Each firm's profit depends on what its rival does
Two supermarkets share a town. Each must choose to keep its prices high or cut them, without knowing what the other will choose. If both keep prices high, each earns £10 million a year. If both cut, each earns £4 million. If one cuts while the other keeps prices high, the one that cut wins customers and earns £15 million, and the other earns only £2 million. A table of these four outcomes is a payoff matrix.
Cutting prices pays whatever the rival does
Look at it from the first supermarket's side. If its rival keeps prices high, cutting earns £15 million against £10 million for holding. If its rival cuts, cutting earns £4 million against £2 million for holding. Either way, cutting pays more. The rival faces the same choice and reaches the same answer, so both cut.
Check yourself
In the supermarket game, the first supermarket learns that its rival will keep prices high. What should it do to earn the most profit?
Both end up worse off than if they had cooperated
When both cut, each earns £4 million, a total of £8 million. Had both kept prices high, each would have earned £10 million, a total of £20 million. Each firm acted in its own interest and the pair ended worse off. The firms could escape by agreeing to hold prices, but each would then be tempted to cheat, and in the UK such an agreement is illegal.
Check yourself
In the supermarket game, by how many million pounds would the two firms' combined profit rise if both kept prices high instead of both cutting?
12
Both holding gives £10 million each, £20 million in all. Both cutting gives £4 million each, £8 million in all. The difference is £20 million − £8 million = £12 million.
The two supermarkets will play this game every year for the foreseeable future. What do you think happens?
When the game repeats, a cut this year can be punished with a price war next year. That threat can make holding prices worth more than a one-off gain, so tacit cooperation may last.
Repeating the game makes cooperation easier to keep
The way out of a prisoner's dilemma is to find a way to penalise those who do not cooperate. When the same firms meet year after year, each can answer a price cut by cutting its own price, so cheating wins a single good year and then years of lower profit. Firms may also keep close tabs on each other's prices. Many oligopolies go through spells of cooperation and spells of price war.
- Dominant strategy
- A dominant strategy is the strategy a firm will pursue regardless of the other firm's decision, because it pays best whatever the rival chooses.
- Prisoner's dilemma
- The prisoner's dilemma is a scenario in which the gains from cooperation are larger than the rewards from pursuing self-interest.
The language of game theory
Can you name the three ideas you need to read a two-firm game?
These three ideas are enough to read any two-firm game.
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that analyses situations in which players make decisions and receive payoffs based on what other players decide to do.
Can you think of an example?
Two airlines on the same route each choose a fare. How many seats each fills, and so its profit, depends on the fare the other sets as well as its own.
A payoff matrix is a table showing the payoff to each player for every combination of the choices the players can make.
Can you think of an example?
Two choices each for two firms gives four boxes. The box for both keeping prices high reads £10 million to each; the box for one cutting reads £15 million and £2 million.
A Nash equilibrium is an outcome where each player is making its best choice given what the other is doing, so neither wants to change on its own.
Can you think of an example?
When both supermarkets cut prices, neither gains by raising its price alone: it would drop from £4 million to £2 million. So both cutting is where the game settles.
If both firms gain from cooperating, why don't they just cooperate?
Because each gains even more by cheating while the other cooperates, and each fears being the one cheated. Without a way to enforce a deal, the dominant strategy wins. An agreement to fix prices, written or spoken, is illegal under UK competition law, so firms cannot make a deal that a court would uphold. That is why cartels tend to break down and why cooperation, when it happens, is usually tacit.
Draw a 2×2 grid, A's choices down the side and B's across the top, with A's payoff first in each box. Then work through it out loud for one firm: "If B holds, A earns £15m by cutting against £10m by holding; if B cuts, £4m against £2m. So cutting is A's dominant strategy." Say B reasons the same way and name the outcome.
Check yourself
What makes a game a prisoner's dilemma?
Exam question
Using a two-firm payoff matrix, explain why firms in an oligopoly may fail to collude even when colluding would raise both firms' profits. [4]
Each firm chooses to keep price high or cut it. Whatever its rival does, cutting earns it more: more than holding if the rival holds, and more than being undercut if the rival cuts. So cutting is each firm's dominant strategy, and both cut. Both then earn less than if both had held prices high. Without a way to enforce an agreement, and with agreements to collude illegal, the cooperative outcome is not reached.
One mark for setting out the payoffs, one for showing cutting pays whatever the rival does, one for naming it the dominant strategy for both, and one for comparing the outcome with cooperation.
Game theory analyses choices whose payoffs depend on what others do. In the prisoner's dilemma each firm's dominant strategy is to cut its price or raise its output, whatever the rival does, so both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. The way out is to penalise those who do not cooperate, which repeated play makes possible, but agreements to collude are illegal in the UK.