Blocking a merger that cuts competition keeps prices down and choice open
A merger joins two firms into one, so it can reduce competition. Where it does, the merged firm can charge higher prices, offer fewer goods or services, let quality slip and innovate less. In the UK the Competition and Markets Authority assesses how mergers could affect competition. A regulator can allow a merger, stop it, or allow it on conditions, a common one being that the firm sells part of the business to a rival. If it stops the merger, or allows it only on such a condition, enough rivals stay in the market to hold prices, quality and choice near where competition would put them.
A regulator makes a monopoly cut its price to the level of its average cost. What do you think happens to the amount it sells?
At a lower price buyers want more. The firm can no longer hold output down to keep the price high, and it still covers its costs, so it supplies the larger quantity buyers demand.
A price set at average cost lowers the price, raises output and removes supernormal profit
Left alone, a natural monopoly produces where marginal revenue equals marginal cost and charges the highest price buyers will pay for that output, earning supernormal profit. A regulator who sets the price where average cost meets demand gives buyers a lower price and a larger output, while the firm covers its costs and earns only normal profit. A price pushed lower still, to marginal cost, would give the efficient output, where the value of the last unit equals the cost of making it. But that price sits below average cost, so the firm would make a loss unless it were subsidised.
UnregulatedLeft alone, the monopoly sells Q1, where MR = MC, at the price P1, above average cost.
Check yourself
A regulator moves a natural monopoly from its profit-maximising price to a price equal to its average cost. Which describes the result?
Quality standards and performance targets protect service but add to costs
A firm whose price is capped can raise its profit by letting service slip as well as by cutting waste. At its 2014 price review Ofwat added performance commitments, with rewards and penalties, to stop water companies cutting costs by cutting service or damaging the environment. Targets like these, and standards such as safety rules, raise quality and reliability. They also add to the firm's costs, so either its profit falls or, where the regulator allows, its prices rise. Buyers get a better service, but no more choice of who supplies it.
Opening a market to new rivals cuts prices and profits and widens choice
Removing the rules that keep new firms out exposes the existing ones to competition. When the US government stopped controlling airline fares and routes in 1978, new airlines entered, fares fell by about a third over the next two decades, planes flew fuller and more cities were served. Famous old airlines that could not compete went bankrupt and their workers lost their jobs, though passenger numbers and jobs across the airline industry both doubled overall. Every one of these interventions also depends on the authority knowing costs and demand as well as the firms do, and a regulator that leans on the firm for information risks being captured by it.
Check yourself
Three of these are likely effects of opening a market to new rivals. Which one is not?
- Merger control
- Merger control is a competition authority's power to allow a merger, block it, or allow it on conditions when it could reduce competition.
- Deregulation
- Deregulation is the removal of government controls over the prices firms charge, the quantities they produce and which firms may enter a market.
Isn't every merger bad for consumers?
No. Most mergers are allowed, because most let the combined firm operate more efficiently, and lower costs can feed through to lower prices. The US Federal Trade Commission, which reviews mergers there, says the same. The worry is the minority that would leave a market concentrated enough for the merged firm to raise prices, cut quality or innovate less. Even then, blocking is not the only answer: the merger can go ahead on condition that the firm sells off the parts where the two overlapped. Judge a merger by what it does to competition in the market, not by the size of the firms.
Take one intervention at a time and trace it to each outcome the question names: price, profit, efficiency, quality, choice. Say which efficiency you mean, allocative or productive. Then add one limit in a sentence, such as the regulator knowing less about costs than the firm, or being captured by it. A list of interventions with no chain to an outcome earns knowledge marks only.
Check yourself
A regulator sets a water company a target for cutting leaks, with a penalty for missing it. What is the most likely effect?
Exam question
A competition authority is deciding whether to allow the only two bus companies in a city to merge. Assess the likely effects of blocking the merger on fares, profits and efficiency. [10]
Blocking keeps two rivals, so each must keep fares down and service up to win passengers; neither can raise fares to the level a single firm could, so supernormal profit stays limited and buyers keep a choice of operator. Rivalry also pushes each firm to cut costs and improve services, which supports productive and dynamic efficiency. Against: a merged firm might share depots and cut duplicated routes, lowering average cost, and some of that saving could reach passengers as lower fares; blocking gives this up. The authority could instead allow the merger on condition that some routes are sold to a new operator. Judgement: blocking is more likely to help passengers where the cost savings are small and new firms would find it hard to enter; where savings are large and entry is easy, conditions may serve better.
Levels reward a chain from blocking to each named outcome (fares, profit, efficiency), the counter-case of lost economies of scale, and a judgement that names what it depends on, such as the size of the cost savings or how easily new firms could enter.
Blocking a merger that would reduce competition protects buyers from higher prices, poorer quality and less choice, though most mergers are allowed, since most let firms operate more efficiently. A price set at average cost lowers the price, raises output and limits a monopoly to normal profit; a price at marginal cost would be efficient but loss-making. Quality standards and performance targets raise service but add to costs. Opening a market to rivals cuts prices and profits and widens choice, at the cost of exits and lost jobs at failing firms.