Where every figure came from
Federal Open Market Committee, Record of Policy Actions, meeting held on 6 October 1979 (released 23 November 1979) (What the Federal Reserve's policy committee decided on 6 October 1979, and why): https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcropa19791006.pdf. Public domain (Federal Reserve). The meeting was called by the Chairman. Prices were rising somewhat faster than expected, partly from further large rises in energy and food; the dollar had fallen substantially against major currencies since mid-September and monetary authorities had bought, net, a large amount of dollars; gold had fallen from record highs; staff still thought a fall in activity in the fourth quarter probable. Ranges for 1979 (fourth quarter 1978 to fourth quarter 1979): M1 1½ to 4½ per cent (3 to 6 after an adjustment for new account types), M2 5 to 8, M3 6 to 9. M1 grew at annual rates of about 7½ and 9½ per cent in the second and third quarters; growth within the ranges for the year required a substantial slowing in the final quarter; money growth had exceeded expectations despite substantial increases in short-term rates, and the links between rates, money and activity had become less reliable. Most members strongly supported supplying the reserves consistent with the money targets while permitting much greater fluctuations in the federal funds rate; a few preferred to keep aiming at levels of the funds rate. The reserves approach was expected to give greater assurance of meeting the targets, to raise confidence at home and abroad in the System's determination, and to moderate inflationary expectations; it might bring larger rate rises at first, and would let rates ease more promptly if demand for money weakened; the link between reserves and money was not precise. Vote 12-0; weekly average funds rate range 11½ to 15½ per cent. The Board then raised the discount rate from 11 to 12 per cent and set an 8 per cent marginal reserve requirement on increases in managed liabilities (large time deposits, Eurodollar borrowings, repurchase agreements, some federal funds borrowing). On 22 October total reserves had grown faster than intended and the funds rate was near the top of its range; no change was made. Retrieved 2 October 2026.
Federal Open Market Committee, transcript of the meeting of 6 October 1979 (The arguments made around the table on 6 October 1979): https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC19791006meeting.pdf. Public domain (Federal Reserve). Pages 7-9, Chairman Volcker: broadly two possibilities, a traditional discount rate move with a significant rise in the federal funds rate, or managing operations to a reserve path to hit a money target, with a wider range for the funds rate; the traditional method of small moves had in some sense "run out of psychological gas", with each rise greeted as not enough. Pages 12-13, Governor Charles Partee: the traditional method of estimating the short-term rates needed risked missing shifts in the demand for money; changing the operating mode was "extremely dangerous" and risky, but less risky than staying put. Pages 18-19, Roger Guffey, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: a never-tried technique might look to markets like grasping at the last straw; the same could be done with present procedures by widening the funds-rate range; he would not object if a consensus formed the other way. Page numbers as printed on the transcript. Retrieved 2 October 2026.
Federal Reserve Bulletin, February, October, November and December 1979, table 3.26 "Discount rates of foreign central banks", and December 1979, "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations: Interim Report" (via FRASER) (The central bank rates of the other countries before and after October 1979): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/FRB/1970s/frb_121979.pdf. Public domain (Federal Reserve Board). Same table in each issue; rate in per cent and month it took effect. On 31 January 1979: Canada 11.25, West Germany 3.0, Italy 10.5, Japan 3.5, Netherlands 6.5, Sweden 6.5, Switzerland 1.0, United Kingdom 12.5, France 9.5 (since August 1977). On 30 September 1979: Canada 12.25, West Germany 5.0, Italy 10.5, Japan 5.25, Netherlands 8.0, Sweden 8.0, Switzerland 1.0, United Kingdom 14.0, France 9.5. On 31 October 1979: Canada 14.0 (October), Italy 12.0 (October), the rest unchanged. On 30 November 1979: West Germany 6.0, Japan 6.25, Netherlands 9.5, Sweden 9.0, United Kingdom 17.0 and Switzerland 2.0, the first five marked November 1979; the Switzerland row prints its month as November 1978, a misprint, since the October table shows 1.0. France 9.5 throughout. Australia is not in the table. So nine of the other ten have a rate in the table and eight of the nine raised in October or November 1979, and six of them (Canada, West Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom) were higher on 30 September than on 31 January 1979: our count from the four tables. December 1979, page 951: interest rates in other major industrial countries had moved higher through 1979 as credit demands grew and inflation accelerated, and the Bundesbank had acted to slow money and credit. Files: frb_021979.pdf, frb_101979.pdf, frb_111979.pdf, frb_121979.pdf at the same FRASER folder. Retrieved 2 October 2026.
Economic Report of the President, February 1983, with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (via FRASER) (The President's economic advisers on the cost of bringing inflation down, money targets and oil): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1983/ERP_1983.pdf. Public domain. President Ronald Reagan's message, dated 2 February 1983 (unnumbered pages; PDF page 9): unemployment was a consequence of the disinflation that had to follow the accelerating inflation of the previous decade. Page 17: the second of two back-to-back recessions began in July 1981, the first in January 1980; unemployment reached 10.8 per cent in December 1982, about 5 million more unemployed than in January 1980; the country entered the 1980s with widespread expectations that inflation would stay high, built into the plans and contracts of firms and workers, so lowering it was painful. Pages 20-21: wages and prices are not all flexible; while expectations of inflation stay embedded, prices and wages keep rising for a time, so slower growth in spending cuts real growth as well as inflation; real GNP, fourth quarter to fourth quarter, rose 0.7 per cent in 1981 and fell 1.2 per cent in 1982. Page 24: from the Second World War until the mid-1970s the Federal Reserve, like most central banks, focused on interest rates and money market conditions; over the 1970s it gave increasing emphasis to money targets, and from October 1979 greater emphasis still, accepting larger swings in interest rates, which have been more variable since; the rate that matters to borrowers and lenders is the real rate, after expected inflation. Page 106: non-Communist world oil use fell from 51.5 million barrels a day in 1978 to 45.5 million in 1982; production outside OPEC rose from 30.3 to 34.3 million (first ten months of 1982); OPEC spare capacity was at least 8.5 million barrels a day; the threat to use oil as a political weapon may be less effective than once thought. Retrieved 2 October 2026.
Economic Report of the President, February 1984, with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (via FRASER) (The President's economic advisers on the dollar and on Europe, 1980 to 1983): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1984/ERP_1984.pdf. Public domain. Pages 52-53: the rise in the US real interest rate between 1980 and 1983 was the major cause of the dollar's real rise; real rates rose less in other countries. Page 63: inflation had declined in all the larger European countries since 1980, but not easily; weak currencies against the dollar raised the prices of oil and other imports; to limit inflation most European countries accepted higher real interest rates than they otherwise would have, and this was the way recession was transmitted to Europe in 1981. Retrieved 2 October 2026.
Andreas Beyer, Vitor Gaspar, Christina Gerberding and Otmar Issing, "Opting Out of the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy after the Breakdown of Bretton Woods", in M. Bordo and A. Orphanides (eds), The Great Inflation, NBER and University of Chicago Press, 2013 (conference of September 2008) (An account of the Bundesbank's money targets, written partly by central bank economists): https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9158. Not openly licensed; paraphrased. Page 301: the authors relate the Bundesbank's success in keeping prices stable and anchoring expected inflation to its money-target strategy. At writing, Beyer was at the European Central Bank and Gerberding at the Bundesbank. Pages 311-312: while the mark was fixed to the dollar, buying dollars added to German money and resisting imported inflation was self-defeating; the float of March 1973 changed this. Page 313: the Bundesbank adopted a money target for 1975, and missed it for many years. Table 6.2: the target was not achieved in 1975, 1976, 1977 or 1978, actual growth being above target each year; it was achieved from 1979 to 1985. Pages 317-318: in 1979 the Bundesbank raised its discount rate in steps from 3 per cent. Page 320: the authors judge that the strategy proved itself in 1979 and the early 1980s and established credibility; target misses had to be explained to the public. Retrieved 2 October 2026.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Funds Effective Rate (FEDFUNDS), via FRED (The chart: the interest rate US banks charged each other overnight, month by month, 1977 to 1984): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=FEDFUNDS. FRED tag "Public Domain: Citation Requested" (checked 3 October 2026). Per cent, monthly average of daily figures, not seasonally adjusted. September 1979 11.43; October 1979 13.77; April 1980 17.61; July 1980 9.03; January 1981 19.08. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate (UNRATE), via FRED (US unemployment, month by month): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=UNRATE. FRED tag "Public Domain: Citation Requested". Per cent of the labour force, aged 16 and over, seasonally adjusted, monthly: 6.3 in January 1980; 10.8 in November and December 1982. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
West Texas Intermediate spot crude oil price (WTISPLC), via the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) (What a barrel of West Texas crude oil cost): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=WTISPLC. Monthly, US dollars a barrel, nominal. Tagged "Copyrighted: citation required" on FRED, so used for figures in the text only and not charted. The 1980 and 1983 figures are the averages of each year's twelve monthly prices, our arithmetic: 37.375 and 30.395. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, consumer price indices, via FRED (Consumer price inflation in the eleven countries): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=CPALTT01USM659N. Series CPALTT01<country>M659N, consumer prices, all items, growth on the same month a year before, monthly; Australia is quarterly (CPALTT01AUQ659N). Tagged "Copyrighted: citation required" on FRED; figures in the text only. Each yearly figure is the average of the year's monthly (or quarterly) rates; each peak is the highest yearly figure over 1978 to 1983; the gaps and counts are our arithmetic. Peak, then 1983, then gap in points, the gaps computed before rounding (so the Netherlands, Switzerland and Australia do not subtract exactly from the printed two-decimal figures): Britain 18.07 (1980), 4.61, 13.46; United States 13.58 (1980), 3.22, 10.36; Canada 12.47 (1981), 5.89, 6.58; Italy 21.06 (1980), 14.71, 6.35; Japan 7.76 (1980), 1.90, 5.86; Sweden 13.69 (1980), 8.87, 4.82; France 13.56 (1980), 9.46, 4.10; Netherlands 6.74 (1981), 2.74, 3.99; Switzerland 6.48 (1981), 2.98, 3.51; West Germany 6.34 (1981), 3.30, 3.04; Australia 11.34 (1982), 10.08, 1.27. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.