneven State of Financial Sector Reforms" (pp. CRS-8 to CRS-9): reform of financial systems and corporate governance had gone much more slowly than the economies; South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia had recapitalised their banks with government funds, in effect turning short-term private debt into longer-term government debt; they remained in a credit crunch, partly because so many firms were bankrupt and borrowers who could meet stricter standards were scarce. "Huge Unresolved Bad Loans" (pp. CRS-11 to CRS-12): bad loans appeared to be falling slowly as a share of total debt in most crisis countries but were possibly still rising in absolute terms; company restructuring had moved slowly. Read from EveryCRSReport.com; no Internet Archive capture of the official crsreports.congress.gov copy exists (checked 2 Oct 2026). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.