A common resource is rival, but nobody can be kept out
Almost anyone with a boat can fish in the open sea, so the catch is non-excludable. But fishing is rival: a cod landed by one boat is a cod no other boat can land. Goods that are non-excludable and rival are common resources, neither private nor public goods. A village's shared grazing land and groundwater pumped by many farms are others.
Each user keeps the whole gain and shares the loss, so the stock is over-used
Nobody owns the sea or its fish, so no single user has a reason to protect the stock. A skipper who lands an extra tonne of cod keeps all the revenue. The cost, a smaller stock that yields poorer catches next year, is spread across every boat. A fish she leaves behind will probably be caught by a rival, so holding back gains her nothing.
Every skipper reasons the same way, and the stock is fished faster than it can renew. The ecologist Garrett Hardin called this the tragedy of the commons in 1968.
Check yourself
Which of these is a common resource?
Property rights and catch limits decide who may take how much
Since nobody owns the resource, one answer is to create property rights: an owner bears the cost of over-use and gains from conserving. Where a resource cannot be parcelled out, the government limits use directly. Licences restrict who may fish, quotas cap how much may be landed, and closed seasons restrict when.
Quotas can be made tradable, like pollution permits: the total catch stays capped, and a boat that fishes at high cost can sell its share to one that fishes more cheaply. Each tool works only if landings are recorded and cheats are caught.
A village's cattle share a mountain pasture, and no government sets any rules for it. What do you think happens to the pasture?
Ruin is a risk, not a certainty. Hardin expected it, but shared pastures, forests and irrigation systems have been kept in good order for centuries by rules their own users made and enforced.
Users can govern a commons themselves when they can watch and punish each other
Elinor Ostrom, winner of a Nobel prize in economics, studied commons their users had kept in good order for centuries without private ownership or state control, such as Swiss mountain pastures and Spanish irrigation systems. The lasting ones had clear rules on who may use the resource, rules made by the users to fit local conditions, users watching each other, and penalties that started small and rose with repeated breaches.
Community rules suit a small group whose members can see who cheats. An ocean fishery worked by boats from many countries needs agreements between governments instead.
Check yourself
The anglers who use a lake set up a club to manage its fish stock. Which arrangement is most likely to keep the stock healthy?
- Tragedy of the commons
- The tragedy of the commons is the over-use of a common resource, because each user gains from taking more while the cost of depletion is shared by all.
- Public good
- A public good is non-excludable and non-rival, so one person's use leaves no less of it for anybody else.
Isn't a fishing ground a public good, since nobody can be kept out?
No. A public good is non-excludable and non-rival. A fishing ground is non-excludable but rival: every fish landed is one fewer for everyone else. A lighthouse passes both tests: its light guides one more ship without dimming for the rest. The market fails to provide a public good because free riders will not pay; a common resource is provided by nature and used up.
Apply both characteristics to the case: "non-excludable, because any boat can fish there; rival, because a fish caught by one boat cannot be caught by another". Then give the incentive: the gain is private and the cost is shared. To evaluate a remedy, say what it needs: a quota needs catches checked; community rules need a group small enough to see cheats.
Check yourself
Three of these would reduce over-fishing of a fish stock open to all boats. Which one would not?
Exam question
Explain why a fish stock that any boat may fish is likely to be over-fished, and how a catch quota could prevent this. [4]
The stock is non-excludable, since no boat can be kept out, and rival, since each fish caught is one fewer for others. Each skipper keeps the whole revenue from an extra catch while the cost of a smaller stock is shared by all boats, and a fish left behind will be caught by a rival, so the stock is fished faster than it renews. A quota caps the total landed at a level the stock can sustain, provided catches are recorded and enforced.
One mark each for: non-excludable and rival applied to fish; the incentive, where the gain is private and the cost of depletion is shared; the result, a stock fished faster than it can renew; and the quota capping the total catch at a sustainable level, with enforcement.
A common resource, like fish in the open sea, is non-excludable and rival. Each user keeps the gain from taking more while the cost of depletion is shared, so it is over-used. Property rights, licences and quotas limit who may take how much, and a small group of users can govern a commons itself by catching and punishing cheats.