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Advanced theory

Repeated games and cooperation

Say why repeating a game can sustain cooperation, and when it breaks down

Specification: AQA 4.1.5.5 Edexcel 3.4.4

A one-off prisoner's dilemma predicts that every cartel collapses

A-level oligopoly theory says firms are tempted to collude and tempted to cheat. Played once, the cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma: whatever its rival does, each firm earns more by cheating on the agreed price, so both cheat and each earns £3 million instead of £5 million. The way out of a prisoner's dilemma is to find a way to penalise those who do not cooperate. A cartel cannot sign a contract a court will enforce, so the penalty has to come from somewhere else: the future.

One round of the cartel game: profits in £ million, Firm A firstA two-by-two payoff matrix. Rows are Firm A holding to the agreed price or cheating; columns are Firm B doing the same. Both hold: 5 and 5. A holds, B cheats: 2 and 6. A cheats, B holds: 6 and 2. Both cheat: 3 and 3.B: HoldB: CheatA: HoldA: Cheat5, 52, 66, 23, 3
Each cell gives Firm A's profit, then Firm B's, in £ million, for one round. Illustrative figures.

A known last round unravels cooperation all the way back to the first

Suppose the two firms know they will play exactly ten rounds, perhaps because a licence runs out. In round ten nothing follows, so it is a one-off game and both cheat. In round nine, both know round ten will be cheating whatever happens now, so good behaviour in round nine buys nothing, and both cheat. The same reasoning runs back to round one. Working from the end of a game to the start like this is backward induction, and with a known finite horizon it predicts cheating from the start.

Check yourself

Two firms know their cartel game will be played for exactly five rounds. What does backward induction predict for round one?

Take a guess

Now nobody knows which round will be the last: after each one there is a good chance of another. Can the cartel hold together?

An uncertain end lets the threat of punishment keep firms honest

If the game might go on after every round, each firm can play a trigger strategy: hold the price while the rival does, and cheat for good once the rival cheats. Cheating now gains £1 million, taking profit from £5 million to £6 million, but every later round then pays £3 million instead of £5 million. With a chance p of another round each time, the expected loss is £2 million times p/(1 − p), where p/(1 − p) is the expected number of further rounds: p + p² + p³ and so on. It outweighs the £1 million gain once p is above one third, so a likely enough future sustains the cartel.

Check yourself

Each round, a cheat gains £1 million and then loses £2 million in every later round. Which chance of another round is too low for the threat to stop cheating?

Cartels break when cheating pays more, is seen later, or can be confessed

Each firm faces a private temptation to produce a little more while counting on the others to hold back. More members make that temptation larger, because a small firm that cheats wins a big share of the market, and make cheating harder to spot. Uncertain demand hides cheating, because a fall in sales could be a rival's price cut or a weak market. Slow detection delays the punishment. Leniency programmes, such as the Competition and Markets Authority's, offer the first member to confess immunity from fines, which turns the cartel itself into a new prisoner's dilemma.

Key terms
Repeated game
A repeated game is a game in which the same players meet in the same situation again and again, so each can respond to what others did before.
One-shot game
A one-shot game is a game the players play only once, so no choice made in it can be rewarded or punished later.

Ideas that explain when cartels hold and when they break

Can you name the four ideas that explain when a cartel holds and when it breaks?

Common mistake

If the game is repeated, won't the firms always cooperate?

No. Repetition makes cooperation possible, not certain. It fails if the last round is known, because backward induction unravels it. It fails if the firms care too little about the future, or think another round too unlikely, because then the threat of punishment is too weak. And even when cooperation could last, both firms cheating in every round is still an equilibrium of the repeated game: if each expects the other to cheat, cheating is each one's best reply. Repetition opens a door; it does not push anyone through it.

Exam tip

State the one-shot prediction first, then say what repetition changes: a future in which cheating can be punished. Name the condition, a high enough chance of meeting again, and then the forces that break it: many firms, uncertain demand, slow detection, leniency. An interviewer rewards an answer that says when the argument fails, not only when it works.

Exam question

Why do cartels hold, and what would you do to break one? [6]

Exam question

Two ferry firms share a route under licences that both expire in exactly three years. Should we expect them to keep fares high until then? [4]

Exam question

Why might a price-fixing cartel fall apart in a recession? [4]

What to take away

Played once, the cartel game is a prisoner's dilemma and each member cheats. With a known last round, backward induction unravels cooperation back to the first round. With no known end, trigger strategies and tit-for-tat can sustain it, if another round is likely enough that future losses outweigh today's gain from cheating. Cartels break when there are many members, when demand is uncertain, when cheating is seen late, and when leniency rewards the first to confess.