Where every figure came from
IMF Independent Evaluation Office, The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (2003) (Korea's reserves and bank debt, the warnings of 1997, why the December loan and high rates did not stop the run, the rollover): http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Page numbers are the printed page numbers. Annex 2 (Korea), p. 95: the IMF's view early in 1997 was that Korea's financial problems, though potentially serious, carried no risk of a crisis of confidence; the failure of Hanbo Steel was treated as a political matter, for its effect on the ruling party, rather than for what further failures of big business groups would mean for the banks; much of the Korean banks' debt was short-term and exposed to foreign lenders deciding not to renew it; staff were troubled by the guarantee given in late August to the Korean banks' foreign debts, since honouring it meant borrowing abroad or using reserves. Pp. 94-95: holders of short-term debt can demand payment as it matures, while holders of long-term debt can only sell it; once some creditors demand repayment, all are pushed to do so, much like a bank run. P. 104: there was little risk of residents taking money abroad, given limits on doing so; in IMF staff's view at the time the main channel for high rates was the choice facing a Korean bank with a dollar loan falling due, to pay its lender more interest to renew it, or to borrow won at home, in effect from the central bank, and buy dollars, which pushes the won down; for many creditor banks the decision to renew turned more on credit risk than on the rate offered, and outflows stopped only when high rates were joined by the coordinated rollover. P. 102: the overnight call rate, 12.7 per cent on 2 December, was raised to 25 per cent in early December; a usury law capped it at 25 per cent; after the cap was raised in mid-December the rate went to 30 per cent. Box A2.2 (p. 100): new foreign exchange advances from the central bank to banks carried a penalty rate. P. 112: usable reserves (official reserves less the sums placed with Korean banks' branches abroad to meet short-term debt payments) stood at about US$11 billion and were dropping very fast when the IMF team arrived; the main drain was bank debt repayments, not portfolio outflows; the debt was larger than first thought because residence-based data left out borrowing by Korean banks' overseas branches; banks owed US$62 billion of the short-term external debt at end-September 1997 (nearly three-quarters of the annex's total, derived here), and the office says it was this bank debt that triggered the crisis; short-term external bank debt fell to US$49 billion at end-November and US$33 billion at end-December, an outflow of US$16 billion in a month. P. 113: to make the December 4 programme add up without the bilateral second line, the share of short-term interbank loans assumed to be rolled over was raised from 20 to 80 per cent, which the office calls arbitrary (note 35: the figures come from staff interviews); the announced package included a second line of more than US$20 billion, which markets doubted; political opposition to bailouts ran high in several contributing countries; shareholder governments were reluctant to use nonmarket means to sway private lenders, fearing an exodus of capital from emerging markets; the second line could not be ready for several weeks. P. 114: staff projected usable reserves falling from US$8.5 billion on 14 December to US$4.5 billion at year-end; further official money was neither politically nor practically feasible; a bond offering by the state-owned Korea Development Bank failed; a sharper rise in rates might have drawn some capital back but could have harmed the heavily indebted corporate sector so much that confidence fell; foreign bankers in Korea raised a rollover in early December without their head offices' support; the decision to press the banks came from Korean, US and IMF officials just after the presidential election of 18 December, whose winner's support for the programme helped its credibility; central banks and finance ministries contacted large banks, which contacted other lenders; the banks agreed to keep existing credit lines while negotiating longer maturities; daily monitoring set up with IMF help ensured compliance; a second announcement on 16 January committed the banks to keep lines to the end of March; in April 1998 some US$22 billion of eligible bank debt maturing in 1998 was exchanged for government-guaranteed loans of one to three years; talks on the second line went nowhere, most likely because private financing had improved. P. 115: all the extended loans were repaid by the original borrowers and the guarantee was never used. P. 117: some creditors wanted out of Korea whatever happened; the shareholder governments feared undesirable precedents and effects on flows to other emerging economies. Appendix 2.1 (pp. 118-119): 23 January 1997, Hanbo Steel bankrupt with US$6 billion of debt; 29 August, the government says it will ensure payment of Korean financial institutions' foreign debts; 26 November, the IMF team arrives in Seoul; 16 December, the 10 per cent daily limit on the won's movement removed; 18 December, presidential election. Main report: Executive summary p. 2: the IMF was optimistic until virtually the last minute; the first programme was clearly underfinanced. P. 4: the agreement by major international banks to roll over interbank debt on 24 December 1997 was a turning point, owing much to most of the short-term external debt being interbank credit. Chapter 2, p. 19: leaked programme documents showed usable reserves lower than markets had feared, and rollovers kept falling. P. 20: a joint announcement by the largest banks was hoped to remove the fear that Korea would soon run out of foreign exchange; the won recovered to W 1,400 by the end of March 1998. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20050315024854id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf (capture 2005-03-15). Annex 2 read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20050315030632id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/Kor.PDF (capture 2005-03-15). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Bank for International Settlements, 68th Annual Report (8 June 1998), chapter VII, Financial intermediation and the Asian crisis (The reserves on deposit, the float, the debt exchange): http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. Page numbers are printed page footers. Page 128: at end-November 1997 the Bank of Korea had placed almost $17 billion of its $24.4 billion of reserves with overseas branches of Korean banks that had struggled to meet their foreign currency obligations ("most", derived here). Table VII.6, chronology (p. 131): 4 December, IMF standby credit for Korea of "a record $21 billion" approved; 16 December, floating of the won; 29 January 1998, an agreement between Korea and its foreign creditors to swap $24 billion of short-term debt into loans carrying a government guarantee and floating interest rates (the body gives the agreement without the sum; the April exchange figure is from the evaluation office). Page 135: the Korean government guaranteed bank debt in return for foreign banks lengthening their loans, and exchange rates steadied in the periods just after such announcements. The IEO dates the tentative agreement 28 January (its chronology gives that entry in US Eastern time); this module uses the BIS date. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20030814095807id_/http://www.bis.org/publ/ar98c07.pdf (capture 2003-08-14). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
US Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, RR-2131, 24 December 1997 (The 24 December announcement): http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/pr2131.htm. Public domain (US government work). The G-7 and other nations announced support for bringing forward, by early January, existing commitments of official finance, "in the context of a significant voluntary extension of the maturities of existing claims by international bank creditors on Korean financial institutions." Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20000311163317id_/http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/pr2131.htm (capture 2000-03-11). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Government of Korea, Letter of Intent to the IMF, 24 December 1997 (The strengthened programme of 24 December): http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/122497.htm. Published by the IMF with the authorities' permission; paraphrased. The government's strategy: strengthen and bring forward the programme, discuss with foreign banks better rollover of short-term borrowing, and seek faster official disbursements; the call rate reached about 30 per cent on 24 December; the central bank's penalty rate on loans to banks to cover foreign debt service was raised further, to push banks to find other ways to pay. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/19990208234440id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/122497.htm (capture 1999-02-08). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, South Korean won to one US dollar, monthly average (H.10), via FRED, series EXKOUS (The chart): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EXKOUS. Public domain; citation requested. Monthly averages, won per US dollar: June 1997 891.4; November 1997 1,035.2; December 1997 1,496.9; January 1998 1,707.3, the highest month on the chart; February 1,628.4; March 1,489.4; April 1,391.5; May 1,399.1; June 1,397.8. Derived here: a dollar debt cost 1,707.3/891.4 - 1 = 92 per cent more won in January 1998 than in June 1997; the won's largest monthly fall on the chart was in December 1997. Retrieved 1 October 2026 on the device and read twice.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.