Where every figure came from
IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics: discount rate, Japan, per cent a year, monthly (MFS_IR, JPN.DISR_RT_PT_A_PT.M) (The Bank of Japan's discount rate, 1995 to 2007; the chart): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/2.1/data/IMF.STA,MFS_IR/JPN.DISR_RT_PT_A_PT.M. IMF data, reused with credit: IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics. Retrieved 3 October 2026 from the IMF SDMX API and downloaded again independently; the two reads are identical (re-compared 4 October 2026). Rows in the lane media pack s3/m7_disr_rows.json (January 1995 to December 2007, 156 months). Per cent a year, monthly: 1.75 until March 1995; 1.0 from April 1995; 0.5 from September 1995 to January 2001; 0.35 in February 2001; 0.25 from March 2001; 0.1 from September 2001 to June 2006; 0.4 from July 2006; 0.75 from February 2007. Derived here: the rate did not move between September 1995 and January 2001, so it stayed at 0.5 through the zero interest rate policy (February 1999 to August 2000); the early-2001 cut came in two steps, 0.35 in February and 0.25 from March 2001; its lowest level in the period is 0.1, held from September 2001 to June 2006.
Bank of Japan, Announcement of the Monetary Policy Meeting Decisions: Change of the Guideline for Money Market Operations, 12 February 1999 (The overnight rate pushed as low as possible, and why): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_1999/k990212c.htm. Bank of Japan terms: paraphrased, no copying. The Bank would supply more ample funds and push the overnight call rate as far down as it could; to avoid too much volatility in short-term markets it would aim at first for around 0.15 per cent and then bring the rate lower as markets allowed. It judged that the economy needed the strongest support monetary policy could give, to keep deflationary pressure from growing and to bring the downturn to a halt. The same statement notes that prices were on a downward trend, long-term interest rates had risen considerably and share prices were weak. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
IMF, Public Information Notice 99/75: IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Japan (August 1999) (The overnight rate virtually zero by March 1999; the April promise): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/pn9975.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Background: the Bank of Japan eased its target for the overnight call rate steadily, and by March 1999 it had been brought down to virtually zero; in April the Governor said this zero interest rate policy would continue until deflationary concerns were dispelled. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20001216065100id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1999/PN9975.HTM (capture 2000-12-16). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bank of Japan, (Reference) Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures from the Late 1990s (The April 1999 promise; the dates of both policies; the target raised to January 2004): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outline/bpreview/ref.htm. Bank of Japan terms: paraphrased. The zero interest rate policy ran from February 1999 to August 2000, with a target of as low as possible (virtually zero) for short-term rates, and quantitative easing from March 2001 to March 2006, which moved the operating target to banks' current-account balances at the Bank. Table rows: the 14 April 1999 row (Governor Hayami's press conference) records that the Bank committed on 13 April to keep the zero rate until deflationary concern was dispelled; 11 August 2000, the policy ended; 19 March 2001, quantitative easing began with a target of around ¥5 trillion; the target was then raised in August, September and December 2001, October 2002, March, April, May and October 2003, and on 20 January 2004 to around ¥30-35 trillion. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bank of Japan, Review of Monetary Policy from a Broad Perspective (December 2024) (The world's first zero interest rate policy; forward guidance; the end in August 2000; the Bank's later view of quantitative easing): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2024/k241219b.pdf. Bank of Japan text, paraphrased with credit (the Bank's terms allow quotation with the source credited, not commercial copying). Chapter I, section B: in 1999 the Bank introduced what it calls the world's first zero interest rate policy, together with forward guidance, which it then called the policy duration effect. Footnote 9: from March 1995 the Bank also used the guiding of market interest rates as a policy instrument, alongside the official discount rate. In 1998 it had lowered its target for the overnight call rate to around 0.25 per cent. Chart 1-2-4 text: in August 2000 the Bank lifted the zero interest rate policy, judging that the point had been reached where deflationary concerns were dispelled; after the economy worsened again it introduced quantitative easing in March 2001. The same passage says the policy is regarded as having worked mainly by pushing down longer-term interest rates through forward guidance and by keeping the financial system stable through ample liquidity. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bank of Japan, New Procedures for Money Market Operations and Monetary Easing (19 March 2001) (The switch to a target for current-account balances, and the promise tied to prices): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2001/k010319a.htm. Bank of Japan terms: paraphrased, no copying. The main operating target moved from the overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current accounts banks hold at the Bank, with the call rate then set in the market below the ceiling given by a Lombard-type lending facility. The balance was to rise to around ¥5 trillion, about ¥1 trillion above the February 2001 average of ¥4 trillion, and the Bank expected the call rate to fall well below its target at the time and stay close to zero. The new procedures were to stay until the consumer price index excluding perishables, nationwide, rose stably at or above zero year on year. The Bank gave as reasons that recovery had paused, prices were weak and downward pressure on prices from weak demand might grow. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
IMF, Public Information Notice 01/85: IMF Concludes 2001 Article IV Consultation with Japan (August 2001) (The early-2001 easing; the overnight rate back to effectively zero): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/pn0185.htm. IMF copyright; paraphrased. Background: with the economy weakening, in February 2001 the Bank of Japan set up a Lombard facility lending on demand at the official discount rate and cut that rate from 0.5 to 0.25 per cent, and lowered its overnight call rate target, which the IMF calls its main policy instrument; in mid-March it moved to a target for current-account balances, at first around ¥5 trillion, about ¥1 trillion above the average of the months before, which brought the overnight call rate effectively back to zero. Read from the Internet Archive capture of the original file, https://web.archive.org/web/20021218072455id_/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/pn0185.htm (capture 2002-12-18). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda and Ugai (Bank of Japan), Japan's deflation, problems in the financial system and monetary policy, BIS Working Papers 188 (November 2005) (The rate before February 1999; the recovery and the end of the zero rate; required reserves; why the promise mattered): https://www.bis.org/publications/working-paper-188-japans-deflation-problems-financial-system-and-monetary-policy.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; Bank of Japan authors, so the text is paraphrased. Section 2.1: the overnight call rate was cut to 0.25 per cent in September 1998 and to near zero in March 1999; the economy then recovered and grew until the third quarter of 2000, the zero rate was dropped in August 2000, and a serious recession followed as world demand for high-technology goods fell. Quantitative easing used banks' current-account balances at the Bank as the target; the target was raised several times, reaching ¥30-35 trillion in January 2004, against required reserves of about ¥6 trillion. Just before March 2001 the balances were about ¥4 trillion, almost equal to required reserves; the increase after that came from the Bank's market operations. Section 2.2: the authors put a commitment to keep the short-term rate at zero until inflation turned positive at the core of both policies, and say it gives a stronger easing effect than a zero rate alone because it works on expected future short-term rates. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on Japan's Economy and Public Finance (Fiscal 2001), Summary (December 2001, provisional translation) (Why falling prices hurt firms that owe money): https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2001/1204wp-keizai/summary.pdf. Government of Japan Standard Terms of Use (compatible with CC BY 4.0); paraphrased. Chapter 1, Section 2, "Deflation and Monetary Policy": the summary says deflation erodes firms' profits by increasing the debt burdens of heavily indebted firms and by raising real interest rates and real wages. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2002, Summary, Chapter 1 (November 2002, provisional translation) (The Cabinet Office's view of quantitative easing in 2002): https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2002/1105wp-keizai/summary1.pdf. Government of Japan Standard Terms of Use (compatible with CC BY 4.0); paraphrased. Chapter 1, "(2) Quantitative easing": the monetary base rose sharply after the Bank of Japan began quantitative easing, but the money supply grew slowly and GDP stayed low; the ratio of money supply to the monetary base fell sharply. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2003, Summary, Chapter 1 (October 2003, provisional translation) (The Cabinet Office's view of quantitative easing in 2003): https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2003/1024wp-keizai/summary1.pdf. Government of Japan Standard Terms of Use (compatible with CC BY 4.0); paraphrased. Chapter 1, "2. Effects of Quantitative Easing": the monetary base had grown substantially while the money supply grew little; banks had not increased their risky assets, buying government securities instead of lending; among the reasons it gives for the lack of visible effects are worries about banks' capital adequacy; among future measures, bad loans should be disposed of. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.