Where every figure came from
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Statistics: Financial Market Prices, Japan, equities, period-average index, monthly (JPN.EQTS.PA_IX.M) (The chart; the share price fall): https://api.imf.org/external/sdmx/3.0/data/dataflow/IMF.STA/MFS_FMP/+/JPN.EQTS.PA_IX.M. IMF data, used with credit ("IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics"). Monthly averages, 2010 = 100. December 1989 322.9, the highest value in the series; August 1992 136.4; December 1998 125.1; February 2000 193.3, the highest value from 1993 to 2003; April 2003 89.4, the lowest value from 1990 to 2007 in the downloaded series, which runs from January 1985 to December 2007 (later values, not charted here, go lower in 2011-12). Derived here: 1 - 89.4/322.9 = 72.3%, so a fall of 72 per cent from December 1989 to April 2003. Retrieved 3 October 2026 through the IMF SDMX API on the device; an independent second download was identical (re-compared 4 October 2026).
Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa and Shigenori Shiratsuka (Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies), The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan's Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons, Monetary and Economic Studies, Special Edition (February 2001) (Land prices): https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/me19-s1-14.pdf. The authors' views, not necessarily the Bank of Japan's; Bank of Japan terms, paraphrased. Section II.B.1: on the Japan Real Estate Institute's Urban Land Price Index (six major cities, commercial areas), land prices peaked in September 1990, almost four times their September 1985 level, then declined; in 1999 they were some 80 per cent below the September 1990 peak. Copied from the japans-asset-bubble lane cache (retrieved 3 October 2026) and read twice: an independent download on 4 October 2026 was byte-identical.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Financial Crises and Bank Supervision: New Directions for Japan?, Economic Letter 97-37 (December 1997) (What caused the bad loans; their size in 1997): https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/economic-letter/1997/12/financial-crises-and-bank-supervision-new-directions-for-japan/. Reserve Bank publication; quoted briefly, otherwise paraphrased. Section "Bad loan problem": the fall in land prices that began in late 1991 was the primary cause of the non-performing loans, and by the end of 1997 many properties were worth only half their peak values; Japanese banks' large equity holdings suffered as the stock market fell; the Ministry of Finance's official estimate was that banks, savings institutions and agricultural cooperatives carried 27.9 trillion yen of non-performing loans, most of them linked to real estate, as of March 1997, while private estimates were generally much higher, "sometimes more than twice the MOF figure". Retrieved 3 October 2026 into the lane cache and read twice.
Ahearne, Gagnon, Haltmaier, Kamin and others, Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan's Experience in the 1990s, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers 729 (June 2002) (Falling prices and collateral): https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2002/729/ifdp729.pdf. Public domain (US government work). Section II: declining stock and land prices undercut the value of the collateral used to secure new loans. Retrieved 3 October 2026 into the lane cache and read twice.
Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda and Ugai (Bank of Japan), Japan's deflation, problems in the financial system and monetary policy, BIS Working Paper 188 (February 2005) (Banks' shareholdings in 2002): https://www.bis.org/publications/working-paper-188-japans-deflation-problems-financial-system-and-monetary-policy.pdf. Published by the BIS; the authors are Bank of Japan staff, so paraphrased. Section 2 notes: as of September 2002 the 15 largest banks held equities worth 19.8 trillion yen, against Tier 1 capital of 15.9 trillion yen, and a law required them to bring equity holdings below Tier 1 capital by September 2006. Retrieved 3 October 2026 into the lane cache and read twice.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2001, summary (provisional translation) (Bad loans in 2001): https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2001/1204wp-keizai/summary.pdf. Government of Japan Standard Terms of Use; paraphrased. Chapter 2, Section 1 (Swelling Non-Performing Loans): on the Cabinet Office's estimate about 10 trillion yen of bad loans were being disposed of a year while about 10 trillion yen of loans became newly non-performing, and the balance of non-performing loans stayed high at slightly more than 30 trillion yen and kept increasing. Retrieved 3 October 2026 into the lane cache and read twice.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance 2003, chapter 1 summary (provisional translation) (Capital losses on land and shares): https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2003/1024wp-keizai/summary1.pdf. Government of Japan Standard Terms of Use; paraphrased. Section 2 (Causes of Deflation and Challenges to Overcome It), item 1, asset deflation: capital losses since the bubble burst came to 1,330 trillion yen; the same item says land prices had fallen faster since 1998 in almost all areas. Retrieved 3 October 2026 into the lane cache and read twice.
Hiroshi Nakaso, The financial crisis in Japan during the 1990s: how the Bank of Japan responded and the lessons learnt, BIS Papers 6 (Bank for International Settlements, October 2001) (The jusen; land exposure; shares in capital): https://www.bis.org/publications/paper-6-financial-crisis-japan-during-1990s-how-bank-japan-responded-and-lessons-learnt.pdf. BIS: brief excerpts with the source stated; otherwise paraphrased. The front matter names the author as a member of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department. Section 1.2.2: Cosmo Credit Cooperative, a deposit-taking lender in Tokyo, failed in July 1995 and Hyogo Bank in August 1995; in the Cosmo case many private financial institutions contributed to cover losses, and Cosmo's assets and deposits were to be transferred to another institution. Section 1.2.3 (The jusen problem): the jusen, or housing loan corporations, were non-bank lenders founded in the 1970s by banks and other financial institutions to add to the banks' housing loans; in the 1980s they moved into lending to real estate developers, with little expertise in commercial lending; a Ministry of Finance inspection in the summer of 1995 put the losses of the seven jusen at 6,410 billion yen, far beyond what their founder banks could cover; after a fierce debate in the Diet a package allocated most of the losses to founder banks, lender banks and agricultural financial institutions, with the rest met from taxpayers' money; the paper calls this the first direct use of taxpayers' money against financial instability in Japan, and says it provoked strong public resentment, which the author suggests may have been partly because the jusen were non-depository institutions with little to do with most taxpayers' daily lives; the resentment made it almost a political taboo even to mention further public funds for the banking problem until the autumn crisis of 1997. Footnote 9: with a further 5 billion yen for the capital of the Deposit Insurance Corporation, total public funds for the jusen problem were 685 billion yen; the section's closing sentence also gives 685 billion yen, and calls it small beside the far larger public money later put in to clean up the banks. Section 2: serious use of public funds for the banks began only in March 1998. Section 2.5: nearly every bank was exposed to the fall in land prices, since much of its lending was secured on property. Section 7, on the structural reforms banks still needed: leaning so heavily on shareholdings for part of their (Tier 2) capital meant that capital wore away quickly once share prices collapsed after the bubble. Retrieved 3 October 2026 into the lane cache and read twice.
All wording is our own. Charts are drawn from the data named under them.