Where every figure came from
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, February 1974 (via FRASER) (The 1973 freeze, the harvests, the commodity boom, inflation abroad, controls abroad): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1974/ERP_1974.pdf. Public domain (US government). Read on the rendered pages (printed page numbers). P. 67: the great increase in US farm and food prices began in 1972 as a reaction to reduced world output caused by adverse weather in several parts of the world; the single most important shortfall was in the Soviet Union, which entered world markets for extremely large quantities of food and feed grains; the United States, as the major source of additional supplies, faced a huge increase in demand; two devaluations of the dollar added to export demand for US food. P. 96: prices of industrial commodities (wholesale) had been rising by about one-third of 1 percent per month in 1972 and in the late winter and spring of 1973 rose by somewhat more than 1 percent per month, reflecting spiralling basic commodity prices from rapid expansion simultaneously in major countries and the decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar; the disappointingly high rate of inflation in the first 5 months of 1973 aroused public dissatisfaction and Congress and the Administration were urged to take stronger action; on June 13 the President announced a freeze on most prices, to last no more than 60 days. P. 97: bad weather had reduced worldwide supplies of farm commodities in 1972, and rising demand produced the largest increase in farm commodity prices since World War I; little could be done through direct controls to stop the price surge without interfering with production and inducing additional exports (Q4); sharp increases in feed costs raised livestock feeding costs (the chunk's feed-to-meat clause). P. 103: the shift from Phase II to Phase III (January 1973) coincided closely with the acceleration of inflation from its moderate 1972 pace; Phase III was seen by many, being self-administered, as a signal that controls had come to an end. P. 104-105: raw agricultural products were exempt from control (Q4 reveal). P. 105, quoted: "Industrial raw materials prices generally rise relative to the prices of finished goods in a boom, and in 1973 the boom affecting the world as a whole was exceptionally strong." P. 209 (the prose's "faster still", against the OECD rates of about 5 to 6 per cent in 1971-72): in the first half of 1973 the worldwide boom was accompanied by inflation rates exceeding 6 percent in Canada, France, Italy, Japan and the United States; a number of national governments attempted to contain inflation by controlling prices. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, February 1975 (via FRASER) (The dates of the war and the embargo): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/ERP/1975/ERP_1975.pdf. Public domain (US government). P. 43: the outbreak of war in the Middle East in early October 1973, the embargo in late October, and the oil price rise in late December. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
OECD, Consumer Price Index: Total for OECD, growth rate same period previous year (OECDCPALTT01GYM), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Consumer price inflation across the OECD, 1971 and 1972): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OECDCPALTT01GYM. OECD data; used for two figures in the prose only, not charted (not tagged public domain). Monthly, per cent change on a year earlier; the series starts in January 1971. Annual figures are this build's mean of the twelve monthly rates: 1971 5.7197, 1972 5.1647, as in the signed research file (link 4); printed rounded as "nearly 6 per cent" and "about 5 per cent". Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Congressional Research Service, Back to the Future? Lessons from the "Great Inflation", In Focus IF12177, L. R. Weinstock, 28 July 2022 (via EveryCRSReport) (The name and span of the Great Inflation): https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF12177.html. Public domain (a CRS report). Calls the "Great Inflation" the period of high inflation from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s (the prose attributes this dating; the series itself covers 1971 to 1982). While the price controls of the early 1970s were in place inflation fell, then spiked after the controls were dismantled (Q7 reveal). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Spot Crude Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate (WTISPLC), via FRED (West Texas crude, 1970 to 1973): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WTISPLC. Monthly, dollars a barrel, nominal. 3.56 in every month from December 1970 to July 1973 (3.31 in November 1970); 4.31 in August 1973. Used for figures in the prose only, not charted. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
World Bank, Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet), annual, updated 3 January 2025 (CMO-Historical-Data-Annual.xlsx) (Saudi Arabian Light crude, and the grain and non-energy indices): https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets. World Bank data, CC BY 4.0, credited. Sheet "Annual Prices (Nominal)", column "Crude oil, Dubai", which the Description sheet says refers to Saudi Arabian Light, 34 API, for 1960 to 1984: 1.21 (1970), 1.69 (1971), 1.82 (1972) dollars a barrel. Sheet "Annual Indices (Nominal)", 2010 = 100: Grains 27.35 (1971), 28.83 (1972), 56.36 (1973); Non-energy 21.58 (1971), 22.54 (1972), 35.17 (1973). Printed rounded (about 29, about 56; about 23, about 35); the prose explains the base as "set at 100 for 2010 and not adjusted for inflation" (the nominal sheet). "Almost doubling" for grains is this build's arithmetic: 56.36 / 28.83 = 1.95. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food in U.S. City Average (CPIUFDSL), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (The episode chart): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIUFDSL. Public Domain: Citation Requested (tag on the series page, checked 1 October 2026). Monthly index, seasonally adjusted. The chart plots this build's change on the same month a year earlier: 3.9 per cent in August 1972, 19.7 per cent in August 1973 (the numeric check), 18.6 per cent in September 1973. For the scene predict (which prices rose fastest, year to June 1973): food 13.6 per cent; gasoline (FRED CUSR0000SETB01, BLS) 11.9 per cent; new vehicles (FRED CUSR0000SETA01, BLS) -0.4 per cent, all this build's arithmetic. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average (CPIAUCSL), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (US consumer prices, 1970 to 1973): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL. Public Domain: Citation Requested (checked 1 October 2026). Monthly index, seasonally adjusted; changes on a year earlier are this build's arithmetic: December 1970 5.6 per cent and 1970 annual average 5.9 per cent (the predict stem's "more than 5 per cent in 1970"); December 1972 3.4 per cent; August 1973 7.4 per cent. These SA figures differ slightly from the BLS headline December-on-December rates. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Funds Effective Rate (FEDFUNDS), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (The federal funds rate, 1970 to 1973): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS. Public Domain: Citation Requested (checked 1 October 2026). Monthly averages, per cent: 8.98 (February 1970), 3.51 (January 1972), 3.30 (February 1972, the lowest month of 1970 to 1973), 4.81 (August 1972), 5.33 (December 1972), 5.06 (November 1972; inside the 4 1/2 to 5 1/4 range, the decide block's impact), 10.40 (July 1973). The 1970-72 fall "by more than half" in the predict is this build's arithmetic (3.30 / 8.98 = 0.37). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, M2 (M2SL), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Money growth, 1971 and 1972): https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2SL. Public Domain: Citation Requested. Monthly, seasonally adjusted. Change on a year earlier, this build's arithmetic: December 1971 13.4 per cent ("about 13 per cent"), December 1972 13.0 per cent (the decide block's impact). Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Board Members since 1914 (chairs) (Burns's term as chair): https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm. Public domain. Lists Arthur F. Burns as chair Feb. 1, 1970 - Jan. 31, 1978. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Arthur F. Burns, "The Basis for Lasting Prosperity", address at Pepperdine College, Los Angeles, 7 December 1970 (via FRASER) (Burns's view that costs, mainly wages, drove inflation): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/burns/Burns_19701207.pdf. Public domain (a speech by the Board's chair). Quoted from printed p. 18 (the scan shows "rates*"; normalised to a full stop): "The inflation that we are still experiencing is no longer due to excess demand. It rests rather on the upward push of costs—mainly, sharply rising wage rates." P. 20: it would be desirable to supplement monetary and fiscal policies with an incomes policy. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Federal Open Market Committee, Memorandum of Discussion, meeting of 15 August 1972 (Board of Governors) (The August 1972 meeting, and Burns's remarks to it): https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcmod19720815.pdf. Public domain (a Federal Reserve record). The staff's third-person record, so quoted as "the record". Pp. 72-73: Brimmer said alternative A appeared to represent no change in policy; Holland said A called for roughly the same pattern of interest rates as at the last meeting but a higher rate of growth in the aggregates (decide option c). P. 63, quoted in the Fed chunk: one member (Mr Clay) said the Committee had to limit the growth rates of the monetary aggregates in order "to avoid excessive stimulation of the economy" in the months ahead, and that he wanted prosperity without inflation. Pp. 60-73: in the go-around some members favoured alternative C (slower money growth), one with a funds-rate range up to 6 per cent (p. 64, p. 70), and one warned that if the Committee let this opportunity pass it might find restraint very hard to apply later (p. 64); members expected that firm restraint could bring a rise in the discount rate (pp. 63-64); two members preferred alternative A, no change, to avoid creating expectations of a discount-rate rise (pp. 69-70). P. 74: one member said the Committee was in danger of voting for inconsistent specifications, since everyone would like more moderate money growth without paying the price in interest rates; Burns said there were no political constraints, but "the Federal Reserve System was a part of the Government", whose incomes policy applied to prices, wages and profits and, voluntarily, to dividends and interest rates. P. 75, quoted: "there was widespread opposition to higher interest rates" and "the Federal Reserve should not be eager to raise interest rates"; he saw no reason for a deliberate move to raise the funds rate by half a point within the next month. P. 77: the funds rate was at its current level of 4 3/4 per cent. Pp. 81-82, the directive adopted by unanimous vote: M1 grew at an unusually rapid rate in July; wholesale prices of farm and food products rose sharply further; unemployment was lower but still substantial; the Committee sought conditions that would support moderate growth in monetary aggregates (alternative B). Attachment B: range for the federal funds rate 4 1/2 to 5 1/4 per cent. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
Burton A. Abrams, "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes", Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4), 2006, pp. 177-188 (via FRASER) (Pressure from the White House, and the argument over why Burns eased): https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/meltzer/jep_2006_abrams_how_richard_nixon.pdf. Copyright American Economic Association; paraphrased, with one six-word tape quotation (the recorded words are a US government record). The tapes used begin in October 1971 and record Nixon and aides pressing for monetary expansion before the 1972 election. P. 178: names George Shultz as Budget Director. P. 187: the discount rate was 4.5 percent in July 1972 (the decide setup). P. 183: on 14 February 1972 (conversation 670-5, Burns absent) George Shultz said "Keep the money supply going up!" P. 187: whether Burns responded to political pressure or to his own convictions may never be definitively determined; a more sympathetic reading is that, with controls restraining prices and expectations, he believed monetary stimulus could return the economy to full employment at little inflationary cost. Retrieved 1 October 2026.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.