Before you start
What you'll be able to answer
- How far did Japan's share and land prices fall after their peaks?
- How did the falls leave Japan's banks with bad loans and less capital to cover their losses?
- What deal covered the losses of the failed housing-loan companies, the jusen, and how did it affect later public help for the banks?
Where this sits
Japan's Lost Decade — 1989 to 2006 · this module is lit
- Dec 1989Share prices in Japan peak
- Aug 1990The Bank of Japan's last rise in its discount rate, the interest rate at which it lent to banks
- Aug 1992The government announces the first of six spending packages up to 1995
- 1995-96The first direct use of taxpayers' money against financial instability covers losses at failed housing-loan companies, the jusen
- 1 Apr 1997The consumption tax rate, a tax on what people buy, is raised
- Nov 1997Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities fail
- Oct-Dec 1998Japan's parliament, the Diet, makes more public money available to deal with banks' bad loans, and the state takes over the Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank
- Feb 1999The Bank of Japan begins its zero interest rate policy, pushing its overnight rate as low as possible
- Mar 1999Public capital, new capital paid for by the state, is put into the major banks
- Mar 2001The Bank of Japan begins quantitative easing, a target for the money banks keep in their accounts with it
- Oct 2002The Financial Services Agency, the banking regulator, launches its programme to cut bad loans
- Mar 2006The Bank of Japan ends quantitative easing
Japan's banks at the end of 1989, when share prices were at their highest
In December 1989 Japanese share prices stood at their peak, and land prices in the big cities were still rising. How they rose so far is told in the series Japan's Asset Bubble. Japan's banks had made many loans to firms, and the firms had pledged land to the banks in case they did not repay. The banks also owned shares in many other companies. Over the next decade and more both share and land prices fell, and the banks were left with loans that would not be repaid.
An index is a number that tracks prices against a starting level. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) keeps an index of Japanese share prices. On that index, how much of their December 1989 value had shares lost by April 2003, when they hit a low?
About three-quarters, and that low came more than thirteen years after the peak.
Share prices lost almost three-quarters of their value by 2003
The chart shows the IMF's index of Japanese share prices. Each point is the average for one month. The index counts the average for 2010 as 100, so a reading of 200 means prices twice the 2010 level. The index stood at 322.9 in December 1989, its highest point, and fell through 1990. In April 2003 it reached 89.4. That was the lowest reading in the IMF's figures for 1990 to 2007, and 72 per cent below the peak.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Statistics: Financial Market Prices, Japan, equities, period-average index. IMF data, used with credit.
Land for shops and offices lost most of its value by 1999
Land prices turned later than share prices and kept falling through the 1990s. By 1999 land for shops and offices in the six major cities cost about 80 per cent less than at its peak in September 1990. These figures come from the Japan Real Estate Institute's index, as reported by Bank of Japan economists.
Put shares and land together and the losses are larger still. A capital loss is a fall in the value of something owned. The Cabinet Office is the Japanese government department that reports each year on the economy. It counted capital losses on land and shares of ¥1,330 trillion between the peaks and 2003.
Check yourself
Look at the chart. What did share prices do between 1993 and 2003?
Both share prices and land prices fell. Which fall do you expect caused Japan's banks more difficulty?
Nobody can measure this directly, so the answer rests on the judgement of experts. A 1997 letter from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco said the fall in land prices was the main cause of the bad loans. Hiroshi Nakaso wrote a 2001 paper for the Bank for International Settlements. He says nearly every bank was hurt by the fall in land prices, because much of its lending was backed by property. Falling share prices also hurt the banks, in another way that the sections below explain.
Loans backed by land turned into bad loans
Much of the banks' lending was backed by land as collateral. That meant the lender could take the land if a loan was not repaid. As land prices fell, the land behind many loans became worth less than the money lent. Falling prices cut the value of the collateral, Federal Reserve Board staff wrote in 2002. A non-performing loan, or bad loan, is one the borrower is not repaying as agreed.
The fall in land prices was the main cause of the bad loans, according to the San Francisco Fed. By the end of 1997 many properties were worth only half their peak values. Property firms, builders and wholesale and retail firms own a lot of land and were hit by its fall, the Cabinet Office said in 2001. Bad loans were also spreading to other industries because the economy stayed weak.
Falling share prices cut the banks' capital
A bank's capital is the money its owners have put into it. If a bank makes losses, the losses come out of its capital first. This protects depositors, the people who keep their savings in the bank. Japanese banks owned shares in other companies, and they counted part of the value of those shares as capital. Nakaso says that when share prices crashed after the bubble burst, the banks' capital shrank quickly as a result.
The banks still held many shares years later. In September 2002 the 15 biggest banks held ¥19.8 trillion of shares. Core capital is the most secure part of a bank's capital, and for these banks it was ¥15.9 trillion. So the shares they held were worth more than their core capital, Bank of Japan economists wrote.
Check yourself
Work from this example. A bank has ¥10 billion of capital. ¥4 billion of it depends on the value of shares the bank holds. Share prices fall, and that ¥4 billion shrinks to ¥1 billion. Then a ¥5 billion loan goes bad and nothing is recovered. How much capital does the bank have left, in billions of yen?
2 billion yen
Exactly ¥2 billion. The share fall takes ¥3 billion off the capital (¥4 billion down to ¥1 billion), leaving ¥7 billion. The ¥5 billion bad loan then leaves ¥2 billion. Falling land prices turned loans bad, and falling share prices had shrunk the capital that had to cover the loss.
The bad loans proved larger than first reported
In March 1997 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) said that bad loans at banks, savings institutions and farmers' co-operatives came to ¥27.9 trillion. Most of them were linked to property, the San Francisco Fed reported. Private estimates were generally much higher, "sometimes more than twice the MOF figure".
In 2001 the Cabinet Office put Japan's bad loans at slightly more than ¥30 trillion. This was a separate estimate for a later date, so it cannot be set directly beside the 1997 figure. Banks were removing about ¥10 trillion of bad loans from their books a year at the time of the Cabinet Office's 2001 report. About the same amount of loans went bad each year, so the total did not shrink, and the Cabinet Office said it kept growing.
Check yourself
Three of these added to the bad loans at Japan's banks in the 1990s. Which one did not?
In 1995-96 Japan's government put forward a plan to use taxpayers' money to cover part of the losses at failed lenders. How do you expect the public to have responded?
There was strong public resentment. Next comes who the failed lenders were. After that comes one account of why the anger ran so deep.
Taxpayers' money covered losses at failed housing-loan companies in 1995-96
The jusen were housing-loan companies that took no deposits. Banks and others set them up in the 1970s. In the 1980s they turned to lending to property developers, with little experience of it. A Ministry of Finance inspection in mid-1995 put the seven jusen's losses at ¥6,410 billion, far more than their founders could cover.
After a fierce debate, Japan's parliament (the Diet) approved a plan to share out the losses. Three groups took most of the losses: the banks that founded the jusen, other banks that lent to them, and farm lenders. Taxpayers' money covered the rest. Public money for the jusen came to ¥685 billion. A small part went to the capital of Japan's deposit insurance corporation, which guarantees savers' deposits. It was the first time Japan used taxpayers' money directly to stop failures spreading from one lender to another. The public strongly resented it.
Check yourself
Which fact about the jusen may help explain why public money for them angered taxpayers so strongly?
After the jusen, public money for the banks became hard to propose
In 2001 Hiroshi Nakaso wrote a paper for the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a body owned by central banks. He describes what happened after the jusen deal. In his account the public anger left politicians almost unable even to mention more public money for the banks. That reluctance lasted until the autumn of 1997, when one financial firm after another failed.
Until then the banks had to carry the bad loans and their reduced capital with no public help. Over the same years the Bank of Japan and the government had also acted against the slump. What did they do in the early 1990s, and what did their actions do to the government's budget? The next module goes back to 1990.
Check yourself
The key questions
How far did Japan's share and land prices fall after their peaks?
Share prices lost almost three-quarters of their value between December 1989 and April 2003 on the IMF's index. Land for shops and offices in the six major cities was about four-fifths below its September 1990 peak by 1999, on the Japan Real Estate Institute's index.
How did the falls leave Japan's banks with bad loans and less capital to cover their losses?
Banks had lent against land. As land prices fell, the land behind many loans became worth less than the money lent, and borrowers stopped repaying. Banks also counted shares they held towards part of their capital. So falling share prices cut the capital that had to cover those losses.
What deal covered the losses of the failed housing-loan companies, the jusen, and how did it affect later public help for the banks?
In 1995-96 taxpayers' money covered part of the losses at failed housing-loan companies called the jusen. It was the first time Japan used taxpayers' money directly to stop failures spreading from one lender to another. The public strongly resented it. In Nakaso's account, politicians were then almost unable even to mention more public money for the banks until the failures of autumn 1997.
The numbers
Check yourself
Which pair best describes how far Japan's share and land prices fell after their peaks?
Check yourself
A bank lent ¥10 billion against land worth ¥16 billion, and held shares as part of its capital. Then land and share prices both halved. What did the bank face?
Check yourself
In 1996 a minister wants public money for a failing bank. After the jusen settlement, what is he likely to face?