- Bilateral monopoly
- A bilateral monopoly is a labour market with a monopsony employer on the demand side and a trade union on the supply side.
- Monopsony
- A monopsony is a labour market with only one employer, which faces the whole supply curve of labour and chooses the wage.
The employer's choiceThe monopsony hires L1, where MCL meets MRP, and pays Wm, read down to the supply curve S.
With employment at L1, the wage can go up from the monopsony's Wm to the union's target Wu; bargaining power decides where it settles.
- The monopsony hires L1, where the marginal cost of labour equals the marginal revenue product, and pays Wm, the lowest wage the supply curve allows for L1 workers.
- The union, the only seller of this labour, aims for Wu, the marginal revenue product of the L1th worker: the highest wage at which the employer still wants all L1 workers.
- The diagram does not fix the wage. It settles closer to Wu the more bargaining power the union has and closer to Wm the more the employer has. If employment stays at L1, it is below the competitive level L2.
Check yourself
A union faces a monopsony employer. Which point marks the union's target wage?
Yes. A is the marginal revenue product of the last worker at the employment where MCL meets MRP: the highest wage at which the employer still wants that many workers.
B is on the supply curve below the hiring point. It is the lowest wage that attracts that many workers, which is what the monopsony would pay without a union.
C is where supply meets marginal revenue product: the wage and employment of a competitive labour market, not the top of the bargaining range.
A union and a monopsony agree a wage a little above Wm, to be paid to every worker the firm hires. What do you think happens to employment?
With one wage agreed for everyone, hiring an extra worker no longer raises the pay of the rest. Each extra worker now costs the firm less than before, so it hires more, up to the supply curve.
The monopsony aloneWithout an agreement the monopsony hires L1 and pays Wm.
An agreed wage W1 above Wm makes the marginal cost of labour flat at W1, so employment moves right from L1 to L3.
- With W1 agreed for every worker, taking on one more worker no longer raises anyone else's pay, so up to the supply curve the marginal cost of labour is just W1.
- Every worker up to L3 adds more to revenue than W1 costs, so the firm hires all who will work for W1: L3 workers, more than L1.
- Employment is highest when the agreed wage equals the competitive wage Wc. Above Wc the firm hires only where marginal revenue product equals the wage, so employment falls, back to L1 at Wu.
Check yourself
A union and a monopsony agree a wage above the monopsony wage Wm but below the competitive wage Wc, paid to every worker. Compared with the monopsony alone, what happens?
Doesn't a union facing a monopsony always cost jobs?
No. In a competitive labour market, a union wage above equilibrium does cut the number of jobs. A monopsony hires few workers because each extra one raises the pay of all the others. A wage agreed for everyone removes that reason, so a wage anywhere above Wm and up to Wc raises pay and employment together. Above Wc employment starts to fall again, but it stays above L1 until the wage reaches Wu.
Draw S, MCL above it, and MRP. Mark L1 where MCL meets MRP, then read Wm down to S and Wu up to MRP. State that the wage is indeterminate between them and depends on bargaining power. For evaluation, add that a wage agreed between Wm and Wc raises employment as well as pay.
Check yourself
A monopsony employs 50 workers. The supply curve shows 50 workers will work for £12 an hour, and the marginal revenue product of the 50th worker is £18 an hour. The union and the employer settle exactly halfway between the monopsony wage and the union's target. What is the hourly wage, in pounds?
£15
The monopsony wage is £12, read from the supply curve, and the union's target is £18, the marginal revenue product. Halfway between them is £12 plus half of £6, which is £15.
Exam question
Explain, with the help of a diagram, why the wage in a bilateral monopoly is indeterminate. [4]
The monopsony hires L1, where the marginal cost of labour meets the marginal revenue product, and would pay only Wm, read from the supply curve. The union would aim for Wu, the marginal revenue product at L1. Any wage between Wm and Wu is possible, and where it settles depends on the relative bargaining power of the union and the employer.
One mark for L1 where MCL meets MRP, one for Wm from the supply curve, one for Wu from MRP, and one for the outcome depending on bargaining power.
In a bilateral monopoly a union faces a monopsony employer. The monopsony hires L1, where the marginal cost of labour meets the marginal revenue product, and would pay Wm; the union aims for Wu, the marginal revenue product at L1. The wage is indeterminate between them and depends on bargaining power. A wage agreed for every worker above Wm and up to the competitive wage raises employment as well as pay.