Where every figure came from
Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 1,135, "Muddling through or tunnelling through?" UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation, Michael Bordo, Oliver Bush and Ryland Thomas, 4 July 2025 (The two explanations as the argument over Britain frames them, and these authors' own answer): https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/2025/muddling-through-or-tunnelling-through-uk-monetary-and-fiscal-exceptionalism-and-the-great-inflation. Bank of England copyright (not OGL); paraphrased. Abstract: the debate over what caused Britain's 1970s inflation has centred on bad luck, meaning unusually big shocks to commodity prices and to supply, against bad policy, meaning failures of monetary policy and of prices and incomes policy. Looking at the record from the 1950s to the early 1990s, the authors find these can account for some of the big swings but not fully for how long the inflation lasted. In their view underlying inflation and expected inflation followed a series of regime shifts, tied as much to fiscal policy as to monetary policy and union reforms. They argue fiscal policy was at the heart of many of the problems: unusually for British history it was not used to stabilise the public finances but to keep unemployment low and growth high, to compensate those who lost from terms of trade shocks, and to secure agreements with the unions. Bordo is at Rutgers University; Bush and Thomas are at the Bank of England. Staff working papers give the authors' research, not the Bank's view. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Alan S. Blinder and Jeremy B. Rudd, "The Supply-Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited", NBER Working Paper 14563, December 2008; chapter 2 of Bordo and Orphanides (eds), The Great Inflation, University of Chicago Press, 2013 (The case that food and energy shocks, and the end of price controls, drove the jumps in US inflation): https://www.nber.org/papers/w14563. Paraphrased from the abstract (working paper page) and the chapter page. US inflation rose into double figures twice, in 1973-74 and 1978-80; the supply-shock account puts both jumps down to large food and energy shocks, and in 1973-74 to the removal of price controls. Critics have blamed monetary policy instead and have pointed to the much smaller effects of more recent oil shocks. The authors find the classic supply-shock explanation holds up very well, reject several versions of the claim that monetary policy was really to blame for the jumps, and examine changes in the economy that may explain why oil shocks now do less. The chapter page lists the shocks as the two OPEC oil price rises, two food price rises at about the same times, and the lifting of wage and price controls in 1973 and 1974. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian, "Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative", NBER Working Paper 8389, July 2001 (The case that swings in money, not oil, produced the stagflation): https://www.nber.org/papers/w8389. Paraphrased from the abstract. Big oil price rises were, in the authors' view, far less essential to what caused the 1970s stagflation than is often thought; they find neither a theoretical presumption nor robust evidence that oil supply shocks are stagflationary. They show that monetary expansions and contractions can generate stagflation of a realistic size with no supply shocks at all, and that swings in money help explain the movements of oil and other commodity prices, including the surge in industrial commodity prices before the 1973/74 oil price increase. Published in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Banca d'Italia, Questioni di Economia e Finanza No. 790, "Inflation and energy price shocks: lessons from the 1970s", Francesco Corsello, Matteo Gomellini and Dario Pellegrino, July 2023 (What three economists at Italy's central bank say is agreed and what is not): https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2023-0790/QEF_790_23.pdf. Paraphrased from the abstract. The authors report a broad consensus that a weak monetary policy response, tightening too late or loosening too early, was one of the main causes of the failure to keep inflation under control after the 1973 shock; they tie that failure to the end of the Bretton Woods era in 1971, when monetary policy lost a settled frame of reference. Monetary policy conduct alone, they write, does not fully explain why inflation persisted or why it differed so much across advanced economies; other institutional factors mattered, chiefly central banks' lack of independence, the structure of labour markets, and fiscal rules that turned out to be at odds with price stability. The series states that the views are the authors' and not the Bank's. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Athanasios Orphanides, "Monetary Policy Rules and the Great Inflation", Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-8, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 2002 (The case that policymakers misjudged how much spare capacity the economy had): https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200208/200208pap.pdf. Paraphrased (Board staff paper; the author's opinions, not the Board's). Abstract: judged on what policymakers believed at the time about inflation and unemployment, 1970s policy looks like a systematic, forward-looking rule of the kind often recommended, so the errors happened despite an approach that seemed sound, and the activist policies proved counterproductive in retrospect. pp.5-6 (printed pages; PDF pp.6-7): key policymakers suggested at the end of the 1960s that 4 per cent was a reasonable estimate of the natural rate of unemployment; because estimates of that rate made at the time were wrong, policy through much of the 1970s was set as if the economy had spare capacity, when in fact it was running beyond its full-employment potential. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Economic Report of the President, January 1978, with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (via FRASER) (What the President's economic advisers said in 1978 drove the 1973-74 inflation): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1978/ERP_1978.pdf. Public domain. Chapter 4, p.141: although each of several special events had a marked effect on prices, the dominant influence was the rise in fuel and food prices; "The pass-through of cost increases into other prices broadened the inflation, and the rise in consumer prices led to efforts by wage earners to recover lost real incomes." A FRASER scan. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Economic Report of the President, February 1982, with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (via FRASER) (What a new administration's economic advisers said about stagflation in 1982): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1982/ERP_1982.pdf. Public domain. Chapter 1, pp.22-23, under "The Legacy of 'Stagflation'": part of the decline in US economic performance was due to developments not affected by federal policy, such as the oil price increases of the 1970s, but such developments explain only a small part; "A full explanation of stagflation in the United States and other countries has yet to be developed. An important lesson of this period, however, is that there is no long-term tradeoff between unemployment and inflation." The federal government bears the most direct responsibility for the rise in inflation and interest rates, "which were due to excessive expansion of the money supply. In short, Federal economic policies bear the major responsibility for the legacy of stagflation." The Report was the first of an administration that took office in January 1981. A FRASER scan. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Economic Report of the President, February 1974 and February 1975 (via FRASER) (Which European currencies floated together against the dollar in 1973 and 1974): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1975/ERP_1975.pdf. Public domain. ERP 1974, pp.184-185: on 19 March 1973 five European Community countries, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands, let their currencies float jointly against the dollar, keeping the rate between any two within 2 1/4 per cent of an agreed relationship; Norway and Sweden then pegged their currencies to the jointly floating currencies. ERP 1975, p.201 (printed page): the United Kingdom and Italy did not join the group, France withdrew in January 1974, and by the end of 1974 only Germany, the Benelux countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden floated jointly against the dollar. Of the eleven countries this series follows, West Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are therefore the three in the joint float through 1974 (ERP 1974 is at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1974/ERP_1974.pdf). Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Statistics (MFS), Non-Standard Data (IMF.STA:MFS_NSRF) (How fast each country's broad money grew, 1971 to 1973): https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA:MFS_NSRF. IMF data, used with credit (imf.org/external/terms.htm). Fetched through the IMF SDMX 2.1 service. Broad money is the heading money plus quasi-money (NSRF_35L). Growth is the IMF's own annual percentage change (NSRF_35L_PC_CP_A_PT) for the United States, Japan, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Australia; for the United Kingdom and Switzerland it is our arithmetic on the yearly NSRF_35L stocks; France publishes no total for these years, so its figure is the sum of currency (NSRF_34A), demand deposits (NSRF_34B_N) and other deposits (NSRF_35_N). Each country's figure for 1971 to 1973 is the average of its three yearly growth rates (our arithmetic): United Kingdom 22.88, Japan 22.71, Italy 18.93, France 17.00, Australia 16.57, Canada 15.22, the Netherlands 14.18, the United States 12.57, West Germany 12.40, Sweden 12.28, Switzerland 8.91 per cent a year. The IMF describes the dataset as country-reported, using each country's own terms and not harmonised across countries, and as discontinued, holding vintage data only. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, consumer price indices, via FRED (Consumer price inflation in each of the eleven countries in 1974): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=CPALTT01GBM659N. Series CPALTT01<country>M659N, consumer prices, all items, growth on the same month a year before, monthly; Australia is quarterly (CPALTT01AUQ659N). Tagged "Copyrighted: citation required" on FRED; figures in the text only. Each 1974 figure is the average of the year's monthly (or quarterly) rates, our arithmetic. In order from the highest: Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, the United States, Canada, Sweden (9.90), Switzerland (9.79), the Netherlands (9.57), West Germany (6.99). The averages of 8.82 per cent for West Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden and 14.87 per cent for the other eight are our arithmetic. Retrieved 1 October 2026 (the vintage modules 7 and 8 use).
Penn World Table 11.0 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre), via FRED (How much an hour of work produced in each country, before and after 1973): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=RGDPNAJPA666NRUG. Output per hour is our arithmetic: real GDP at constant national prices (RGDPNA<cc>A666NRUG) over persons engaged (EMPENG<cc>A148NRUG) times average annual hours worked (AVHWPE<cc>A065NRUG); West Germany is DE. Growth is compound, 1965 to 1973 against 1973 to 1985, and the slowdown is the first rate less the second, in percentage points a year: Japan 4.67 (8.10 to 3.42), then Italy, Sweden 2.82, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, and Australia 0.82 (2.46 to 1.64). Total factor productivity (RTFPNA<cc>A632NRUG) also slowed in all eleven. Citation: Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015), The Next Generation of the Penn World Table, American Economic Review 105(10). Retrieved 3 October 2026.
International Monetary Fund, Consumer Price Index (IMF.STA:CPI), United Kingdom, change on a year before, yearly (The chart: British consumer price inflation, year by year, 1965 to 1985): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/2.1/data/IMF.STA,CPI/GBR.CPI._T.YOY_PCH_PA_PT.A. IMF data, used with credit (imf.org/external/terms.htm). Percentage change in consumer prices on the year before, all items, yearly, rounded to one decimal place for the chart; 1975 is 24.2, the highest in the chart. The IMF's yearly figure and the OECD's average of monthly rates are different summaries of the same price index, so they can differ slightly. Retrieved 3 October 2026.
National Bureau of Economic Research, The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking, Michael D. Bordo and Athanasios Orphanides (eds), University of Chicago Press, 2013 (book page) (How the leading collection of later studies describes the state of the argument): https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/great-inflation-rebirth-modern-central-banking. Paraphrased from the book's own description: the volume is about the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, a time of rising inflation in many nations; the immediate cause of the rise is the subject of considerable debate, with much attention on the role of monetary policy. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "The Redefined Monetary Aggregates", Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1980, p.97 (via FRASER) (Why the Federal Reserve changed its own money measures in 1980): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/FRB/1980s/frb_021980.pdf. Public domain. p.97: "The Federal Reserve has redefined the monetary aggregates. This action was prompted by the many financial developments that have altered the meaning and reduced the significance of the old measures." It names new monetary assets such as NOW accounts and money market mutual fund shares. A FRASER scan. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Methods, chapter 17, The Consumer Price Index (When the US price index changed how it counts the cost of an owner's home): https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/cpi-20180214.pdf. Public domain. The index for all urban consumers converted to rental equivalence, valuing an owner-occupied home by what it would cost to rent, with the index for January 1983; the index for wage earners and clerical workers followed two years later. Retrieved 3 October 2026. (sources cache).
Short-term interest rates, ten countries, 1974 and 1980, as recorded in the series research file (spine link 25), from series carried by FRED (Short-term interest rates in 1980, for the comparison with inflation peaks): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=IRSTCI01USM156N. Yearly means of monthly rates, as recorded in the research file for this series: call money or interbank rates from OECD Main Economic Indicators (IRSTCI01<cc>M156N) for the United States, West Germany, France, Sweden and Switzerland; three-month interbank rates (IR3TIB01<cc>M156N) for the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia; IMF discount rates (INTDSRJPM193N, INTDSRITM193N) for Japan and Italy. The set has no Dutch rate. 1980: the United Kingdom highest, then Italy, the United States and Canada; Switzerland lowest. Each country's inflation peak is its highest yearly OECD figure over 1978 to 1983 (the oecd source). The comparison is ours; the rates are not printed on the page. Rates as recorded 1 October 2026 in modules/research/the-great-inflation.json; the ranking recomputed 3 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.