Economic history · Thatcher's Economic Policy
Six steps, about nine minutes, a question at each. You need no economics and no preparation, only a willingness to guess before you are told.
A run of new laws had already changed what a union could legally do and made a strike cost the union money. The government had refused to settle national disputes by bargaining.
In 1984 Britain still dug its coal from deep mines, called pits, and 139,000 people worked in them. A pit was often the only employer in its village. When the government's Coal Board set out to close some of the pits, the miners' union called its members out on strike. Coalfields across Britain stopped work for a year.
The strike ran from 12 March 1984 to 3 March 1985, and the miners lost it. Britain got through it without a single power cut, because Margaret Thatcher's government had spent years stocking coal at the power stations. The blow that broke the union came from two of its own miners, who took it to court over the vote the union's own rules had promised them.
Six steps cover why the Coal Board moved, the vote that never happened, and what was left of coal mining ten years later.
What this module covers
Written for every level. Tap any underlined word for what it means, and open the boxes below for the economics behind each decision. If you already know the theory, skip both and the history reads straight through.
Step 1 of 6
Coal was not only work here. It was why the village existed.
The National Coal Board told the unions on 6 March 1984 that it would cut four million tonnes of capacity in a year.
The board was a industry whose losses had grown bigger than everything it held in reserve. 30 of its oldest pits produced 90 per cent of the loss.
The government had hired a new chairman, Ian MacGregor, six months earlier. He came from British Steel, where the Opposition said his rescue had cost nearly 120,000 jobs.
Cutting capacity means closing pits: the deep mines coal comes out of, often the only employer in the village built around them. The board would not say which pits it meant.
Cortonwood, a pit in Yorkshire, had been told it would stay open for five more years. Miners had moved from other areas to live near it, expecting the work to last. Instead the board gave it five weeks' notice to close.
Production was to come down to 97.4 million tonnes. The board also said what the plan would cost in jobs in its first year.
Take a guess. You are not expected to know the answers, and being wrong is what makes a number stick.
The Coal Board said how many jobs its plan would cost in that first year. How many?
For scale. Coal mining employed 139,000 people in 1984.
It is March 1984 and pits in Yorkshire and Scotland have already stopped work.
You are one of the leaders of the National Union of Mineworkers, on its ruling committee, the executive. The union's president, Arthur Scargill, is beside you, and together you must decide whether the goes national.
Your own Rule 43 says a national strike needs a ballot, a vote of every member, with 55 per cent of those voting in favour. Rule 41 lets each area, the union's regional branches, strike if the executive approves instead.
The union's rulebook allowed two kinds of strike. A strike across the whole country needed a ballot of every member. A strike in one region only, called an area strike, needed no ballot, just the leadership's approval. The leadership called what was really a national strike using the regional rule, so it never had to hold the vote. That gave any miner who wanted to keep working a way to fight back: he could ask a court to rule that the strike broke the union's own rulebook. Two miners did exactly that, and won.
Some areas have already voted, and they voted against striking. Parliament is discussing a law to require a ballot before every strike, but it has not been passed, so in March 1984 no law demands one.
You lead the union. The Coal Board will not name the pits, and Yorkshire and Scotland are already on strike. What do you do?
Arthur Scargill and the executive made the area strikes national on 12 March 1984 with no ballot. On 19 April a special conference of the union cut the share needed to win a ballot from 55 per cent to half, and no national ballot was held after that either.
What followedTwo working miners, Taylor and Foulstone, sued their own union. On 28 September Mr Justice Nicholls ruled that the strike broke the union's own rules. The union carried on anyway, so on 10 October he fined it 200,000 pounds for ignoring the court, which the law calls contempt, and on 26 October he sent in accountants to take control of its money.
The ballot law Parliament had been discussing did become law that July, four months after the strike began. It played no part in what you have just seen. The case that broke the union was brought by its own members, under its own rules.
Britain got through the strike without a single power cut caused by it.
Margaret Thatcher's government had prepared for exactly this. Coal stocks had been built up at the power stations and the pits before the strike. The Central Electricity Generating Board, which ran the power stations, had bought more coal and stored it in Rotterdam.
Stopping the electricity is how a miners' strike is supposed to work, and this one never did. Britain still had the oil-fired stations built when oil was cheap, and they ran instead.
A power station burns whatever it is built to burn, and Britain had oil-fired stations standing by from the years when oil was cheap. Nuclear stations run at full power whatever else happens. Between them they carried the load while the coal stations used up the coal already stacked at the stations.
Coal production fell 58 per cent in 1984 and the country used almost exactly as much energy as the year before. Petroleum imports rose by more than 30 per cent.
Nearly 12 million tonnes of coal were still stacked at the power stations when the miners went back.
In a normal year coal made about 80 per cent of Britain's electricity. What share did it make in August 1984?
For scale. Oil and nuclear together made 66 per cent of it that month.
The strike slowed the whole British economy. Growth in 1984 came out at 2.5 per cent, and the official estimate was that it would have been between 1 and 1.25 per cent higher without the strike.
Coal that is not dug is that does not happen, and the oil bought to replace it was bought from abroad. Both show up in the growth figure.
The Coal Board sold the coal the pits dug. When digging the coal cost more than buyers paid for it, the difference fell to the taxpayer.
About 187,000 miners struck in England and Wales, 8,788 were arrested and 10,372 charges were brought. Scotland had about 14,000 out and about 1,400 arrested.
No full costing of the year was given at the time, and the larger totals claimed in Parliament were not official ones.
The year was paid for twice over. Which was larger, the Coal Board's own loss or the extra the strike added to public spending?
A tie counts as correct either way.
For scale. The board paid 366 million pounds in interest in 1982 to 1983, before the strike.
The union's elected delegates voted 98 to 91 on 3 March 1985 to end the strike, and the miners went back to work two days later.
Miners had been returning to work through the winter. The union's money was still under the court's control, so it could not support the men who stayed on strike.
The strike had run from 12 March 1984, when the union made the area strikes national, to the conference vote on 3 March 1985.
The miners went back to work after a year on strike. On what terms did the strike end?
For scale. The vote was 98 to 91, so seven delegates decided it.
One third of Britain's pits closed in 1985 and 1986 alone, the two years after the strike was lost.
The union had spent a year on strike and gone back with nothing, so it could not strike again, and no agreement protected any pit from closure.
Coal mining employed 139,000 people in 1984, across more than a hundred pits.
Britain has no deep mines at all now. Kellingley, the last of them, shut in December 2015.
Coal mining employed 139,000 people when the strike began. How many still worked in it by 1994, ten years on, when the industry was sold to private owners?
For scale. Coal mining employed about 850,000 people when the industry was taken into public ownership in 1947.
Module 6 of 13 in Thatcher's Economic Policy
What the Coal Board announced on 6 March 1984
4 million tonnes, 20,000 jobsWhat the union's own Rule 43 required before a national
a ballot, and 55% in favourCoal's share of Britain's electricity in August 1984
33 per centWhat the took off Britain's growth in 1984
1 to 1.25 per centThe vote that ended it, on 3 March 1985
98 to 91People employed in coal mining, 1984 and 1994
139,000, then 7,000You met three terms in this module
, ,
Coal mining employed 139,000 people in 1984 and 7,000 by 1994, and no institution has said what would have happened had the miners won.
[1] What was announced: Hansard, HC Deb 7 June 1984 and HC Deb 4 February 1985, Coal Industry Dispute. Stan Orme, 4 February 1985: 'On 6 March 1984, the NCB announced that it intended to cut capacity in the coal mining industry by 4 million tonnes.' 7 June 1984, col 458: 'the NCB admitted that the plan would mean the loss of 20,000 jobs this year and a cut in output to 97.4 million tonnes.' Col 459 on Cortonwood: 'It was said that Cortonwood had five years of life and miners moved from other areas to live near it. However, it was given five weeks' notice to close.' Both are Opposition front bench and uncontradicted; the announcement was made to the unions at a consultative meeting rather than to the House, so no minister states the figures. Col 458 also carries the preparation, from the same front bench: 'By 1984 they had been able to build up coal stocks at power stations and pits', and the CEGB had been enabled 'to buy coal and stock it in Rotterdam for importation'. Col 457 has Orme meeting 'Mr. Scargill and his colleagues'.
[2] The chairman the government hired: Hansard, HC Deb 28 March 1983, National Coal Board (Chairman). Nigel Lawson, then Energy Secretary, announced Ian MacGregor's appointment on 28 March 1983, to run from 1 September 1983 for three years, calling it 'excellent value for money for the taxpayer' despite a 1.5 million pound transfer fee to Lazard Freres. MacGregor came from the chairmanship of British Steel, 1980 to 1983. His record there is stated in the debate only as an Opposition charge, 'the destruction of nearly 120,000 jobs', which is why the module gives it as the Opposition's figure and not as a count. John Smith for the Opposition: 'this is an extremely foolish appointment that will divide a great industry.'
[3] Why the board was cutting: Hansard, HC Deb 15 November 1983, Coal Industry Bill. Peter Walker, col 737: the NCB's accumulated losses were greater than its reserves, leaving it 'technically insolvent'. Col 752, citing the Select Committee: 'In 1981... losses incurred in 30 of the Board's older collieries totalled some 228 million pounds, equivalent to 90 per cent. of the industry's operating deficit.' Col 743, Orme: the board paid 366 million pounds in interest in 1982-83. Col 751 puts national coal stocks at 58 million tonnes against 34 million five years earlier; that is a backbench figure, so the prose states the build-up on the front-bench authority above and leaves the tonnage to this note.
[4] What the union's own rules required: Wray and Allsop, Damaged by Democracy: the National Union of Mineworkers and the 1984-85 Strike, Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal 23(2). Rule 43: 'A national strike shall only be entered upon as the result of a ballot vote of the members taken in pursuance of a resolution of a Conference', with 55 per cent of those voting in favour. Rule 41 allowed area action with the National Executive's sanction, which is the route used. The 55 per cent threshold was cut to a simple majority at a special conference on 19 April 1984, during the strike.
[5] What the courts did: Hansard, HC Deb 11 December 1984 and HC Deb 19 December 1984, National Union of Mineworkers. On 28 September 1984 Nicholls J restrained the NUM from calling the Yorkshire strike official, because it breached the union's own rules. On 10 October he fined the union 200,000 pounds for contempt: 'A great and powerful trade union, with a large membership affected by the court orders in question, has decided to regard itself above the law, and to make this plain repeatedly, emphatically and publicly on a nationwide basis.' Sequestrators were appointed on 26 October and had recovered 8,500 pounds by 11 November, over 8 million having been moved to banks abroad. The case is named at col 426 of the 19 December debate as Taylor and Foulstone v the NUM, a private action by two working miners rather than by the government or the Coal Board.
[6] When the new law started: Trade Union Act 1984, legislation.gov.uk. Royal Assent 26 July 1984. Section 22 brings Part II, the secret ballot requirements at sections 10 and 11, into force two months later, on 26 September 1984. The strike began in March. NO INSTITUTIONAL SOURCE SHOWS THE 1984 ACT'S BALLOT PROVISIONS USED AGAINST THE NUM AT ANY POINT, which is why module 5 no longer calls this the strike the new law was written for.
[7] Whether the lights stayed on: Hansard, HL Deb 4 March 1985 The Miners' Strike, and HC Deb 26 November 1984 Electricity Generation. Government statement the day after the strike ended: 'during the period of this dispute, industry at large was able to obtain the energy supplies it required. There were no power cuts due to the dispute, and there are still nearly 12 million tonnes of coal stocks at Britain's power stations.' Alastair Goodlad, 26 November 1984, share of electricity produced by the electricity boards in August 1984: coal 33 per cent, oil 49 per cent, nuclear 17 per cent, hydro and gas 1 per cent. NOT VERIFIED and therefore not stated anywhere: the coal stock held at power stations in March 1984, and whether voluntary restrictions were requested.
[8] What came out of the ground: Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics, Chapter 1 Long Term Trends, Table 1.1.2. Thousand tonnes of oil equivalent. Coal production 72,696 in 1983, 30,719 in 1984 and 56,572 in 1985. Coal imports 3,713, 7,980 and 9,482. Petroleum imports 43,543 in 1983 and 59,146 in 1984. Total inland consumption for energy use 196,764 in 1983 and 196,402 in 1984, so the energy system did not shrink, it substituted one fuel for another.
[9] What it cost: Hansard, HL Deb 19 February 1985 Miners' Strike: Overall Cost, and HC Deb 1 May 1985 Coal Industry Bill. Earl of Gowrie, col 474: the strike 'reduced growth in the gross domestic product by between 1 and 1.25 per cent, in 1984, to 2.5 per cent'. Col 475 cites Command Paper 9428 and the Chancellor's Autumn Statement for a 1.5 billion pound addition to public expenditure, and declines a fuller estimate: 'It is too soon to give any new estimate of cost.' Peter Walker, 1 May 1985, col 315: 'Total losses for 1984-85 are expected to exceed 2 billion pounds, very largely due to the strike.' Larger totals in the same debates are backbench estimates rather than official costings and are not used.
[10] Arrests: Scottish Government, Policing of the miners' strike 1984-1985, impact on communities: independent review. England and Wales, 13 March 1984 to 5 March 1985: about 187,000 striking miners, 8,788 arrested and 10,372 charges brought; of 5,653 concluded cases, 4,318 convictions and 1,335 acquittals. Scotland: about 14,000 strikers, about 1,400 arrested. The timeline in the same review gives 12 March 1984 for the NUM making the area strikes national, and 3 March 1985 for the delegate conference ending it, 98 to 91. The 12 March entry names the actor: 'National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) President Arthur Scargill unites various strikes into nationwide industrial action, without a ballot', which is what lets the prose name Scargill and his office. The Commons Library debate pack CDP-2024-0015 gives 'over 11,000 arrested and around 8,000 charged', footnoted to an academic book; the two counts do not reconcile and are not merged.
[11] How it ended: Hansard, HL Deb 4 March 1985, The Miners' Strike. 'Yesterday, at a delegate conference of the National Union of Mineworkers, a decision was made to end the industrial action which has been conducted by some sections of the NUM over the past year. The conference decided that there should be a return to work tomorrow.' The statement records no agreement of any kind and no undertaking against future closures, and calls it 'this unjustified dispute, which has taken place without a ballot'.
[12] Days lost to strikes: ONS series BBFW, working days lost to strike action, United Kingdom. Thousands of days: 3,754 in 1983, 27,135 in 1984, 6,402 in 1985 and 1,903 in 1990. 1984 is the second highest year of the whole post-war record, behind 1979.
[13] The decade in outline: House of Lords Library, The UK economy in the 1980s. Trade union density stood at 52.4% in 1979, its highest point since the war, and 37.5% by 1989.
[14] What was left: House of Commons Library, General debate on government support for coalfield communities, CDP-2025-0028. 'employment in coal mining falling from 139,000 in 1984 to 7,000 in 1994', and 'The UK's last three remaining deep cast mines all closed in 2015', Kellingley in December. The Library attributes the long decline to falling demand for coal and to mechanisation rather than to the strike. The National Archives' British Coal Corporation Appraisal Report gives 13,100 employees at privatisation in 1994 and 16 deep mines; that is a British Coal headcount against the Library's whole-industry figure, and the two are not merged.
Country data from the World Bank (CC BY 4.0) and the UNDP Human Development Report (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
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