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Advanced theory

Behavioural economics beyond the textbook

Judge what prospect theory and present bias add to the rational model

Specification: AQA 4.1.2.3, 4.1.2.4

Key terms
Prospect theory
Prospect theory is a model of choice under risk in which people judge outcomes as gains or losses from a reference point and feel losses more than gains.
Expected utility theory
Expected utility theory is the standard model of choice under risk, in which people weight the utility of each possible final level of wealth by its probability.

What behavioural economics adds to the rational model

Can you name the five ideas behavioural economists add to the rational model of choice?

The first four are the parts of prospect theory; the fifth is about time rather than risk.

Prospect theory keeps the maximising but changes what is maximised

At A-level, behavioural economics usually arrives as a list of biases set against the rational model. At university the sharper question is which assumption fails and what replaces it. Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory keeps the idea that people pick the option they value most. What changes is the thing being valued: not final wealth, but gains and losses from a reference point. The value function is steeper for losses than for gains, flattens out in both directions, and outcomes are weighted by how likely they feel, which overstates small chances.

The prospect theory value functionVertical axis: Value felt. Horizontal axis: Outcome. Value: an upward-sloping curve. Horizontal line. Vertical line: Reference point.Reference pointValueGainLoss
The value felt is measured from the reference point, where the two dashed lines cross. Moving the same distance into a loss drops the value further than moving into a gain raises it, and the curve flattens further out on both sides.

Check yourself

A shop that charges more for card payments calls the gap "a discount for paying cash". Why might shoppers mind this less than a "card surcharge" of the same size?

Take a guess

Would you rather have £100 today or £110 in a week? And £100 in a year or £110 in a year and a week?

Present bias makes today's plans inconsistent with tomorrow's choices

Present value discounts every year at the same rate, so waiting a week costs the same whether the week starts today or in a year. The £100-or-£110 choice breaks that. The beta-delta model captures it: each future period is discounted by δ as usual, and every future payoff is also multiplied by a factor β below one, so "now" gets a premium no later date shares. When next year becomes this year, the premium moves with it and the plan changes. People who know this about themselves buy commitment devices: a pension they cannot touch until retirement, or a gym membership paid a year ahead.

Check yourself

Which of these works as a commitment device against present bias?

Automatic enrolment shows how far a default can move behaviour

From 2012, UK employers were required, in stages, to enrol eligible staff in a workplace pension automatically, leaving each worker free to opt out. A rational saver would not care which way the form was set, because the pension on offer is identical. Yet among eligible private-sector employees the share saving into a workplace pension rose from 42% in 2012 to 88% in 2025. Not all of that rise is the default: the reform also required every employer to offer a scheme and to contribute to it. But because staff were enrolled automatically and could leave, the fact that most stayed in is the default at work. Inertia and present bias fit: opting in takes effort today, and the reward arrives decades later. The same thinking runs through the Behavioural Insights Team, set up inside the Cabinet Office to test such nudges with trials.

The findings refine the rational model more than they overturn it

Critics make three points. Some effects fade with experience: John List found traders at sports-card fairs showed far less attachment to what they owned than novices. Nudges tested at scale often do much less than in academic papers, as DellaVigna and Linos found when they gathered the trials run by nudge units. And a nudge assumes the planner knows what people really want. Against that, the beta-delta and prospect theory models still have people maximising; they change the function, not the method. The rational model survives best in repeated, high-stakes markets and worst in rare, delayed choices.

Exam tip

Interviewers often pick up a book from your reading, and Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow is a favourite. Expect "so is economics wrong?". Name one finding, say which assumption of the rational model it breaks, give the evidence, then say where the model still holds. Mentioning loss aversion alone is a summary; saying when it fades is an argument.

Exam question

You've read Thinking, Fast and Slow. Does it show that the rational-choice model is wrong? [6]

Exam question

A gambler is £500 down near the end of the night and starts placing bigger, riskier bets. Why? [4]

Exam question

Why might the same person buy a lottery ticket and insure their phone? [4]

What to take away

Prospect theory says people judge outcomes as gains or losses from a reference point, feel losses more than equal gains, grow less sensitive further from the reference point and overweight small chances. Present bias gives "now" a premium, so plans unravel and commitment devices and defaults such as automatic enrolment work. Critics find some effects fade with experience and nudges shrink at scale. The models refine rational choice rather than replace it.