Where every figure came from
Finance ministers and central bank governors of the G5 (France, West Germany, Japan, the UK, the US), announcement known as the Plaza Accord, 22 September 1985 (published by the G7 Research Group, University of Toronto) (The Plaza Agreement): http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm. Official communique; quoted briefly. The five countries' finance ministers and central bank governors met in New York on 22 September 1985 and judged that a further orderly rise of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar was desirable (para 18). Among its stated intentions, the Government of Japan listed flexible management of monetary policy "with due attention to the yen rate". Retrieved 3 October 2026.
International Monetary Fund, Exchange Rates: yen per US dollar, period average, monthly (JPN.XDC_USD.PA_RT.M) (The rise of the yen): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/3.0/data/dataflow/IMF.STA/ER/+/JPN.XDC_USD.PA_RT.M. IMF data, used with credit. Monthly averages: September 1985 236.95 yen per dollar; January 1987 154.48. Retrieved 3 October 2026 through the IMF SDMX API on the device and read twice.
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Statistics: Interest Rates, Japan, discount rate, monthly (JPN.DISR_RT_PT_A_PT.M) (The chart): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/3.0/data/dataflow/IMF.STA/MFS_IR/+/JPN.DISR_RT_PT_A_PT.M. IMF data, used with credit. Per cent a year, monthly: 5.0 to December 1985; 2.5 from February 1987 to April 1989; 3.25 in May 1989; 6.0 from August 1990 to June 1991; 5.5 in July 1991; 2.5 from February to August 1993; 1.75 from September 1993; 1.0 from April 1995. The changes match the Bank of Japan's own table (bojodr). Retrieved 3 October 2026 through the IMF SDMX API on the device and read twice.
Bank of Japan, The Basic Discount Rate and Basic Loan Rate (previously indicated as "Official Discount Rates") (The dates of the cuts): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/boj/other/discount/discount.htm. Table of effective dates, per cent: 30 January 1986 4.50, the first of five cuts from 5.00; 23 February 1987 2.50; 31 May 1989 3.25, the first rise; 1 July 1991 5.50, the first cut after the rises; 4 February 1993 2.50; 21 September 1993 1.75, the seventh cut since July 1991. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa and Shigenori Shiratsuka (Bank of Japan), 'The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan's Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons', Monetary and Economic Studies, Special Edition, February 2001 (The causes, the delay, the 1998 public money): https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/me19-s1-14.pdf. The authors' views, not necessarily the Bank of Japan's; paraphrased. Section IV.A.1 and Table 2: after the Plaza Agreement the Bank cut the official discount rate five times, from 5.0 to 2.5 per cent, between January 1986 and February 1987, and the 2.5 per cent rate then lasted about two years and three months, to May 1989; in the authors' account only the first cut was the Bank's own initiative, the second and third were decided at the same time as in the United States, and the fifth was announced on the day the Louvre Accord was agreed in Paris; surplus countries such as Japan were asked to boost domestic demand. Section III.B: no single factor caused the bubble; banks' aggressive behaviour was the initial factor, amplified by protracted monetary easing, tax and regulation favouring higher land prices, a weak mechanism of discipline and confidence in Japan. III.B.1.a: as firms were freed from around 1980 to raise money in securities markets and deposit rates were gradually deregulated, banks turned to small firms against property and to property-related loans. III.B.2: rising land and share prices raised firms' collateral and cut the cost of raising capital; monetary easing was a necessary but not a sufficient condition. III.B.3: land was taxed lightly while held and heavily on sale, which held back supply. IV.A.3.a: the Bank's quarterly outlook voiced concern about inflation pressure from summer 1988 while the Economic Planning Agency kept saying consumer prices were stable. VI.A: even when measured inflation is stable, rates may need to rise promptly. Footnote 54 quotes the Bank of Japan in April 1990 warning that many assumed a 'myth of ever-rising land prices'. Footnote 9: legislation passed by the Diet in October 1998 provided ¥60 trillion, 12 per cent of nominal GDP, in public funds for banks' non-performing assets. Section II.B.1: land prices fell from 1990 through 1999. Read twice. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Ministry of Finance, Japan, Policy Research Institute, Fiscal and Monetary Policies of Japan in Stable Growth Period, 1972 to 1990, Chapter 3, Section 2, Monetary and Financial Policy (The yen-appreciation recession, the delay, the later verdict): https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/policy_1972-1990/Chapter3-2.pdf. Japanese government content; paraphrased. Pages 159-161: Japan's government accepted after the Plaza Accord that domestic demand should be expanded; a 'Yen Appreciation Recession' occurred in 1986; aggressive bank lending against real estate was one of the factors that set off the bubble; tightening was hard because general prices were stable and price stability was the central bank's main mission; after the October 1987 crash Japan's rate was treated as an anchor for world rates; a chance to tighten in spring 1988 was missed and the first rise came in May 1989. Pages 161-162: the Ministry had given guidance on land-related loans since July 1985, made gradually stricter; special hearings on specific loans from July 1987 showed no effect; the March 1990 quantitative restriction followed. Page 161: tightening started too late, so it became too severe, and the turn to easing in July 1991 also came too late; the downturn was large and long, with effects for more than ten years. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
World Bank, World Development Indicators: Japan, inflation, consumer prices (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) and GDP growth (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG), annual per cent (Consumer prices and growth): https://data.worldbank.org/country/japan. CC BY 4.0. Consumer prices: 1987 0.13; 1988 0.68; 1995 -0.13; 1999 -0.34; 2000 -0.68; 2001 -0.74; 2002 -0.92; 2004 -0.01; 2005 -0.28; every year from 1999 to 2005 below zero. GDP growth: 1980-1989 average 4.33 and 1991-2000 average 1.24 (derived here from the annual values). Retrieved 3 October 2026 through the World Bank API (last updated 13 July 2026) and read twice.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on Japan's Economy and Public Finance (Fiscal 2001), Summary, December 2001 (Lending, bad loans, deflation): https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2001/1204wp-keizai/summary.pdf. Japanese government content; paraphrased. Chapter 1, Section 2: Japan was in a mild deflationary phase (CPI deflation for about two years, GDP-deflator deflation since the mid-1990s), and deflation raises the debt burden of heavily indebted firms and raises real interest rates. Chapter 2, Section 1: non-performing loans were estimated at slightly more than 30 trillion yen, 54 per cent of them in real estate, construction and wholesale and retail, industries that hold much land and were hit by its fall. Section 2: lending to the real estate industry more than doubled in 1990 compared with 1985; bad loans held back bank lending, and excess corporate debt cut business investment. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Bank of Japan, Statement by the Governor (tentative translation), 17 November 1997 (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank): https://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/press/danwa/dan9711b.htm. Paraphrased. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank told the Bank of Japan that it had become difficult to continue its business on its own, after it lost market confidence, seen in a sharp fall in its share price and in its deposits; its sound business was to be transferred to another bank, and all deposits were protected. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, Financial Assistance (on a Fiscal Year Basis) (Failed banks helped by the deposit insurer): https://www.dic.go.jp/english/e_katsudo/page_000210.html. Table as of the end of March 2026, number of cases of financial assistance by fiscal year: 1992, 2; 1995, 3; 1996, 6; 1997, 7; 1998, 30; 1999, 20; 2000, 20; 2001, 37; 2002, 51; none from 2003 to 2007. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Alan Ahearne, Joseph Gagnon, Jane Haltmaier, Steve Kamin and others (Federal Reserve Board), 'Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan's Experience in the 1990s', International Finance Discussion Papers 729, June 2002 (The slump and the argument over it): https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2002/729/ifdp729.pdf. US government work, public domain; staff views. Abstract: Japan's sustained deflationary slump was "very much unanticipated by Japanese policymakers and observers alike", which the authors see as a key reason the authorities did not provide enough stimulus to keep growth and inflation positive. Section II: the official discount rate was lowered in seven steps from 6 to 1.75 per cent by September 1993, easing having begun in summer 1991 soon after real estate prices began to fall; the structural budget balance moved from a surplus of 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1990 to a deficit of nearly 5 per cent by 1996. Introduction: after the collapse of the asset price bubble in early 1990, growth deteriorated steadily through the first half of the 1990s. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.