On 2 July 1997 Thailand stopped holding its currency steady
For years Thailand's central bank had kept its currency, the baht, close to a fixed rate against the US dollar. In 1997 traders sold baht, betting that the fixed rate could not last. The bank spent its dollars buying baht, which held up its price. On 2 July 1997 the bank gave up and let the baht float, so the market would set its price.
Before you start
What you'll be able to answer
- Why did borrowing abroad leave Thailand and its neighbours at risk when lenders suddenly pulled their money out?
- What rescue loans did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lead, and what did they ask of each country?
- What did the crisis cost the region's economies in 1998?
In June 1997 one US dollar bought about 25 Thai baht. By January 1998, how many baht did a dollar buy?
About 53. A dollar bought about 25 baht in June 1997 and about 53 baht in January 1998. So one baht bought less than half as many dollars as seven months before.
Where this sits
The Asian Financial Crisis — 1997 to 2000 · this module is lit
- 2 Jul 1997Thailand stops holding the baht at a fixed rate to the dollar and lets it float
- 14 Aug 1997Indonesia lets the rupiah float
- 20 Aug 1997The IMF approves a loan of about $3.9 billion for Thailand
- Nov 1997The IMF approves a loan of about $10.1 billion for Indonesia
- Nov 1997Indonesia closes 16 banks
- 4 Dec 1997The IMF approves a loan of about $21 billion for Korea
- 24 Dec 1997Korea's programme is speeded up
- 21 May 1998President Suharto of Indonesia resigns
- Aug 1998A crisis in Russia spreads panic beyond Asia
- 1-2 Sep 1998Malaysia brings in rules on money leaving the country
- 1999Growth returns in most of the region
The borrowing of the 1990s
In the 1990s banks and firms in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and their neighbours borrowed heavily abroad. The banks lent much of it at home. In most of the region, bank lending grew over 10 per cent a year faster than prices. Much of this lending went into property and company investment.
Much of the foreign borrowing was due within a year and owed in dollars or yen. With the currency held close to the dollar, few borrowers paid a bank to fix the exchange rate for their repayments. If the currency fell, each dollar or yen owed would cost more local money.
Lenders who feared losses could refuse new loans as old ones fell due. A central bank can hold up its currency by raising interest rates. Higher rates pay investors more to hold the currency, so fewer sell it. But they also raise what indebted borrowers pay.
The float and the fall of the baht
The chart shows how many baht one US dollar bought each month. A rising line means a weaker baht. Traders betting on a fall had been selling baht for months. The Bank of Thailand, the central bank, had used much of its dollars to defend the rate. It had also signed deals promising to sell more dollars to other banks in the coming months. After the float the baht fell fast. By January 1998 it took about 53 baht to buy a dollar, against about 25 in June 1997.
Every Thai bank and firm with dollar debts now owed far more in baht, and lenders abroad grew less willing to renew their loans.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.10, via FRED (series EXTHUS). Public domain.
Check yourself
Look at the chart. What happened to the baht during 1998?
Thailand's neighbours had not floated their currencies in July 1997. Why might trouble in Thailand reach them within weeks?
Investors pulled money out of economies that seemed to share Thailand's weak points. The weak points were short-term dollar debts and weak banks, meaning banks that might not be able to pay what they owed. Each currency that fell made investors more wary of the next.
The spread to the neighbours and Korea
Investors who had lent to Thailand looked again at its neighbours. Where they saw the same short-term dollar debts and weak banks, they took their money out of those countries. Within weeks of the float, traders were selling three more currencies: the Philippine peso, the Malaysian ringgit and the Indonesian rupiah. In August Indonesia let the rupiah float. By late October the selling had reached South Korea, the world's eleventh largest economy. In December Korea let its currency, the won, float.
In January 1998 Alan Greenspan, head of the US central bank (the Federal Reserve), told the US Congress that fear was spreading from country to country: "Vicious cycles of ever rising and reinforcing fears have become contagious."
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea turned for help to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which lends to countries that cannot pay their foreign bills, and to other lenders. Roughly how much did the IMF and other lenders commit to the three in all?
About 118 billion dollars in all by January 1999, from the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and lending governments. These were promises of loans. The lenders were to hand the money over in parts, and not all of the promised money was handed over.
The rescue loans and their conditions
The IMF approved loans of about 3.9 billion dollars for Thailand in August 1997, about 10.1 billion for Indonesia in November and about 21 billion for Korea in December. The money came in stages, each paid only after the country met its conditions: higher interest rates for a time to steady the currency, budget targets, and closing or rebuilding weak banks.
On 1 November Indonesia closed 16 banks. Relatives of President Suharto partly owned three of them, and the family fought the closures. A son of Suharto moved his bank's business to another bank, and a half-brother went to court. The fight made the public doubt the clean-up. People also rightly believed that other weak banks were still open.
Runs followed at many other banks: customers rushed to withdraw savings. In Korea foreign banks kept pulling short-term loans until 24 December 1997, when the big banks agreed to keep lending.
Check yourself
Add up the IMF's three loans in this section (about 3.9, 10.1 and 21 billion dollars). All lenders together committed about 118 billion dollars. Roughly what share of that total, in per cent, did the IMF's three loans make up?
30 %
About 30 per cent: 3.9 + 10.1 + 21 = 35, and 35 is about 0.30 of 118. The IMF added to Indonesia's loan in 1998. That brought the IMF's part to about 36 billion dollars by January 1999, or about 31 per cent of 118.
Indonesia in 1998, and Malaysia's own approach
The rupiah kept falling into 1998. Indonesia's IMF programme required the government to stop paying part of the cost of fuel (the subsidies that kept fuel cheap). In early May the government raised fuel prices. It moved faster than the IMF had advised, according to the IMF's evaluation office. The rises set off unrest, and later that month President Suharto resigned.
In August 1998 a crisis in Russia spread panic far beyond Asia. Malaysia had not taken IMF loans, as a US Congressional Research Service report notes. At first Malaysia did what the rescued countries did: it pushed up interest rates and cut back the government's budget. Then it took a different approach. On 1 September it restricted money leaving the country, and the next day it fixed the ringgit against the dollar.
Check yourself
On 24 December 1997 the big international banks agreed together to keep lending to Korea's banks. Before that, each bank on its own had kept pulling its loans. Why could the joint agreement stop the pull-out?
Falling output in 1998, and the recovery
In 1998 the crisis became a recession, as the economies shrank. Output, everything a country produces, fell by about 13 per cent in Indonesia. It fell by more than 7 per cent in Thailand and Malaysia, by about 5 per cent in Korea and slightly in the Philippines. Firms closed, jobs were lost and poverty rose.
In 1999 growth returned. Korea grew by about 11.6 per cent, Thailand by about 4.6 per cent and Indonesia by under 1 per cent. The IMF gave several reasons. Households and firms spent again, exports grew and interest rates stayed low. The IMF also credited its own programmes.
Why the crisis happened, and whether the IMF's conditions helped or hurt, is still argued; the last module of this series takes it up. The next module goes back before 1997: what had the region borrowed, and why could Thailand not keep the baht steady?
Check yourself
Three of these were conditions of the IMF-led rescues. Which one was not?
Check yourself
The key questions
Why did borrowing abroad leave Thailand and its neighbours at risk when lenders suddenly pulled their money out?
Banks and firms in Thailand and its neighbours had borrowed heavily abroad, much of it short-term and in dollars, while their currencies were held close to the dollar. Lenders could pull out quickly, and a falling currency raised what borrowers owed.
What rescue loans did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lead, and what did they ask of each country?
Loans from the IMF and other lenders to Thailand, Indonesia and Korea. They were paid in stages. Each country had to raise interest rates for a time, meet budget targets and close or rebuild weak banks.
What did the crisis cost the region's economies in 1998?
Recessions across the region. Output fell by about 13 per cent in Indonesia and by more than 7 per cent in Thailand and Malaysia. Firms closed, jobs were lost and poverty rose.
The numbers
Check yourself
A Thai firm earned its income in baht and owed its foreign lenders dollars. What did the fall of the baht in 1997 do to the size of that debt, counted in baht?
Check yourself
Suppose a rescued country fell behind on the conditions of its IMF loan. What could the lenders do?
Check yourself
In which of these countries did output fall by the most in 1998?